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In Rwanda, the high visibility of uniformed state officials at strategic sites creates a 
misleading impression of how public order is maintained. In fact, crime prevention in 
the country’s major cities relies to a significant degree on non-state, often ostensibly 
voluntary, participation and takes place in the margins of centralized state authority. 
The Rwanda National Police (RNP) has prioritized crime prevention over 
investigation, and by partitioning the country into small self-policing neighbourhood 
communities, has created an environment resistant to micro-level violence. The 
degree to which the Rwandan government has been able to coordinate the 
participation of civilian community members in the maintenance of public order is a 
powerful manifestation of its state reach. 
 
The extent of Rwandan state reach is most striking in Gisenyi, the country’s largest 
border town, where the government has mobilised local communities to share 
information and effectively control levels of street crime despite what appear to be 
significant difficulties resulting from the town’s geographical position. Crime 
prevention in Gisenyi takes place in the context of widespread criminality 
immediately across the border in Goma, the capital of the DRC’s North Kivu Province. 
The asymmetry in the prevalence of crime is sustained despite the border itself being 
relatively frictionless, allowing both goods and people to cross with ease. I argue that 
these issues are not unrelated, and that the dialectical relationship between Goma 
and Gisenyi bolsters mechanisms that contribute to the prevention of street crime 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 An Unlikely Safety 
 
This PhD thesis offers an account of the mechanisms of crime prevention in Rwandan 
cities. Analysis centres around the Rwanda National Police (RNP), its recent history 
and everyday operations. This is extended to include the various groups involved in 
securing individual neighbourhoods, how these groups interact, and how individuals 
within them perceive their own duties.  
 
Policing in Rwanda breaks the pattern that is emerging from other African cases such 
as Nigeria (Owen 2014), Somalia (Hills 2013), Kenya (Ruteere & Pommerole, 2003) 
and South Africa (Steinberg, 2011). The Rwanda National Police (RNP) does not 
tolerate personal profiteering by its junior officers. It performs effective, country-
wide operations on a limited budget. Although the Rwandan police are ultimately 
subservient to presidential edicts, their day-to-day operations are not limited to 
protecting the regime. The RNP regularly demonstrates its autonomy, with officers 
enforcing the law over other branches of the state, including, at times, senior 
elements in the military. Within Rwanda’s internal security network, the state police 
effectively oversee non-state policing partners. 
 
This discussion of policing is intended for a wider audience than scholars of Rwanda. 
Through an ethnographic analysis of local policing in small Rwandan communities 
(based on twenty months of fieldwork), it contributes to a growing body of empirical 
material supporting the as yet embryonic theories about police in Africa. The 
materials in chapters four and five speak in particular to current debates about the 
state-society interface, about violence and public order, and about the role of non-




Gisenyi (now Rubavu1), Rwanda’s largest border town, is used as a test site in which 
to investigate strong central government capacity in the territorial margins of the 
state, areas more often associated with limited statehood. Chapter Six explores the 
borderland processes that shape not only crime itself, but also the strategies of the 
local communities and state police who deal with it. Goma (DRC) and Gisenyi 
(Rwanda) are presented as an example of paired border towns that exhibit striking 
urban asymmetries in law enforcement.  
 
Due to the sensitivities involved when researching contemporary Rwandan politics, 
it is worth being explicit about what this thesis is not. I am not attempting any kind 
of normative assessment of how well the Rwanda National Police operates as an 
institution, or else more broadly of how well the Rwandan Patriotic Front governs as 
a political party. Based on the country’s remarkably low crime rates, I take for granted 
that policing in the country is effective (see UNODC, 2016; Gallup, 2016). My concern 
is rather with how policing in Rwanda takes place: who is involved, how they interact 
at a person-to-person level, and what the implications are in terms of state reach. 
 
1.2 Research Questions and Argument 
 
This research was guided by a number of unanswered questions: 
 
(1) What makes Rwandan neighbourhoods resistant to criminal activity? How can a 
landlocked, post-genocide, rapidly urbanising territory – one that borders areas of 
intractable insecurity and presents the highest rates of economic inequality in its 
region – be ranked the safest in Africa (Gallop, 2015)?  
                                                          
 
1 The names of many Rwandan towns have recently been changed. Gisenyi is now officially called 
Rubavu, a name it shares with the district at large. Despite this, the urban centre closest to the border 
belongs to a smaller administrative sector that has kept the name Gisenyi, and residents still refer to 
the town as such. For clarity, I take Gisenyi to refer to the urban districts of the border town and 
Rubavu for wider borderland district. 
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(2) How do its mechanisms of crime prevention vary with distance from the state 
capital (Kigali), and with proximity to the international border with the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC)? 
 
In addressing these questions, I argue that there is a uniquely Rwandan mode of 
policing and public order. The country’s violent recent history, its pre-colonial past, 
its small geographical size and high population density, cultural characteristics built 
into the umuco nyarwanda (the Rwandan cultural code), and the idiosyncrasies of its 
current leadership all give rise to a context that defies straightforward comparison or 
generalisation.  
 
The first part of this thesis (Chapter Three, Four and Five) examines the institutional 
margins of the Rwandan state with respect to groups that engage in the prevention 
of street crime. I argue that the process involves less direct state intervention than 
has been implied elsewhere, particularly in critical accounts of Rwanda as a ‘police 
state’ guided by the principal logic of ethnic subjugation (Reyntjens, 2013; Thomson, 
2013; Nyamwasa et al., 2010). Whereas commercial districts, city centres and major 
crossroads in Rwanda are guarded by visible, unformed and well-armed state 
personnel, this gives a misleading impression of everyday life in small Rwandan 
communities, where the sight of a uniformed soldier or police officer is a rarity, and 
where a diverse range of actors cooperate in the pursuit of communal security. 
 
Crime prevention in Rwanda is state co-ordinated without always being state 
enacted. Since 2000, the Rwandan government has adopted a range of community 
policing initiatives that have been gradually extended across its territory. These 
initiatives have been built into local administrative structures which bridge the 
country’s state and non-state divide. At the root of this system is an administrative 
unit – the umudugudu – which is, for the majority of unlawful incidents, self-policing. 
Rwanda’s administrative structure has been adapted to pass information from the 
level of individual households to the top of its security pyramid, the Joint Operations 
Centre in Kigali. An enormous body of intelligence is filtered along the way, looking 
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for anything that appears as an existential threat to the governing elite, or indicates 
a trend towards escalating violence. 
 
The system is extremely intolerant of anonymity, and a great deal of energy is 
dedicated to neighbourhood monitoring at the umudugudu level. This requires a high 
degree of local, non-state participation, often through unpaid volunteering. I argue 
that the battle for crime prevention in Rwanda is fought in large part at the level of 
incentivising communities to actively share information. Civilians have numerous 
opportunities and incentives to cooperate with the security apparatus. This sort of 
participation is widespread and the motivations behind it are diverse.  
 
Chapter Six turns to the issue of state reach in the country’s borderlands. It asks how 
crime prevention is shaped by the border town context, and how the DRC-Rwanda 
border insulates Rwandan territory from the high levels of crime in the DRC. I argue 
that, in general, the Rwandan policing system shows a remarkable consistency as it 
extends out of the capital city into the country’s borderlands. Nevertheless, the 
presence of the international border does have important impacts on the kinds of 
community participation in crime prevention that are outlined in Chapters Four and 
Five, in part by altering the incentives for borderland residents to coordinate with 
state security. 
 
Academic literature on African border towns tends to depict them somewhat bleakly 
as unruly urban spaces, subject to limited statehood and high rates of crime. Chapter 
Six presents a number of explanations for why the opposite is true of Gisenyi. It 
argues that the location of a disorderly urban space immediately in contact with the 
other side of the border may in fact serve to make Gisenyi more secure: that the 
border town community organises itself in a unique way to share information and 





1.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
To locate these arguments in current debates, I draw on three intersecting academic 
literatures: (1) on state authority and state reach, (2) on models of policing, and (3) 
on the political governance of borderland regions in Africa.  
 
The dominant thread linking this material concerns boundaries. African states have 
traditionally been understood as disconnected from large portions of the societies 
they govern. Modern theory depicts them as the product of elite bargaining, in which 
the majority agrarian and impoverished urban populations are too often 
underrepresented, held in contempt, or actively abused by central authorities (see 
Cheeseman, 2015; Khan, 2005).  
 
At the social boundaries of the state we find the national police, ‘holding the line’ 
between state and society by enforcing the policies laid down by central authorities. 
This is no easy task, as police find themselves torn between the often contradictory 
roles of protecting governing regimes and ensuring public safety (see Potholm, 1969). 
Frequently under-resourced, they are rarely the sole actors working to maintain 
public order, and must interact across the public–private boundary with groups and 
individuals who perform similar functions without representing central government.  
 
These relationships become more complicated at the territorial boundaries of the 
state, where frontier and borderland logics shape a political arena that operates 
differently from that of the metropole. In border cities, the contest between state 
and non-state actors is often more acrimonious, producing economic subversion, 
violent disorder and modes of hybrid governance that tend to side-line local 
government officials. The following subsections provide a brief overview of the core 





State and State Reach 
 
The state has been variously defined (1) by the groups that comprise governing 
institutions, (2) by their practices and their legislative rule-making authority, or, 
somewhat differently, (3) as a non-physical arena in which political contests are 
enacted (Mann, 1984; Abrams, 1988; Migdal, 2004). This section examines a number 
of alternative understandings of the state in pursuit of conceptual clarity. 
 
Discussions of the state tend to open with Weber’s well-established definition, which 
identifies the state as a category of political organisation defined by its purpose – the 
goal of successfully monopolising legitimate violence within a territorial boundary. 
Weber’s argument speaks to an ideal-type, in which the state as a political 
organisation is elevated above the rest of society by the means of physical 
domination: 
 
A ruling organisation is one whose existence and order is continually 
safeguarded within a territorial area by the threat and application of physical 
force on the part of administrative staff. [A ruling organisation] …will be called 
a state in so far as its administrative staff upholds the claim to the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.  
Weber (1922/2013:54) 
 
Weber’s critics have emphasised shortcomings in: (1) the implied unity of governing 
political organisations (Abrams, 1988; Mann, 1984), (2) the clear-cut separation of 
those organisations from the populations that they govern (Lund, 2006a; Migdal, 
2004; Lemarchand, 1992) and (3) the practical challenges of imposing anything 
resembling a genuine monopoly over the use of force, which over-emphasises 
militaristism as a core state function (Mann, 1984; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). Perhaps 
more than elsewhere, these criticisms have found empirical support across post-
colonial Africa, where governing political bodies have faced unique challenges, and 
where the European state model has been forcibly imposed under social, 
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geographical and historical conditions quite unlike those in which it emerged (Herbst, 
2000; Lemarchand, 1992, Englebert, 2009).  
 
The Weberian definition obscures a number of state functions that, although they 
may not in themselves constitute a definitional basis of the state, have become 
intimately tied to our modern understanding of the concept. Broadly speaking, these 
can be identified as centralised goal-setting and the implementation of policy, the 
enforcement of law, the legitimation of order and the redistribution of resources 
(Abrams, 1988:11). Factoring in these functions, Lund offers a practical definition of 
statehood as “the quality of an institution being able to define and enforce 
collectively binding decisions on members of society” (Lund, 2006a:676). 
 
As a political institution, the state can be separated into (1) an idea and (2) a set of 
practices. The idea of the state, according to Migdal (2004) is that of a dominant, 
centralised and autonomous entity that controls rule-making throughout a territory. 
It represents a unified political body, governing populations either directly through 
its own agencies, or else by legitimising other groups in society to make and enforce 
rules. The idea of the state is historically transient, and has been, in Abrams’ terms, 
“projected, purveyed and variously believed in different societies at different times” 
(1988:58). 
 
This vision of the state is distinct from one that captures the routine performances of 
state actors, their internal conflicts and allegiances. The state, according to Marenin 
(1982:379), is an abstraction, one that ‘takes on life’ only when the actions of its 
individual representatives are described. Abrams terms this the ‘state system’, which 
he defines as a “palpable nexus of practice and institutional structure centred in 
government and more or less extensive, unified and dominant in any given society” 
(Abrams, 1988:58). He argues that the idea of the state is a convenient fiction, a 
‘smokescreen’ that masks the messier reality of how state agents operate. These 
practices may reinforce the idea of the state under certain conditions, while 
weakening it in others. At times they can do both simultaneously – state agents that 
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subvert central authorities may make the state real for the populations that they 
interact with, but they ultimately undermine the image of central unity. 
 
Describing states according to their practices tends to reveal a great deal of disunity, 
and has resulted in the notion of the state as a space rather than as an entity. Migdal 
(2001:15) writes: “the state is a field of power, marked by the use and threat of 
violence”. According to Mann (1984), the centralised organisation of political power 
creates an arena for political contest that, by nature of its centralisation, tends to be 
dominant – the highest tournament in the land when it comes to political authority 
and rule-making. Success in this sphere is often reflected in the international 
recognition of state-ness – membership in the international club of states that is 
conferred on political entities that claim dominance within a territory (see Englebert, 
2009). 
 
Mann argues that even where the state is regarded as a space, the centralisation of 
political authority that it prompts produces a form of autonomy (Mann, 1984:188). 
This autonomy can take two forms: (1) despotic power, which lacks routine, 
institutionalisation or negotiation with civil society groups, but reflects instead the 
raw power of a central elite over civil society, often through the threat of violent 
domination; and (2) infrastructural power, by which the state is able to penetrate 
into and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society (Ibid. 212).  
 
Behind this discussion lies the question of how far – if at all – the state can be 
separated from other social formations within its territory. Lemarchand argues 
forcibly that it cannot, attacking approaches that attempt “to treat the state-society 
boundary as a given rather than a problematic” (1992:177). He observes that 
nowhere in Africa has there ever existed a clear line of demarcation at the boundary 
of the state (Ibid.). Mitchell (1991) argues similarly that the boundaries of the state 
are ‘internally drawn’. Even a cursory examination of political institutions, he argues, 
demonstrates the significant grey area of contact between government authorities 
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and civil society groups that share in the production of public authority, what Lund 
(2006a:673) has termed ‘twilight institutions’. 
 
Overall, if the notion of the state is to be deployed at all meaningfully, it is necessary 
to accept unclear boundaries (Mitchell, 1991; 2006). The degree of statehood 
possessed by individual actors becomes increasingly ambiguous with each degree of 
separation from a nation’s governing executive body (Englebert, 2009). State-hood 
would appear to exist on a sliding scale. The further from the centre – not only moving 
down the institutional hierarchy but also moving away from state capitals – the more 
fiercely it becomes contested (see Asad, 2004). Rather than a clear public-private 
divide, the institutional boundaries of any state are almost always spread across a 
margin. ‘State reach’, in this sense, can be best regarded as the ability of central 
authorities to co-opt non-state groups, without losing the ability to define their own 
outer limits (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001). 
 
Police and Policing 
 
Police inhabit the interface between state and society, an institutional borderland in 
which they are tasked with reinforcing the state’s claims to authority (Marenin, 1982; 
Giustozzi, 2011). Francis defines the police as “state officials or persons recruited and 
trained by the state and empowered by the state to enforce the law, protect life and 
property and prevent or reduce civil disorder” (Francis, 2012:3). Frankel (1980:482) 
reduces this to the “collection of government agencies … responsible for enforcing 
the formal rules of the system”.  
 
In terms of police functions, Potholm draws a practical distinction between (1) 
regulatory activities: “the licensing of commercial enterprises, supervision of trade, 
management of prisons, protection of the currency, enforcement of exchange 
controls as well as immigration and passport inspection, border patrol and refugee 
settlement” and (2) paramilitary activities: “intelligence gathering, riot control, 
containment and eradication of local insurgency – even the detection and eradication 
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of exile groups bent on destruction in the region” (Potholm, 1969:144). There are 
three recurrent themes in the academic literature on policing (1) who polices in 
practice, (2) in whose interests do they police, and (3) how do they go about it. 
 
The social function of policing involves organised practices that maintain communal 
order: deterrence, the application of rules, the investigation of breaches, the 
confrontation of offenders and their subsequent punishment (Potholm, 1969). These 
are almost never monopolised by the social institution of the state police (Reiner, 
2010). Instead, a variety of different actors engage in policing, each with its unique 
practices, organisational cultures, capacity to use force and sources of authority 
(Marenin 2005:41). When it comes to social order, populations are confronted with 
a range of providers, and have a degree of power in legitimising and de-legitimising 
different actors, a phenomenon that Bruce Baker terms ‘multi-choice’ policing (Baker 
2008:2). He identifies a ‘bewildering variety’ of non-state policing groups “authorised 
by an array of groups besides governments” (Baker, 2004:167). When combined, 
these produce “a kaleidoscope of overlapping policing agencies that are formal and 
informal, legal and illegal, effective and inept, fair and partisan, restrained and brutal” 
(Baker, 2008:5). 
 
This approach runs the risk of loosening the definition of policing to the point where 
it becomes all encompassing, “covering everything pertaining to socialisation, 
coercion and censure” (Alemika, 2009:499). Alemika proposes a restriction of the 
term to refer solely to activities “pertaining to target hardening […] the visibility of 
policing actors and operations, surveillance, patrols, investigations, detection and 
apprehension of suspects” (Ibid.). He calls for a more rigorous typology of policing 
groups, and sets up a practical distinction between ‘customary’ policing, often built 
on kinship and family ties, and ‘territorial’ policing, which refers to civilian patrols and 
neighbourhood watch organisations. 
 
Groups that engage in territorial policing alongside state institutions include 
civil/local defence forces, private security firms, civil militias, vigilantes and religious 
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police, with each institution serving only a fraction of the population as a whole 
(Francis, 2012:18, Clapham, 1982). Crudely dividing them into public and private 
police is not especially helpful in understanding their respective roles in bringing 
about security. Instead, the relationship between different coercive agencies, the 
state and the population is continually negotiated through every day practices. The 
nature and scope of these negotiations has come to define how policing is exercised 
across much of the African continent (Pratten, 2006). 
 
Policing 'for whom' most often arises as a normative question in the field of security 
sector reform. Analysis typically concerns how best to incentivise police forces to 
better serve the public interest (Marenin, 2005). National police departments are 
assessed on a spectrum ranging from self-interest and regime protection at one end, 
to the protection of the population at large at the other (Bayley, 1971). As such, police 
practices have come to be read as a ‘litmus test’ for the degree of democratisation or 
authoritarianism of governing bodies (Francis, 2012:3). Although practical to a 
degree, this assumes that the interests of the political elite and the interests of police 
necessarily align, something that is rarely the case (see Hills, 2012). Similarly, these 
models risk simplifying the relationship between general crime control and the 
narrow protection of the elite, which need not be exclusive, especially when 
maintaining public order is regarded by governments as a source of popular 
legitimacy. 
 
In terms of their practices, African police departments have typically been reactive, 
responding selectively and in force to incidents after an initial breach has occurred. 
Reactive policing, as Alemika argues, “relies heavily on the willingness of victims to 
report their victimisation to the police” (Alemika, 2009:484). No police force can 
function properly without being visible to the population at large. Steinberg refers to 
this simply as the 'numbers game', which he considers critical in determining both 
where police authority extends and when it extends there (see Steinberg, 2008). In 
transitional and post-conflict societies, there is often very little incentive for 
individual officers to risk venturing into volatile districts hostile to their presence 
24 
 
(Francis, 2012:8). Where police lack the numbers, equipment and incentives to 
engage effectively in hostile areas, swathes of territory come to lack any state police 
enforcement whatsoever. In rural areas and townships after dark it is often “not just 
that state police are ineffective, predatory and potentially violent; they are absent” 
(Baker, 2004:165). 
 
A number of police departments have tried to combat these shortfalls with models 
of policing that privilege a generalised maintenance of public order above narrow law 
enforcement. Such models often rest on the perceived reciprocal relationship 
between environment and crime, known commonly as the ‘broken windows’ thesis 
(from Wilson & Kelling, 1982). In response to environmental stimuli suggestive of 
crime, residents modify their behaviour, avoid one another, which fragments the 
community and weakens its mechanisms for internal monitoring, or, if they have the 
resources to do so, abandon the neighbourhood altogether. Positive environmental 
stimuli have the opposite effect, encouraging greater communal interaction, raising 
the community’s intolerance of disorder and discouraging criminal behaviour (Xu et 
al. 2005; Kelling & Coles, 1997; Sampson et al., 2004). 
 
One reaction to the broken windows thesis has been for policy makers to privilege 
policing systems that emphasize local participation in the maintenance of public 
order, and to use these systems to enforce a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach to minor 
public order misdemeanours. Both ‘zero-tolerance’ and ‘community-led’ policing 
have cycled in and out of fashion in western police departments (Bullock 2013). While 
zero-tolerance is a straightforward principle - involving heavy penalties for offences 
that threaten the environmental aesthetic and internal cohesion of particular 
neighbourhoods – community policing is more difficult to pin down, and there is no 
single model. Skogan and Hartnett (1997) suggest that it has four central pillars: (1) 
the decentralisation of authority and patrol strategies; (2) a commitment to problem-
orientated policing; (3) permitting public participation in setting policing priorities; 
and (4) empowering communities through the financial sponsorship of crime 
prevention programmes. In practice, the community policing model generally 
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involves policing ‘forums’, managed by local notables who coordinate community 
patrols with formal police activities. 
 
Encouraging local participation in crime prevention tends to increase the perceived 
legitimacy of police departments through collaboration, improved information 
sharing and access to better local knowledge of the communities being policed. This 
concept has proven attractive to international donors funding African police 
departments, since active community participation is thought to lessen state capacity 
shortfalls, grant increased legitimacy to policing activities and demilitarise African 
police forces. As Brogden (2004:636) writes: “an official tide, backed by international 
human rights discourse, […] has adopted community orientated policing as an instant 
legal response to a variety of ethnic and socioeconomic conflicts”. 
 
For many policymakers, community policing represents an ideal form of interaction 
between the state and non-state groups. In practice, these relationships are rarely so 
straightforward. Benefits come at a cost, particularly where local community police 
lack oversight and abuse their positions for personal gain. In the worst cases, 
community police begin to look act as vigilantes, operating as a law unto themselves 
(Abrahams, 1998). Conservative police departments have viewed the practice with 
some suspicion, considering it ‘soft’ when compared to more traditional police 
methods, or else viewing it as the product of political and budgeting compromises 
(Klockars, 1985). Alemika (2009:493) lists the advantages and disadvantages of 
informal policing groups, with local knowledge, citizen activism and their compliment 
to stretched national police forces on the one hand, versus the non-representation 
of diverse groups, a lack of accountability, the tendency to take the law into their own 
hands and the tendency to antagonise formal state policing agencies on the other. 
 
Exporting the idea of community policing to developing countries has proven 
particularly challenging, often “running into serious difficulties […] hindered by low 
levels of professionalism of police agencies, public disrespect for law enforcement, 
lack of community organisation and other contextual factors” (Davis et. al, 2003:285). 
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A recent extended cross-case analysis by Davis, Henderson and Merrick (Ibid.) 
showed significant differences states’ capacities to implement community policing 
and similar differences in how the policy was regarded, both by officials and by the 
populations at large. 
 
Police and the Security Sector in Africa 
 
Recent discussions of policing in Africa have generally taken place in the context of 
security sector reform (Duffield, 2001; Keen, 2008).2 
 
Owing to the traditional power 
of state armed forces and the history of military coups across post-independence 
Africa, it is the military that has received most academic attention regarding the 
interplay between security and development. The police, meanwhile, are most often 
encouraged to disarm and decouple from the military, but subjected to little further 
analysis. There is, as Marenin (2005:29) writes, a paradox here, since for the bulk of 
the civilian population the police are generally the most visible branch of state 
security enforcement, with the military “standing in the background”. Positioned at 
the nexus between security and development, the police are equally capable of 
promoting peace and stability or of driving insecurity and violence, but remain, as 
Baker (2004:165) reflects, “widely perceived as indifferent, inept, inefficient and 
corrupt” across African examples. 
 
Explanations for the failure of many African police forces to serve the public good 
tend to trace the history of these institutions back to their colonial legacies. Post-
independence governments across Africa inherited a policing infrastructure that 
catered primarily to the protection of elite interests. They have since served a great 
many repressive post-independence regimes (see Reno, 1999). This situation was 
                                                          
 
2 Marenin (2005:22) provides a minimalist definition of the security sector as “agencies of coercion 
controlled by the state who are charged with the physical protection of civic society and the state […] 
as well as other agencies whose work is essential to sustain the effectiveness and accountability of the 
agencies of control”. As such, the police operate within a much larger network of institutions in the 
field of state security. 
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exacerbated by the international turn towards neo-liberal economic models in the 
1980s, which saw public spending on policing cut dramatically across the developing 
world (Marenin, 2005). Many African police forces were in effect privatised, broken 
up into smaller (sometimes rival) organisations and employed directly by individuals 
in positions of power (Francis, 2012:13-16). 
 
This is not to say that African police institutions are stuck rigidly in an authoritarian 
mode. Rather, twentieth century history highlights the flexibility and tenacity of police 
in Africa (Hills, 2000:5). International norms prescribe that any sovereign state 
authority will possess formal policing institutions, regardless of their actual practices 
(Ibid., 12). These institutions constantly shift their form to suit changes in the political 
environment, and almost no matter whether they have the capacity to enforce public 
order, police institutions persist.  
 
Overall, policing in Africa, despite its importance in debates surrounding good 
governance, liberalisation and democratisation, has been consistently under-
researched. Published works in English on policing in Francophone Africa and ex-
Belgian colonies in particular are, as Alice Hills observes, “almost non-existent” (Hills, 
2000:4). What studies do exist often stem from the grey literature of government 
organisations and international development agencies bent on ‘improving’ police 
practice on the continent. Despite the notable progress of a handful of dedicated 
researchers, the academic neglect of African policing has left a significant gap in how 
African states are understood (see Baker, 2010; Steinberg, 2008; Hills, 2000; Marenin, 




The term borderland refers to the territorial margins of individual nation states: 
spaces in contact with international boundaries. In any borderland, this border-
contact is a defining feature of local economic and political practices (see Korf & 
Raeymaekers, 2013). The study of borderlands, unlike that of borders, focuses first 
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and foremost on the communities located near states' territorial limits, rather than 
on the international relations of nation state governments (Coplan, 2012). 
 
It is worth distinguishing borderlands from frontiers, a somewhat different concept 
that can be detached altogether from the presence of an international boundary. 
Frontiers are tied instead to a teleological language of state expansion and 
modernization. Korf and Raeymaekers (2013:6) note that frontier is a term most often 
deployed by political centres to describe spaces where, “territorial and institutional 
penetration of the modern state has not (yet) been completed”. According to Kopytoff 
(1987), borderlands represent one particular 'sub-geography' of a state's frontier, 
manifesting frontier logics such as limited state capacity and the economic subversion 
of central authorities by local trading networks. 
 
Recent analysis of territorial state boundaries has been shaped above all by their 
paradoxical capacity to both divide and unite (Kopytoff, 1987; Asiwaju & Adeniyi, 
1989; Nugent & Asiwaju, 1996). Cultural and institutional differences develop over 
time and combine with regulatory discrepancies in a manner that produces significant 
cross-border imbalances. For the most part, the greater these imbalances (be they 
social, economic or geographic), the greater the opportunities they provide. Cross-
border discrepancies have been likened to potential difference in a battery, inducing 
both people and goods to flow back and forth (Jackson, 2006). The result is that 
neighbouring populations living in proximity to an international divide are often 
brought closer together by their privileged access to the ‘best of both worlds’ 
(Anderson & O'Dowd, 1999; Feyissa & Hoehne, 2010). 
 
In as much as the border is a site of opportunity, it is also a source of power (see 
Zartman, 2010; Das & Poole, 2004).
3
 The existence of a border gives rise to a variety 
of roles: border guard, customs agent, smuggler, cross-border trader and so on. 
                                                          
 
3 In this context, power is understood in the “civilisational” as well as the coercive, political and 
economic sense (Zartman, 2010:3). It is external to actors and emerges from their interrelation. 
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Between these roles, unique relationships are established that organise local power 
structures and produce networks and hierarchies in the surrounding area. This idea 
challenges an international relations model in which the ideal-type border forms a 
clean break between two political ‘like units’ (Waltz, 1979:96). A state’s controlling 
influence very rarely extends evenly to these territorial limits (Hansen & Stepputat, 
2001; Bierschenk & Sardan, 1997). Instead, modes of hybrid governance divorced 
from state control flourish around borders, and frequently emerge in competition 
with powers at the centre (Raeymaekers, 2010; see also Tilly, 1985:169-171). In 
extreme cases, the state in the borderland comes to act as just one political institution 
among many, and can be harnessed, or ‘colonised’, to serve the interests of non-state 
actors (Das & Poole, 2004). The extension of central control to these regions incurs 
extremely high costs for state authorities, and is often not a high priority for 
governments content to consolidate their authority over economic urban centres and 
capital cities (Herbst, 2000). 
 
In this manner, borderlands give rise to a ‘polyform scenario’ of local governance that, 
as Roitman (1990:695) argues, “articulates itself via the intersection of various 
agents”. Although state and non-state competition for political authority is by no 
means specific to borderlands, the empowering opportunities provided by these 
regions often exaggerate the contest. In order to interpret broader power structures, 
it becomes necessary to examine in detail the specific points of contact between the 
different political spheres (Ibid.). 
 
The empowerment of non-state brokers in African borderlands carries significant 
implications for the nature of state sovereignty. Central authorities often see 
diminishing capacity the further they are extended into territorial margins (see 
Herbst, 2000; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992; Albert & Brock, 1998). With state incapacity, 
sovereignty proliferates, undergoing a form of 'commodification' (see Englebert, 
2009; Vlassenroot, 2008). In some cases it is reduced to a crude adhesive, holding 
together otherwise unwieldy institutions simply by permitting more individuals to 
share in the benefits of a sovereign role (Englebert, 2009:99). This produces a 
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multiplicity of institutions that exercise public authority. In various forms, branches of 
public institutions interact with government-recognised 'traditional institutions' and 
other hierarchies of authority emerging from the border, making them, to varying 
degrees, state-sanctioned (Lund 2006a:685). 
 
Public authority emerges from this melting pot of political actors only as “the 
amalgamated result of the exercise of power by a variety of […] [institutions] 
conjugated with the idea of the state” (Lund, 2006a:686, author’s emphasis). As 
argued above in the discussion of state reach, it is the responsibility of the sovereign 
authority to define the political margins these groups inhabit, and countless examples 
show how destabilising the failure to do so can prove (Zeller, 2009:140, see also Asad, 
2004). Across Africa, the nature of political contest in borderland regions can easily 
turn them into the epicentres of conflict. Empowered by the economic opportunities 
of the border and emboldened by state incapacity, militant groups find themselves 
well accommodated in the borderland context (Jackson, 2006).  
 
A number of recent studies have shown borders not so much as obstacles but as 
economic resources exploited by borderland residents (Feyissa and Hoehne 2010). 
This is particularly relevant in border towns, which tend to lie on the intersections of 
well-trodden international trading routes and state boundaries. Frequently, what 
emerges in these sites is a class of transnational, informal traders (see Raeymaekers, 
2010: 581). Power and violence in borderlands tend to be intimately tied to patterns 
of trade and networks of traders. 
 
Smugglers thrive in border towns, circumventing or renegotiating economic 
regulations imposed by centralised authorities.
 
Economic activities that openly 
subvert the state can simultaneously uphold it through the implicit recognition of its 
functions and a constant interaction with its agents (see also Coplan 2012, Chalfin 
2001, Rothschild and Chazan 1988). It is quite often the case that individual state 
representatives find themselves performing seemingly contradictory roles in border 
towns. As Mathys and Büscher (2010:67) observe, “state officials guard the border, 
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but they also maintain informal trade and fraud”. In the borderland context, this 
process allows state authorities to remain relevant despite limited capacity and 
powerful rivals. 
 
To sum up, borderlands represent zones that facilitate interactions between trading 
networks (both local and trans-national), between neighbouring states, and between 
state and non-state modes of governance. Among their most defining features is their 
dynamism, as these relationships are shaped and reshaped by the constant 
interaction between inhabitants (see Newman & Paasi, 1998). Various social actors 
in borderlands come to ‘imagine and instantiate’ state sovereignty in ways that do 
not always align with the unitary, territorial logic of the central state (Chalfin, 
2001:202). Others make direct use of the legal command that sovereignty confers to 
accumulate wealth and resources (Englebert, 2009:80). Analysis of power-relations 
in these regions must account for both the plurality of different political spheres and 




This research finds its theoretical foothold in the interplay among three self-
contained bodies of academic literature: on state authority, policing practices and 
the political and economic idiosyncrasies of borderland regions. Although closely 
interrelated, these topics tend to be discussed separately by different pools of 
scholars.  
 
The political concept of the state is subject to a range of contradictory definitions. 
One disruptive challenge to models that depict the state as a unitary and autonomous 
entity is to ask where its boundaries lie – how far it extends into society and how 
uniformly it spans its delineated territory (Mann, 1984; Migdal, 2001). In doing so, it 
quickly becomes apparent that the state’s boundaries are in fact margins – spaces in 




Within these institutional margins, the ‘idea’ of the state as a centralised rule-making 
authority begins to break down. Instead, the state takes the form of practices enacted 
by a range of actors competing for political authority (Mann, 1984). Returning to 
Weber’s foundational definition, it remains the practice and legitimisation of 
violence, above all else, that defines the state’s representatives in these spaces. 
According to international norms, this form of rule-enforcement by threat of violence 
is the principal responsibility of the national police, an institution that every nation 
state in the modern era employs. But the police are never the only actors involved. 
They compete with a range of other government institutions as one part of a security 
network that can be mapped onto any given territory.  
 
Whole paradigms of police practice have centred on distributing the traditional duties 
of police departments to regular citizens, a policy known as community or 
community-led policing. This has been particularly popular in post-independence 
African states, where police departments have been plagued by underfunding and 
inadequate training, and have preyed on the populations they are intended to 
protect. The relationship between official, unformed state police and non-state 
actors engaged in policing sits at the heart of ‘state reach’ – the ability to define who, 
at the local level, is practicing violence legitimately.   
 
State reach also has a geographical dimension. Territories in contact with 
international borders tend to manifest very different political configurations from 
areas in the national metropole, due in part to the high costs incurred to states 
extending their power into their territorial margins (Herbst, 2000). One of the core 
themes of contemporary borderlands studies has been to show how international 
borders generate, in surrounding territories, modes of political authority that fiercely 
contest centralised control. This prompts one of the central questions that has guided 
this thesis: what effect, if any, does proximity to a border have on state reach, and in 






1.5 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis progresses through seven chapters: 
 
Chapter Two focuses on research methods. Research conducted between 2013 and 
2015 involved ethnographic fieldwork and a series of structured interviews. This 
chapter outlines the key methodological considerations and the challenges that arose 
during that period.  
 
Chapter Three provides an overview of literature on Rwandan politics. It identifies 
the core contemporary academic debates, particularly surrounding the RPF’s mode 
of governance. This material is used to emphasise important gaps in the state of the 
field. I show how a range of claims have been made about Rwandan government 
practices that are based on the stated intentions of the elites, but lack a more fine-
grained analysis of how the officials charged with enacting state policy carry out their 
duties, particularly in the security sector.  
 
The second part of this chapter turns to the institution of the Rwanda National Police 
(RNP) as an entry point for understanding crime prevention in Rwanda. It offers a 
brief history of policing in Rwanda, tracing changes and continuities from the pre-
colonial era to the present day. The current organisation of the institution is then laid 
out through official documents, legal material from the Rwandan parliament, and 
interview material from serving police officers. 
  
Chapter Four looks behind the RNP to establish the network of state and non-state 
groups involved in the everyday practices of crime prevention. Despite the internal 
cohesiveness of the RNP, the country is not policed exclusively by uniformed state 
representatives. This chapter makes use of empirical material gathered in the field to 
map out the activities and interactions between house guards, abanyerondo night 
patrolmen, police community liaison officers, elected heads of neighbourhoods, 
judicial police officers and district security. It also provides thick description of four 




Chapter Five builds on these empirical materials to argue that the prevention of 
urban street crime in Rwanda is achieved locally. This runs counter to persistent 
claims that law enforcement in the country is a ruthless affair, enacted by militarised 
state officials and guided by the logic of ethnic subjugation. I identify a range of 
factors that give rise to an extremely high degree of internal monitoring at the lowest 
administrative tier of Rwandan society, the village or umudugudu. I stress the 
importance of (1) the state security apparatus and its capacity for passing information 
up to government authorities at different tiers of the state hierarchy, (2) the 
organisation of small communities and the local, non-state community policing actors 
who operate in them, and (3) the intolerance of both state and non-state actors to 
social disharmony, which stems in large part from the country’s history of violence.  
 
Despite the visibility of uniformed state officials at strategic sites across Rwanda, I 
argue that the prevention of street crime is achieved locally in small neighbourhood 
communities. It takes place in what Ray Abrahams (1987:179) has termed the 
“shadows, rather than the bright lights of legitimacy and consensus”, and involves a 
network of individuals who operate in the institutional margins of centralised state 
authority. The RNP have made criminal investigation secondary to the construction 
of a general environment, partitioned into and self-contained within small 
communities, that is resistant to crime. The degree to which the Rwandan 
government has coordinated these communities in the prevention of micro-level 
violence is a powerful manifestation of state reach in the country. It relies on a 
significant degree of non-state, often ostensibly voluntary, participation.  
 
Chapter Six focuses in on Rwanda’s western borderlands to investigate policing 
practices in the geographical margins of the state. I argue that Rwandan state reach 
is at its most striking in Gisenyi, the country’s largest border town, where the 
government has mobilised local communities to share information and effectively 
control levels of street crime despite what appear to be significant difficulties arising 
from the town’s geographical position. Crime prevention in Gisenyi takes place in the 
context of widespread criminality immediately across the border in Goma, the capital 
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of the DRC’s North Kivu Province. The asymmetry in the prevalence of crime is 
sustained despite the border itself being relatively frictionless, allowing both goods 
and people to cross with ease. I argue that these issues are not unrelated, and that 
the dialectical relationship between Goma and Gisenyi bolsters mechanisms that 
contribute to the prevention of street crime on the Rwandan side of the border. 
 
Chapter Seven revisits the thesis’ core arguments and points to areas that warrant 
future research. It returns to theoretical material on state reach, policing in Africa, 
and borderland politics to show what the Rwandan case contributes to these 
discussions. It also situates my findings within the growing literature specific to 
Rwandan political processes. Finally, the conclusion considers the durability of 








CHAPTER TWO – METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Encountering Security 
 
This research aimed to observe the mechanisms of policing in Rwanda in as sharp a 
focus as possible, particularly in the country’s border towns where crime rates are 
unexpectedly low. This would be done, where possible: (1) through extended 
encounters, (2) in the local language, (3) with individuals responsible for policing.4 
 
I adopted the working assumption that understanding a social phenomenon, in this 
case public order and crime prevention, almost always benefits from first-hand 
observation. The longer researchers stay in contact with their subject matter (where 
possible in the local language), the ‘closer’ they get to it, the better they understand 
it. This holds true in spite of the possible tainting effect of the researcher’s presence 
(see Geertz 1988) and even though there are increasingly sophisticated tools for 
short-term qualitative research (see Denzin & Lincoln, 2005:24-25). Certainly there is 
a threshold after which returns diminish, but often it is not before several waves of 
assumptions have crested and subsided. Over the course of my fieldwork, although 
various methods and avenues of access were trialled and abandoned, these principles 
remained for the most part unchanged. My approach was influenced by the work of 
Das and Poole (2004) on the unique perspective that ethnographic tools can offer on 
practices that make and undo the state at its territorial and conceptual margins.  
 
Two separate disciplines shaped the direction of my research. While the subject 
matter concerns physical coercion, hierarchies of authority, and the boundaries of 
the state – very much the stuff of politics – the epistemology and certain of the 
ethnographic tools adopted are borrowed from anthropology. Although I recognise 
that situating my research between these two fields may displease purists in both 
                                                          
 
4 From early fieldwork proposals, 2011 and 2012. 
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camps, in practice I found that taking an interdisciplinary approach was better suited 
to fieldwork in Rwanda, where researchers need to be especially flexible and open to 
compromise. This section reviews the major practical and ethical considerations that 
guided my research, describes the participants and methods drawn upon, and 
justifies the sites selected. 
 
In late 2011, I proposed that between six and eight months of fieldwork would 
provide sufficient data on which to build an analysis. Looking back, this was naïve. I 
spent closer to two years in Rwanda and DRC, from July 2013 to April 2015, and have 
returned to the region on several occasions since. This extension was due in part to 
the academic mission-creep common to PhD fieldwork in any context. Answers tend 
to spawn questions and it is not always clear when enough is enough. My progress 
was also impeded in ways that reveal some of the unique difficulties faced by 




Government approval for this research was organised through the Rwandan Ministry 
of Education (MINEDUC), and required my official affiliation to both the Rwanda 
National Police (RNP) and the National University of Rwanda (NUR). The process 
involved a formidable amount of rubberstamping and paperwork, a range of 
references and not a small amount of patience. From start to finish, it took just under 
seven months. My few observations on the process are as follows: 
 
(1) The issue of research access in Rwanda has sparked heated debate in recent years. 
It is one of a number of peripheral skirmishes in an academic community divided on 
the merits and demerits of the Rwandan government (see Times Higher Education 
2014a; 2014b). I see little value in revisiting these arguments here. Research access 
is personal, and I make no claim that my experiences are typical of other researchers 
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working in the country, except to say that the process is both political5 and 
increasingly difficult. 
 
(2) Many of the procedures for gaining research permissions in Rwanda are new, and 
the bureaucrats responsible are still becoming accustomed to recent regulations (for 
the guidelines currently being implemented, see Ministerial Instructions No. 18, 
30/06/2010, Republic of Rwanda, 2010c). In the case of my application, the result 
was a number of ‘Catch 22’ situations, in which, for example, two necessary 
documents each required that the other be signed and delivered first. Although this 
was frustrating, I was not under the impression that these incidents were deliberately 
aimed at stalling applications, a common view among other prospective researchers.6 
The particular type of access I was applying for was novel, and I sensed a slight 
confusion about what the appropriate procedure might be. 
 
(3) A rigid rational-legal bureaucracy reigns over the middle and lower ranking 
officials I encountered in MINEDUC and the RNP. It was striking how binding the small 
print of official documents could be, even when this meant frustration and extra work 
for all involved. In particular, I was impressed by the degree to which junior 
bureaucrats in relatively low-status government departments were able to hold their 
ground when pressured by much more senior officials from different ministerial 
hierarchies. So long as the paperwork was on their side, they did not yield to higher 
authority. This contrasts strongly with what happens in other countries in the region, 
where bureaucratic matters tend to be negotiable and are often subject to the whims 
of the upper echelons (see also Straus & Waldorf, 2011).  During the application 
period, I gained useful insights into the relative authority of different positions within 
                                                          
 
5 In the sense that it is shaped by much more than the technical guidelines provided by MINEDUC 
(Republic of Rwanda, 2010c). Personalities (the jostling among senior government officials), 
reputations (national, institutional and personal; on the part of the researcher and of assistants and 
referees) and events (in this case anything from the publication of critical texts on similar subjects, to 
the outbreak of civil conflict in areas designated for fieldwork) all play a significant role. 
6 Informal conversations, Rwanda Research Roundtable R3, Kigali, 6 March 2014. 
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the RNP, its mechanisms of internal monitoring, and its intense stigmatisation of 
corruption.  
 
(4) Researchers working as recently as three years earlier described a significantly 
more relaxed environment in which many of them had abstained from gaining any 
official clearance whatsoever.7 This would not have been possible during the period 
that I was in Rwanda, especially not for research into sensitive subjects such as 
internal security. Tightening regulations might indicate a narrowing of the space for 
foreign research in Rwanda. A number of recent controversies have frayed the 
relationship between the government and international observers and have resulted 
in a bunker mentality in some quarters of the RPF when it comes to dealing with 
outsiders.8 Criticism of Rwandan policy in academic journals and blogs has caused 
embarrassment and indignation among members of the Rwandan elite, who are 
particularly sensitive to the manner in which negative reports shape donor opinion 
(see Hayman, 2009). The government has little incentive to welcome researchers 
when it suspects this will happen.  
 
(5) New procedures can also be seen to constitute a genuine effort on the part of the 
Rwandan government to bring research regulations in line with western standards. 
An outsider undertaking comparable research in the UK would be subject to a range 
of stringent conditions. They would be unlikely to receive anything like the degree of 
attention from senior officials that is commonly given to international researchers in 
Rwanda. In ministerial offices in Kigali, I sensed a general fatigue with researchers 
who fail to adhere to the stated boundaries of their work or else conduct research 
illegally on tourist visas. There was a marked reluctance on the part of middle ranking 
bureaucrats to take responsibility for these individuals. Gatekeepers described a long 
                                                          
 
7 Informal conversations, Rwanda Research Roundtable R3, Kigali, 6 March 2014. 
8 Discussed in further detail below on research constraints and limitations. 
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history of dealing with researchers who felt “entitled to their access […] with their 
minds already made up about what they will find”.9  
 
During the early stages of my fieldwork, Article 20 of the Ministerial Instructions 
No.003/12 (Republic of Rwanda, 2012) on Police Conduct was read to me. This states 
that revealing police professional secrets is a breach of the police code of conduct, a 
serious offence. It is worth pointing out here that there is nothing new, peculiarly 
Rwandan, or particularly unusual about a police force that is resistant to external 
observation (see Skolnick, 2002), and my research supports the observation of Reiner 
and Newburn (2000), that access is the greatest challenge in conducting research on 
state police in almost any country.  As Abrams (1988:62) writes:  
  
Any attempt to examine politically institutionalised power at close quarters is, 
in short, liable to bring to light the fact that an integral element of such power 
is the quite straightforward ability to withhold information, deny observation 
and dictate the terms of knowledge. 
Abrams (1988:62) 
 
With this in mind, I assembled a range of references before approaching the RNP.10 
In preliminary discussions, I emphasized that my investigations were first and 
foremost into the technical mechanisms of crime prevention, and not into the 
controversial politics of the current Rwandan government. The word politics almost 
always prompted a negative reaction and, like many Rwandans, I came to avoid it.11 
Similarly, I took pains to emphasise that I had no presuppositions about my findings, 
                                                          
 
9 Interview, Ministry of Education, Kigali, 14 October 2013.  
10 With hindsight I suspect that a number of these, what I thought of at the time as character 
references, were actually counter-productive, particularly as it became clear how little authority is 
carried over between parallel government institutions. 
11 I am hesitant to draw strong conclusions from this about the nature of political space in Rwanda, as 
others have (see Beswick, 2010). My experience was that discussing the ‘big politics’ of senior 
government officials (siasa wa simba, lit. politics of the lions) was considered an inappropriate topic, 
more uncomfortable than overtly dangerous. 
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something that was echoed favourably back to me. One official remarked on his past 
experience of foreign researchers: 
 
Making all the right noises [about the positive benefits of their research in 
Rwanda] … we would help them, give them everything they needed. Then they 
are going back to Europe to write all these negative reports … And not on what 
they said they were working on! And often when we just don’t agree with what 
they find at all, and when they don’t even come to discuss their findings with 
us … They bite the hand that feeds them. 
Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 29 January 2014. 
  
Researcher bias is always a risk, particularly when studying state bodies with the 
authority to practice violence. It is extremely difficult to approach them without, as 
Bayley (1971:110) argues “having, or being required to have, a point of view about 
their use”. In light of this, I framed my research as a series of unanswered questions 
about which I had no presuppositions, and submitted to MINEDUC an unedited 
version of an extended PhD research report that I had produced for SOAS in 2012. 
This later worked to my benefit. Having not censored my application, I feel no 
particular pressure to censor my findings. I was aware throughout the application 
process that my research permission could quite legitimately be denied. It was an 










I received approval letters (above) and a resident-research visa in May 2014. I was 
subsequently surprised by how little I was required to renegotiate my position.12 The 
                                                          
 
12 Gellner and Hirsch (2001:4) observe that access is not “negotiated once and then forgotten about”. 
Oddly, this was precisely my experience as far as senior officials were concerned. High ranking police 
in Rwanda are extremely busy in their formal duties. Dealing with the applications of foreign 
researchers was one of their responsibilities, passed up the chain from the middle-ranks. Once 
sanctioned, dealing with the researchers themselves became a much lower priority. 
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same process that had earlier proved a roadblock – the reluctance of low to middle-
ranking officials to take responsibility for sanctioning foreign research – now began 
to work in my favour. Officials I interviewed tended to double-check my clearance by 
phone and make photocopies of my documents for their own insurance.13 Once this 
was done, they became for the most part extremely accommodating, providing 
introductions and feedback, as well as more practical assistance with things like 
transport and office space. 
 
I was fortunate in the timing of my visit, which coincided with a public relations drive 
by the RNP.14 I was put under the direct supervision of the RNP, rather than an 
academic supervisor at the NUR (as is more common for researchers), and was in 
regular contact with a ‘focal point’ officer in the Police Department of Public Relations 
(DPR). This officer handled my queries and connected me with police posts outside 
of the RNP Headquarters in Kacyiru, Kigali.  
 
Although aware that this relationship with the police headquarters could make me 
subject to manipulation, at no point did I feel particularly compromised by the 
assistance I was provided. I supplied the lists of prospective interviewees and sites of 
research, rather than having these selected for me, and I was permitted to conduct 
my own local research in parallel with research coordinated with the RNP. In early 
discussions at the headquarters, I was encouraged to ‘go deep’, to investigate the 
sub-state practices of community policing.15 This gave rise to two separate branches 
                                                          
 
13 In discussions with people who were not state officials, I would generally only show my research 
permissions if asked, or else if I judged that they would be more likely to prompt open discussion, 
rather than stifle it or reduce it to the official government narrative. I cannot claim there was any 
particular science to these judgement calls, except to say that when they were misplaced it was clear 
almost immediately and this allowed me to learn from past mistakes.   
14 In line with the established convention that field research should give back to the communities from 
which information is gathered, a report will be produced in parallel to this thesis that condenses my 
findings to something of more practical value to the RNP. 
15 Perhaps just as an effort to get me out of the police headquarters. The officers were, as already 
noted, very busy. Either way, my research benefitted enormously from this arrangement. I had 
presumed on arrival that community policing practices would be one area that would prove especially 
difficult to access, since central authorities would have more difficulty controlling the narratives that I 
encountered. In practice they seemed unperturbed by this. 
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of field research: formal interviews with government officials at the RNP 
headquarters and sector police posts, and informal interactions at the community 
level with community policing committee members and abanyerondo night 
patrolmen.  
 
Site Selection  
 
My selection of Gisenyi as the core site of research was driven largely by curiosity. 
Before this project I had lived in the north-western border town for several months 
while researching the informal petrol trade across the Rwanda-DRC border. Having 
crossed into Goma each day, I was struck by the stark contrast between the two 
urban spaces, particularly with respect to physical security. There was no obvious 
explanation for the relative physical safety of the Rwandan border town in the face 
of the high crime rates in adjacent Goma. 
 
My initial proposal involved comparing these two border towns, Goma and Gisenyi 
on the north shore of Lake Kivu, with Bukavu and Kamembe on the south. Among 
other things, I was curious about whether cross-border asymmetries would be 
affected by geographical differences between the two pairs of towns. Whereas Goma 
and Gisenyi are contiguous across the border, Bukavu and Kamembe are separated 
by the Rusizi river. Making this comparison proved overly ambitious. For practical 
reasons, my time in the field was divided unevenly, with most of it spent in Goma and 
Gisenyi. The few weeks I spent in Bukavu and Kamembe produced supplementary 
data but not the means for a like-for-like comparison.  
 
Instead, I was able to make a more revealing comparison between the border towns 
and the capital city, Kigali. From the outset, I was concerned that confining fieldwork 
to the borderland would not allow me to distinguish policing practices specific to that 
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context from those common throughout the country.16 A control was needed 
elsewhere, and the capital city seemed the obvious choice to provide a contrast 
between centre and periphery. This was also a practical compromise, as delays in 
obtaining official research permissions confined me to Kigali for much longer than I 
originally intended. 
 
Borderland scholars advocate giving equal attention to both sides of a border during 
field research; a push-back against ‘methodological nationalism’ in which researchers 
privilege ‘their’ side (see Korf and Raeymaekers, 2013; Goodhand, 2013). Intuitively, 
a two-sided approach to borderland studies is preferable, especially where border 
regions demonstrate complex interdependence across a national boundary. 
Nevertheless, working on both sides of the border gives rise to additional challenges 
during fieldwork. First, adopting this approach means that capturing local and state 
perspectives requires a form of ‘double-vision’ in order take account of actors in both 
national territories.17 Second, two-sided research doubles the requirement for 
official permissions, something that is especially problematic where there are 
pronounced hostilities between the neighbouring states. Associating with officials on 
one side may prohibit research on the other. Third, government statistics and other 
sources of data are unlikely to be compiled in the same ways on both sides of a 
border, making accurate comparisons difficult. Finally, where different languages are 
spoken across a border, extra strain is put on researchers, especially those who 
emphasise participant observation. Researchers in Goma and Gisenyi must overcome 
all of these challenges, often within a limited period. 
 
There were also positive reasons to privilege my research on the Rwandan side of the 
border. First, a significant body of academic work already exists on urban processes 
in Goma (Büscher, 2012; 2016; Büscher & Vlassenroot, 2010; Vlassenroot & 
                                                          
 
16 This was also the subject of feedback received at both a qualitative methods course at the Peace 
Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), and a Winter School run by the African Borderlands Research 
Network (ABORNE) in St. Louis, Senegal, in April and January 2013 respectively. 
17 Willem van Schendel, comments made at SOAS Workshop on Borderland Research, 12 January 2016. 
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Raeymaekers; 2004), while much less has been written about Gisenyi (Doevenspeck, 
2011; Brenton et al. 2011). A further body of literature accounts for unruliness and 
violence in border towns generally (Korf & Raeymaekers, 2013), and explains how 
state authorities “promote their agendas, and how their advances are received, 
appropriated, and very often thwarted” (Nugent, 2012:557) within them. Goma 
exemplifies many of the processes previously investigated, whereas Gisenyi stands 
out as an exceptional case, exhibiting levels of state capacity and security that were 
not well explained by established theory. For all these reasons, it struck me that there 
was more to be uncovered on the Rwandan side of the border. Although I crossed 
repeatedly into Goma for interviews and to better understand the daily routines of 
Rwandan traders, most systematic research for this thesis was conducted in 
neighbourhoods of Gisenyi. 
 
Throughout this thesis, Gisenyi is referred to as occupying the ‘periphery’ in contrast 
with Kigali at the country’s ‘centre’. It is worth being clear about what is meant here. 
Gisenyi is not typical of Rwandan towns outside of the state capital. As such, it was 
not selected to indicate centre-periphery relations in Rwandan more generally, and 
both its strategic significance and its geographical idiosyncrasies would undermine 
attempts to do so. Instead, research in Gisenyi allows for policing mechanisms in the 
capital to be contrasted with those in a town that, on paper at least, raises some of 
the most significant challenges for public order maintenance. Gisenyi is the largest 
border town in Rwanda. Outside of the Southern Province it is among the towns set 
farthest from the state’s political centre. Its residents engage in constant economic 
exchange with those of an unruly metropolis at the heart of an unstable foreign 
province - one that is overtly hostile to the current Rwandan government. Finally, the 
city was at the epicentre of the Genocide in 1994 and the North-western Insurgency 
in 1997. If urban policing does take different forms across Rwanda, I reasoned that of 






Participants and Methods 
 
As far as possible, I adopted a perspective from inside the local police post, looking 
out, something I considered to be lacking in prior academic discussions of Rwanda.18 
In recent embedded work on rural Rwandan communities, Ingelaere (2010:41) calls 
for researchers in the country to “physically and mentally move away from the centre 
of society to adopt a bottom up perspective that captures the voices of ordinary 
people”. My intention was to attempt a middle ground, neither focusing exclusively 
on political elites, nor adopting what Abrams disapprovingly calls the “eyes down, 
palms up” approach, where researchers find themselves “studiously averting their 
eyes from the state and attending instead to its subjects” (Abrams, 1988:65).  
 
I interviewed senior officials from the RNP and the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF), 
alongside international police trainers, members of the Rwanda national reserve 
(inkeragutabara), police community liaison officers, cell administrators, members of 
the District Administrative Security Support Organ (DASSO) and officers from the 
lower ranks of the police. These interviews were conducted both inside and outside 
the police posts of Gisenyi and Rusizi Districts at the DRC border and Kigali’s three 
districts: Gasabo, Nyauregenge and Kicukiru. 
 
A second branch of research involved informal interviews at the interface between 
state and non-state policing in Rwanda. These explored the interactions among local 
residents, amarondo night patrols and community policing committees (CPCs) at the 
village level. I supplemented interview data with a combination of secondary 
academic literature, observation, local news reports, maps, government documents 
and historical materials from Rwanda’s national archives. I pursued what Gellner and 
                                                          
 
18 Capturing the police perspective is something stressed by Olly Owen (2014) in a recent doctoral 
study of the Nigerian National Police. Owen’s work has been extremely influential in my own research 
design. In Rwanda, Salas (2002) and Baker (2006) are among the only academic voices to engage 
directly with the RNP, but their studies are now over a decade old, and both have kept to a somewhat 
limiting macro-level, top down view of the institution and of crime prevention. 
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Hirsch (2001:7) term ‘methodological holism’, the notion that any observation could 
be relevant to the research topic, without falling into ‘descriptive holism’, the 
assumption that these observations must be interrelated. Throughout the writing 
process, I have found myself drawing on my observation notebooks at least as much 
as on transcribed interview material. 
 
Clearly the credibility of a study such as this depends on the scale of the research 
conducted. I should stress that raw numbers of interviews do nothing to indicate 
interview quality, which varied enormously within my data set. I conducted 74 formal 
interviews. These were pre-planned meetings in which I drew from a set of formal 
questions. I took detailed notes from a further 184 unstructured discussions. This is 
considerably fewer than the quantities of data recently produced by other 
researchers of Rwanda, some of which has involved hundreds or thousands of life-
history accounts (see Ingelaere, 2010; Clark 2014). Nevertheless, when combined 
with twenty months of observation and informal encounters, and accounting for the 
peculiar challenges that come with researching on themes of security, I consider the 
number sufficient to support the cases presented in subsequent chapters.  
 
Formal interviews with officials were conducted predominantly in English with the 
aid of a research assistant who helped reduce misunderstandings and clarified points 
in post-interview analysis. Most informal interviews took place in Congolese Swahili, 
which is spoken widely throughout Rwanda’s western borderlands and is commonly 
understood in Kigali.  
 
Over its twenty-month course, field research went through a number of phases. I 
took advantage of the initial seven-month delay while awaiting official permissions 
to study Swahili intensively – living for a time with a Congolese family and taking daily 
private tuition. Choosing to work in Swahili, rather than the indigenous Kinyarwanda, 
was a difficult decision that requires some justification. Most simply, I already had 
some proficiency in Swahili, which is a more straightforward and less idiomatic 
language than Kinyarwanda. I considered it likely that Swahili would offer a greater 
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return on the time invested, while I could make use of translators to help with the 
more difficult indigenous language. Finally, Swahili is spoken ubiquitously in 
Rwanda’s western borderlands, and is of practical use on both sides of the Rwanda-
DRC border.  
 
Until official permission was granted, I was prohibited from conducting any formal 
investigations.19 Informal inquiries and conversations during this period were, 
however, revealing. They provided invaluable material that I deployed in interviews 
later on in the research process. Over the course of these early months, I met with a 
range of international staff and conducted preliminary enquiries through them. I 
asked around for accounts of street crime and began an ‘incident’ notebook that was 
later expanded by speaking with Rwandan citizens and police. The recentness, 
severity and frequency of the crimes described proved a useful litmus test both for 
the security of particular neighbourhoods and for how aware residents were of 
criminal activities. 
 
I asked also whether people might contact me in the event or immediate aftermath 
of crimes, so that I could witness first hand the way in which they were handled. This 
approach resulted in a range of experiences recounted in the empirical chapters of 
this thesis. I attended for the most part the sites of break-ins and opportunistic theft. 
Arriving sometimes shortly after the event, I found it revealing to see the way that 
communities responded to these incidents. This provided an avenue into informal 
discussions with house guards and amarondo patrolmen, with whom I was able to 
establish some rapport early on. 
 
                                                          
 
19 The Ministry of Internal Security granted me a temporary residence visa pending the resolution of 
my application for research clearance through MINEDUC. Although the particular terms of this visa 
were somewhat ambiguous, anything resembling formal data collection was expressly forbidden. 
Several foreign researchers have had their visas revoked for breaching this regulation in recent years.  
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I began formal research in May 2014 with interviews at the RNP headquarters in 
Kacyiru and the Metropolitan police headquarters in Muhima, Kigali. These 
interviews with senior officers were guided by a selection of open-ended questions: 
 
1. Who is responsible for constructing, delivering and authorising policing in Rwanda? 
(i) How is the National Police structured internally and organised across its 
territory? 
(ii) How is police training organised and what styles of training are used? 
(iii) What measures are in place to ensure quality of service? 20 
 
2. What is the role of community and non-state policing in Rwanda? 
(i) How are communities organised to perform local policing? 
(ii) How many non-state (private/community) providers of policing are there, 
what do they do and whom do they serve? 
(iii) How are community policing initiatives adapted to different settings? 
 
3. Are the nature and scope of state policing changing in Rwanda? 
(i) What has changed and what has remained the same in Rwandan policing? 
(ii) What are the future goals of the RNP? 
 
4. How can Rwanda's exceptionally low rates of crime be best explained? 
 (i) How is crime reported? 
(ii) Are there areas of crime or regions that are particularly problematic? 
 
These preliminary interviews served several purposes. I used the responses of senior 
officials to build up a picture of the structure and operations of the RNP, and to 
                                                          
 
20 These preliminary questions draw on the recommendations of Bruce Baker in researching police 
forces (Baker, 2010). 
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determine the institution’s internal narrative on its role in Rwandan society. I adopted 
a funnelling approach, beginning with the general, open-ended lines of enquiry 
(above) and following up with increasingly specific questions as a way of safe-
guarding against information being omitted on the basis of being too obvious. These 
discussions also served to reassure ranking officials that my research emphasised the 
procedural side of the RNP and not its politics. 
 
Subsequently, through the Police Department of Public Relations, I was able to 
interview the District Police Commanders (DPCs) and District Community Liaison 
Officers (DCLOs) from Kicukiro, Nyaurugenge and Gasabo, Kigali’s three 
administrative districts. From here, I organised more local interviews at the cell level, 
starting in Nibuye cell in Kicukiro district and speaking with DASSO representatives, 
Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) and cell-level administrators. The approach was 
top-down in the sense that almost all new contacts were introduced to me by their 
senior officers in the police. This guaranteed that conversations took place, but in 
some cases officers may have told me what they assumed their superiors wanted me 
to hear. There is only so much that can be done to safeguard against data being 
tainted in this way. This problem is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
At sector police posts, I spoke with judicial officers at a range of different ranks (from 
constable to assistant superintendent). Questions varied, but the overall purpose was 
to discover the specifics of their daily routines, as well as to find out their perspectives 
on the causes of and solutions to crime at the neighbourhood level. I also asked for 
accounts of the most recent and the most notable criminal incidents that officers had 
encountered in their duties.  
 
Simultaneously, I began to organise less formal interactions with CPC members, house 
guards, heads of imidugudu and abanyerondo night patrol men in Nyarugenge 
district, Kigali. These discussions took place in Swahili. They formed a separate branch 
of my research, distinct from formal interviews, and allowed for the double-checking 
of information. Some of the most productive encounters took place while 
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accompanying night patrolmen in their work. This less formal side of my research 
focused on three main categories of sites: residential imidugudu (14), bus-stations (4) 
(with their market stalls and small shops) and university campuses (3). Dividing 
research sites in this manner allowed for easier comparison of policing in different 






2.2 Constraints and Limitations 
 
Researcher Position and Official Narratives in Rwanda 
 
My presence quite often gave rise to visible consternation on the part of interviewees 
(particularly in formal encounters). On the one hand, I carried permissions from the 
RNP headquarters in Kigali, one of the top links in Rwanda’s state security sector. On 
the other, I was an outsider asking questions about internal security, something that 
elicits a closed response from police forces in almost any context (see Skolnik, 2002; 
Reiner & Newburn, 2000), but perhaps especially in Rwanda where the suspicion of 
outsiders is entrenched in the culture (see Gourevitch, 2009; Purdeková 2011).21  
 
This tension was felt most strongly at the beginning of formal interviews, often during 
the somewhat performative readings of my references.22 I was aware that an 
interviewee’s evasiveness or openness (in essence the value of the encounter) hangs 
on first impressions, tone and the adherence or breach of the interviewee’s initial 
expectations of the foreign researcher. I doubt that dealing with these situations can 
be taught, and it is difficult to isolate and describe formal strategies. The quality of 
data I obtained through these interactions undoubtedly improved with time and 
                                                          
 
21 Foreign accounts that describe a culture as being open or closed (suspicious or welcoming) should 
be treated with scepticism. Nevertheless, certain factors suggest that foreigners face a heightened 
difficulty when attempting to integrate into Rwandan society. In the event of the early termination of 
their twenty-seven-month service, the accounts of American Peace Corps volunteers (a programme 
that encourages societal integration into rural communities), are revealing in this regard. In 2012, 
Rwanda had the highest early termination rate of all Peace Corps placements internationally (across 
sixty-three countries), despite the relative comforts of the Rwandan context compared to elsewhere 
that the organisation operates. Volunteers’ accounts point to the lingering trauma of genocide 
survivors and the complexity of the Kinyarwanda language as barriers to their societal integration, to 
the point that it made their stay unproductive or unmanageable. 
(http://files.peacecorps.gov/multimedia/pdf/policies/Peace_Corps_FY_2012_Early_Termination_Re
port_CONGRESS.pdf, accessed 12 February 2016). 
22 On most occasions I doubt that much more than the organisational insignia and signatures were 
taken in, especially when interviewees spoke no English – but the process could last several long 
minutes. Only later did I learn that stalling when examining documents is a deliberate police strategy, 
intended to gauge the reactions of suspicious persons and assert the status of the officer doing the 
examining (Informal Discussion, RNP Assistant Superintendent, Kigali, 10 December 2014). 
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practice. Effective mannerisms, turns of phrase and the use of deference and 
authority are all context specific and to a large degree learnt through experience.  
 
The pervasiveness of official government narratives in Rwanda was a more persistent 
challenge. Distinguishing whether someone is providing genuine personal responses 
or toeing the government line is at times impossible, especially on themes as sensitive 
as street crime and personal security. As Ingelaere (2010a:53) observes “the 
Rwandan system of communication was (and is) esoteric: statements reveal and 
conceal at the same time”. My own encounters supported this, and a relatively high 
proportion was of interview data was of limited value. Often what I was told 
conformed too closely to official narratives to be taken at face value. In contrast, 
individuals giving voice to strong counter-narratives sounded more genuine, but what 
they say was generally unverifiable and might have concealed a hidden agenda. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to garner credible accounts of policing in Rwanda. Given 
sufficient time and allowing for some careful filtering, the role of the researcher is to 
be as responsible as possible in identifying them. This is not an exact science, and the 
challenges serve as further justification for balancing a broad range of interviews with 
less formal interactions and an extended period of observation. 
 
Due to the nature of certain topics covered, a significant proportion of respondents 
declined to be named or recorded. The shifting political landscape has made me 
hesitant to publish names even where consent to do so was acquired two years ago. 
I recognise how credibility can suffer from a heavy reliance on anonymous interview 
material. Nevertheless, since the bulk of informants were those who engaged directly 
in the everyday maintenance of public order and not high-profile spokespersons, I 
am not sure what their names would contribute other than a small degree of 
unwanted exposure. Any contested or seemingly anecdotal evidence was 




On occasion, research participants were explicit about their own ethnicity, that of 
other members of the community or that of state representatives. Discussions with 
friends and with research assistants occasionally turned to the issue of ethnicity, 
offering a number of revealing insights into the subject. However, due to the 
sensitivities associated with Hutu and Tutsi labels in Rwanda and the restrictions 
associated with my research clearance, I was disinclined to attempt a systematic 




Throughout my fieldwork I was conscious of the fragile relationship between the 
Rwandan government, which had provided my research clearance, and the 
international donor community that, to many Rwandans, my presence represented. 
On occasion, field research was threatened by events beyond my control, particularly 
where this relationship became strained. 
 
Perhaps the most significant setback stemmed from the 2012-2013 M23 crisis in DRC, 
which came close to derailing the project entirely. The 2012 Report of the Group of 
Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo (UN, 2012) accused the Rwandan 
government of complicity in the rebel violence, seriously exacerbating tensions with 
international donors. I distanced my research as much as possible from any mention 
of the conflict, partly due to the sensitivity of the issue, partly because the crisis 
centred on one of my core research sites (Goma/Gisenyi) and the allegations against 
the Rwandan state involved the cross-border flows of arms and military personnel, 
subjects that appeared superficially close to my research topic on crime and violence 
in the borderland. 
 
The rebellion raised security concerns throughout Rwanda’s western borderlands, 
complicating research ethics and creating practical difficulties, not least heightened 
insurance costs. Not long after my arrival, mortar fire crossed the border at the petite 
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barrière23 in Gisenyi, leading the Rwandan government to temporarily evict 
international staff from the border town and to station troops there. The defeat of 
M23 in November 2013 went some way towards stabilising the security situation, 
although the site has remained politically sensitive since. 
 
In July 2013, Transparency Rwanda employee Gustave Makonene was killed in 
Gisenyi while investigating police corruption, and two RNP officers were later 
convicted of his murder. At the time, the incident provoked a hostile reaction from 
the donor community in Kigali and a lengthy critical report from Human Rights Watch 
that insinuated there had been a government conspiracy (HRW, 2014c). Rwandan 
officials, in turn, were frustrated by what they considered to be external interference 
in their own investigations, pointing to their established track record on combatting 
corruption.24 The case shone an international spotlight on the border town that gave 
rise to further critical accounts regarding disappearances in April 2014 (HRW, 2014b). 
Although I was able to distance my fieldwork from these kinds of investigations, there 
can be no doubt that they set back my research, especially in terms of gaining trust 
with the RNP. 
 
Even away from the border town, my research was punctuated by warmer and cooler 
periods in the relationship between the government of Rwanda and international 
observers. Notable controversies during my stay included allegations surrounding the 
assassination of former Rwandan intelligence chief Patrick Karegeya25 in January 
2014, a series of high-profile political arrests26 in Kigali in August 2014, allegations 
                                                          
 
23 The main pedestrian crossing between Goma and Gisenyi. 
24 Interview, Senior Police Officer, Kigali, 22 February 2014. 
25 Reuters (2014), ‘Exiled Rwandan ex-spy boss murdered in South Africa’, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-rwanda-safrica-murder-idUKBREA010E120140102, accessed 15 
February 2016. 
26 The East African (2014), ‘Former RDF boss Rusagara arrested over link to exiled opposition’, 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/Rwanda/News/Former-RDF-boss-Rusagara-arrested-over-link-to-
exiled-opposition/-/1433218/2425662/-/abendaz/-/index.html, accessed 15 February 2016. 
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surrounding the discovery of executed bodies in Lake Rweru27 in August 2014, the 
police killing of President Kagame’s former physician Dr Emmanuel Gasakure28 in 
February 2015, the arrest and subsequent release of Rwandan intelligence chief Lt 
General Karenzi Kareke29 in London in June 2015, allegations surrounding Rwandan 
military support for Burundian Tutsi refugees in Mahama Refugee Camp30 in 
December 2015 and preparations for a constitutional amendment31 to allow for the 
extension of President Kagame’s term in office, a source of lingering tension 
throughout my fieldwork which came to a head with a popular consultation on the 
matter in December 2015. The Rwandan political environment is extremely dynamic, 
and researchers conducting prolonged periods of fieldwork must be prepared to 
weather the diplomatic storms caused by events such as these. 
 
The broadcast of the controversial BBC documentary ‘Rwanda: The Untold Story’ 
(BBC, 2014) was one example from a range of publications and media releases that 
noticeably impacted my relationships with research subjects. The negative reaction 
was not confined to elite circles. In one rural umudugudu on the outskirts of Kigali, a 
local umunurondo patrolman (who spoke no English and had no way of accessing the 
documentary) asked me with a great deal of suspicion whether I was “with the 
BBC”.32 In the weeks after the original broadcast I made a habit of breaking the ice in 
conversations by stating that I was not. 
 
                                                          
 
27 Reuters (2014), ‘Burundi says 40 corpses found in Lake Rweru are Rwandans’, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-burundi-bodies-rwanda-idUSKCN0I31XB20141014, accessed 15 
February 2016. 
28 The East African (2015), ‘Rwanda probing shooting of former president’s doctor by policemen’, 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Rwanda-probing-shooting-of-former-president-s-doctor/-
/2558/2636848/-/item/0/-/b6l8cv/-/index.html, accessed 15 February 2016. 
29 Reuters (2015), ‘Rwanda calls arrest by UK of spy chief an outrage’, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-
rwanda-britain-arrest-idUKKBN0P22D320150623, accessed 15 February 2016. 
30 Reuters (2016), ‘Burundi rebels say trained by Rwandan military’, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-
burundi-rwanda-un-exclusive-idUKKCN0VD04I, accessed 15 February 2016. 
31 Reuters (2015), ‘Rwandans vote on constitution changes to let Kagame extend rule’, 
http://uk.reuters.com/news/picture/rwandans-vote-on-constitution-changes-
to?articleId=UKKBN0U10KE20151218, accessed 15 February 2016. 
32 Informal Discussion, Elderly Patrolman, Kigali, 30 November 2014. 
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2.3 Ethical Considerations 
 
All interviews were conducted with transparency, with informed consent and with 
appropriate steps being taken to avoid putting participants at risk. A large body of 
work on political processes in Africa (including Rwanda) have successfully adhered to 
a similar methodological schema, many of them offering practical advice (see 
Vaughan et al., 2013; Doevenspeck 2011). Broadly speaking, this project did not raise 
ethical concerns beyond those of established qualitative research practice. 
Nevertheless, certain peculiarities of the Rwandan case are worth outlining in more 
detail. 
 
Much has been written criticising the Rwandan government’s monitoring of foreign 
researchers (see Purdeková, 2011; Begley 2013; Leegwater, 2015:55; Sommers, 
2012:22). I cannot speak directly to these experiences other than to contribute my 
own. I was not intimidated, nor to my knowledge followed or monitored in my private 
life, by agents of the Rwandan state.33 There can be no way of knowing what went 
on behind the scenes, but only on very rare occasions was I given the impression that 
interviewees had been briefed in advance of my arrival (twice, officers brought with 
them pre-prepared notes on community policing), and only once, during the early 
phases of research, did a research assistant comment that he suspected an interview 
had been monitored by other elements of the security apparatus (maneco, or spies, 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Five).34  
 
Mechanisms of surveillance feature in the empirical content of this thesis, and I will 
reserve their description for subsequent chapters. Strictly with respect to methods, 
                                                          
 
33 Other than being subjected to the kinds of intra-community monitoring discussed in detail in 
Chapter Five. 
34 At one sector police post in Kigali, a man in plain clothes had stood in the doorway of the office in 
which I was holding interviews. Sector police had showed deference to him, and my research assistant 
later commented “If you thought that we are three [in the interview], be sure that we were four”. The 
incident was not repeated, although I would often ask the opinion of research assistants as to whether 
we were being observed.  
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it has never been clear to me how to distinguish, with assurance, organised political 
monitoring in contexts such as Rwanda from a general curiosity about wazungu 
(white foreigners) acting strangely, especially when examples of surveillance come 
down to cases of “heads snapping sideways at adjacent restaurant tables” (Sommers, 
2012:51).35 If information about my research was secretly passed on to government 
authorities I was never made aware of the fact, nor was I subject to any repercussions 
that could be traced to it.  
 
Reading the accounts of other researchers, I was conscious that interviewees and 
research assistants I worked with could be endangered by my actions (see Begley, 
2010; Leegwater, 2015; Sundaram, 2016). I made sure to consult research assistants 
regarding what they felt comfortable with, and was able to speak candidly with them. 
Among friends in the community, I enquired whether officials had followed up on my 
interviews or interrogated interviewees. I was told they had not.36 Nevertheless I took 
what I considered to be appropriate precautions. In written records, I anonymised 
my interviewees and coded my data where I considered that it might compromise 
the informant, while at the same time being upfront with the authorities as to what 




What follows offers a close-up image of public order in Rwandan cities during my stay 
there. Information was gathered with care, but is nonetheless limited in its scope. 
Accounts of local security may be biased by the prejudices of particular respondents, 
and are subject to constant re-evaluation due to the dynamism of the regulatory 
environment. Despite these limitations, however, the interactions and negotiations 
                                                          
 
35 Sommers is in fact making a similar point about the effects on a researcher of working in an 
environment where rumours of surveillance are so commonly circulated. 
36 Again, there can be no way of knowing for sure. Nevertheless, I suspect that if state representatives 
were pursuing and questioning my contacts, the broader community would have known and I would 
at some point have been made aware, particularly in Gisenyi and in cells of Kigali where I was relatively 
well-integrated into the social life of the umudugudu. 
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identified in local narratives do engage directly with ongoing debates regarding public 
order in Rwanda. They speak in particular to themes of state reach, physical coercion 
and personal security.  
 
My approach brings with it certain notable benefits. Perhaps most substantially, it 
allowed for a spectrum of opinions from both state and non-state actors regarding 
police practice in Rwanda. This was my goal from the beginning, since as a student of 
Rwandan politics it has been frustrating to consistently encounter research that 
privileged either elite accounts in Kigali or else marginal, anonymous and highly 
critical voices. My intention was to fill the gap between them, and much of the 
interview data deployed in subsequent chapters is deliberately selected as that which 
I could triangulate between the statements of police officers and the accounts of 












It has become clichéd to point out Rwanda’s contradictions. That a country whose 
recent history has been blighted by one of humanity’s worst incidents of mass killing 
exhibits some of the lowest incidence of violent crime and strongest rates of 
economic growth internationally. That while effective institutions are being built 
from the ground up, their durability is threatened by a top-heavy executive, headed 
by the controversial figure of President Paul Kagame. That the same government 
rolling out effective and original policies for combatting petty corruption, enforcing 
environmental protection, and providing universal health insurance is also repressing 
certain basic liberties of its citizens. And that many of those citizens appear 
simultaneously proud and deeply frightened of it.37  
 
These contradictions have polarised opinions about Rwandan politics. Critics of the 
government find confirmation in the President’s efforts to prolong his term in office 
beyond constitutional limits, in unfavourable annual reports from international 
agencies such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), and in the political intrigue surrounding 
high profile arrests in the country’s elite circles (see Lemarchand, 2009; Reyntjens, 
2004; HRW, 2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; Amnesty International, 2015). They accuse 
the governing political party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), of creating an 
unstable social and political environment; a pressure cooker of everyday injustice 
that will eventually explode into renewed conflict (Reyntjens, 2013; Thomson, 2013). 
Behind these criticisms lie allegations about the RPF’s military conduct during the 
                                                          
 




Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and the two Congo Wars that followed it (Lemarchand, 
2009; Stearns 2011; Prunier, 2008). 
 
Those who view the government more favourably cite impressive quantitative 
indicators of economic growth, progressive achievements in developmental policies 
and women’s rights, and more general features such as cleanliness and public order 
(World Bank, 2014; World Economic Forum, 2014). Often they make reference to the 
high level of public order in the country, and how Rwanda stands out in a region 
associated with uncontrolled urban street crime.38 The government is on track to 
meet many of the ambitious targets laid down in its national development agenda, 
‘Vision 2020’, and its second Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy, 
‘EDPRS 2’, a remarkable achievement against substantial odds (Republic of Rwanda, 
2000; 2013). 
 
Speculations and misconceptions are rife in both camps, and it seems likely that 
only in the light of future developments will we be able to fully assess the RPF’s 
approach to governance. In the short term, there is an urgent need for more 
evidence-based analysis of the day-to-day functioning of the Rwandan state. The 
country is undergoing extremely rapid social and demographic change. Without 
sustained research, discussions of its political arrangements risk descending into an 
exchange of biases that fail to align with the complex realities on the ground. 
 
                                                          
 
38 The ‘two faces’ of Rwanda have been a staple of op-ed reports in western news outlets. For recent 
examples see: The Economist (2016) ‘A Hilly Dilemma: Should Paul Kagame be backed providing 
stability and prosperity or condemned’, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-
africa/21694551-should-paul-kagame-be-backed-providing-stability-and-prosperity-or-condemned, 
accessed 10 April, 2016. The New York Times (2014) ‘Rwanda’s unfinished miracle’, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/opinion/murithi-mutiga-rwandas-unfinished-miracle, 
accessed 10 April 2016. The Washington Post (2016) ‘Is Rwanda’s authoritarian state sustainable?’, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/03/is-rwandas-authoritarian-
state-sustainable/, accessed 15 July, 2016. 
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This chapter focuses on the divisive issue of state reach in Rwanda, and on how the 
governing elite in Kigali interacts with the broad base of the population. It is intended 
to highlight an anomaly: while many of the central themes in discussions of Rwandan 
governance – political space, popular agency, government legitimacy, ethnic 
subjugation and the centralisation of political power – all turn on the theme of 
authoritarianism, there is a lack of systematic research into mechanisms of physical 
coercion. 
 
Strangely, academic researchers have not shown much interest in the how the 
country is policed. This may be partly due to the way Rwandan agencies of internal 
security have resisted being observed (see Chapter Two). The government is torn 
between the pressure to safeguard international budgetary support by 
demonstrating good governance, and to preside over a population with historical 
divisions that pose an existential threat to the governing elite.  As a result, it has been 
particularly intolerant of public criticism on issues relating to security. In spite of this, 
empirical and conjectural data on Rwandan policing are readily available. At times 
raw and unintegrated, this material nevertheless provides the basis for a more 
systematic treatment than has been attempted to date.39  
 
This chapter progresses through three main sections. The first provides a brief 
overview of academic debates on Rwandan politics and introduces elements of the 
political context that are essential to the analysis in subsequent chapters. The second 
section turns specifically to policing, and traces changes and continuities in the 
historical development of both Rwanda’s national police forces, and of non-state 
policing groups in the country. This information provides a context for the empirical 
materials in Chapters Four and Five. It also offers historical support for the argument 
that the bulk of crime prevention in Rwanda occurs in small communities, and that 
these communities are organised and policed differently in the country’s north-
western borderlands. The final section analyses crime statistics from the period 
                                                          
 
39 Frankel (1980) makes a similar case in observing the absence of systematic research into the South 
African police while political debates raged about the practices of apartheid. 
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immediately before this research was conducted. These show the prevalence of 
crime to be both extremely low throughout the country, and relatively consistent 
among districts outside of Kigali, including the country’s borderlands. 
 
The following sections are complemented by materials in Appendix 1, which provides 
institutional details about the RNP, its structure, responsibilities under Rwandan law 
and a breakdown of officer numbers by rank. 
 
Historical Timeline of the Rwandan State 
 
The timeline below lists key events in the historical development of the Rwandan 
state. They have been selected to give some chronology to specific events discussed 
throughout the course of this thesis.40 
 
1600 The Nyiginya Kingdom This period marks the beginning of the Nyiginya 
dynasty of Tutsi kings in Rwanda.41  
The Rwandan kingdom is consolidated under King 
Kigeri Ndori and mandatory military service is enforced.  
 
1800 The Rwandan Kingdom expands under King Kigeri 
Rwabugiri, making use of its efficient military 
hierarchy built around Itorero, the military regiment. 
 
                                                          
 
40 Not to offer a comprehensive history of the country. The scale of violence perpetrated across the 
Great Lakes Region at the end of the twentieth century continues to evoke personal grievances among 
commentators. The result is that almost every line of Rwanda’s history has been contested. While it is 
worth being sensitive to divided opinions, some historical context needs to be established in order to 
discuss how the country is policed. Information in this section is drawn from what are widely regarded 
as the more mainstream academic accounts: Prunier (1995), Lemarchand (2009), Gourevitch (1996), 
Mamdani (2001), and for material from the colonial and pre-colonial periods, Chrétien (2000), Vansina 
(2005) Newbury (1995) and Rusagara (2009). 
41 Oral accounts suggest that the period of centralised political authority in the Rwandan region may 




1884/5 Colonisation Rwandan territory is made a German protectorate and 
is later designated part of German East Africa. 
 
1916 Belgian forces drive German administrators out of 
Ruanda-Urundi (now Rwanda and Burundi) during the 
First World War.  
Belgian officials take over the colonial administration, 
deploying the Force Publique as its primary 
enforcement arm. 
 
1923 Official Belgian colonial rule is instituted by League of 
Nations mandate. 
This period sees the formal entrenchment of pre-
existing Hutu, Tutsi and Twa ethnic identities through 
the issuing of state identity cards.  
 
1946 Rwanda-Urundi becomes a UN trustee state under 
Belgian administration. 
 
1957 PARMEHUTU, an opposition political party 
representing the country’s Hutu majority, is 
established by Grégoire Kayibanda.  
 
1959 A Hutu rebellion forces up to 150,000 Tutsi to flee the 
county, creating a large Rwandan diaspora in 
neighbouring states, particularly Uganda. 
1961     The Rwandan monarchy is abolished. 
 




1963 Tutsi refugees from Burundi (the “Inyenzi”) launch 
guerrilla attacks against Rwanda, sparking a violent 
anti-Tutsi backlash that kills up to 20,000.  
 
1972 The Tutsi-led government of Burundi is complicit in 
the massacre of an estimated 100,000 Burundian 
Hutu.  
 
1973    The Second Republic Rwandan President Gregoire Kayibanda is overthrown 
by the Army Chief of Staff Juvenal Habyarimana.  
Tutsi are purged from senior government positions and 
universities in Rwanda, creating a second diaspora, 
with many Tutsi resettling in Europe.   
 
1986 President Milton Obote is overthrown in Uganda and 
replaced by Yoweri Museveni with the help of the 
Rwandan Tutsi diaspora in the country. 
 
1990 Rwandan Tutsi break from the Ugandan Defence 
Forces and form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). 
The RPF launches an invasion of Rwanda. 
Paul Kagame takes over the RPF leadership following 
the death of his predecessor, Fred Rwigwema. 
 
1991 The RPF reaches the outskirts of Kigali, but is unable to 
capture the city. 
Peace negotiations are launched in Arusha between 
the government of Rwanda and the RPF. 
 
1993 The newly elected Hutu President Ndadye of Burundi 
is assassinated, sparking civil war in that country. 
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The Burundian Tutsi population is targeted in a series 
of mass killings that provoke a violent backlash from 
the Tutsi military against the Hutu population. 
Estimated death tolls range into the hundreds of 
thousands. 
 
1994 – Genocide against the Tutsi42 
 
Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundian 
President Ntaryamira are assassinated on returning 
from signing the Arusha Accords. 
The genocide beings on 6 April and lasts for three 
months from April to August.  
The Hutu youth militia Interahamwe and the Forces 
Armées Rwandaises (FAR) kill over 800,000 people, 
beginning in Kigali and spreading across the whole of 
Rwanda. They target in particular ethnic Tutsi, although 
many Hutu and Twa are killed in the massacres. 
The RPF and the FAR return to the conflict, and after 
three months of fighting the RPF successfully captures 
Kigali on 4 July. 
French forces declare a demilitarised zone across the 
South of Rwanda which lasts from 22 June to 22 August. 
Over two million predominantly ethnic Hutu flee 
Rwanda fearing reprisal attacks by the RPF, many 
across the Zairian border. 
                                                          
 
42 The official name given to the 100 days of massacres across Rwanda that principally targeted ethnic 
Tutsi populations from April to August 1994 by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
henceforth ‘the Rwandan genocide’ or ‘the 1994 genocide’. 
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The RPF establishes a new government, with Pasteur 
Bizimungu (a Hutu politician from Gisenyi) as President 
and Paul Kagame as Vice-President. 
 
1995 Eastern Zaire is increasingly destabilised by large 
Rwandan refugee populations. 
Rwandan Ex-FAR officers leading Interahamwe 
militiamen begin to launch attacks back into Rwandan 
territory from militarised camps around Bukavu and 
Goma.  
 
1996 Congolese rebel militias backed by Rwandan forces 
attack Goma and break up its three refugee camps 
Mugunga, Kibumba, and Katale.  
Over one million Rwandan refugees, predominantly 
Hutu, return to Rwanda.  
 
1997 – The North-Western Insurgency and The First Congo War 
 
After months of infiltration and periodic attacks, Ex-
FAR officers and remnants of the Interahamwe militia 
launch an insurgency in the North-West of Rwanda.  
RPF counter-insurgency is effective, and the rebels are 
quickly supressed and forced back into Zaire. 
Government policies of villagisation and the promotion 
of local self-defence groups are first trialled in Gisenyi 
prefecture as part of the counter-insurgency efforts.  
Rwandan troops support the Alliance des Forces 
Démocratiques pour la liberation du Congo-Zaire 
(AFDL) militia in Zaire and topple President Mobutu’s 
government. This sparks the First Congo War.  
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Zaire is renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), and the AFDL leader Laurent Kabila is made 
President. 
 
1998 – The Second Congo War 
 
Hostilities develop between Congolese President Kabila 
and the RPF concerning the lingering security threats 
posed to Rwanda by elements of the previous 
Habyarimana regime at large in DRC’s Kivu Provinces.  
Rwanda begins openly sponsoring the anti-government 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) 
rebels in DRC, who take control of the city of Goma. 
This triggers the Second Congo War, 1998-2002. 
 
2000 – The Kagame Administration 
 
President Bizimungu resigns and is replaced by the 
Vice-President and ex-RPF military commander Paul 
Kagame. 
Remnants of the FAR and the Interahamwe consolidate 
into the Forces Démocratique de Libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR). 
The Rwanda National Police (RNP) is established. 
 
2001 Congolese President Laurent Kabila is assassinated 
and replaced in office by his son, Joseph Kabila. 
 
2002 A peace deal is signed between Presidents Kabila and 
Kagame, temporarily stabilising relations between the 




2003 Kagame is elected President and the RPF party wins a 
landslide majority (40 of 53) in the country’s first 
multiparty parliamentary elections. 
 
2005 The Gacaca process begins. Between 2005 and 2012 
local courts mediate on almost two million genocide 
cases. 
 
2006 Cycles of violence persist in the border region 
between Rwanda and the DRC.  
 
2008 The FDLR clashes with remnants of the RCD under the 
new name Congrès National pour la Défense du 
People (CNDP). 
The RPF coalition wins a second landslide majority (42 
of 53 seats) in multi-party parliamentary elections.  
 
2009 The Rwandan government is accused of supporting 
the CNDP as a military proxy to fight the FDLR.  
A peace deal in reached in early 2009 and the CNDP 
leader Laurent Nkunda is arrested in Rwanda. 
 
2010    President Kagame wins a second term in office. 
 
2012    The Gacaca process of genocide tribunals ends. 
Remnants of the CNDP form a new militia, M23, and 
the Rwandan government is accused of providing it 
with financial and military support. 
M23 achieves early military success against the 





2013 International sanctions are imposed on the RPF for its 
alleged role in supporting Congolese rebels. 
The RPF coalition wins a third landslide majority (41 of 
53 seats) in multi-party parliamentary elections.  
The rebel group M23 is defeated militarily in late 2013. 
 
Rwanda Districts Map 
 
Map 1. Rwanda Districts Map 
 






A Contested Field of Study 
 
The manner of Rwanda’s transition from destitution in 1994 to a poster child of 
African development twenty years later has been fiercely contested. RPF policies on 
land redistribution, internal and external security, transitional justice, rural poverty, 
inter-ethnic reconciliation, and media control have all been flashpoints in debates 
about the intentions and alleged abuses of the country’s political elite (Booth & 
Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Clark, 2010; Ingelaere, 2010a; Reyntjens, 2013). Allegations 
of atrocities committed during the 1996-2003 Congo Wars continue to be levelled 
against the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF), making for a tense context in which to 
discuss the RPF’s political governance.43 These tensions are intensified by the fact 
that much recent analysis of Rwanda as a country has become inseparable from 
judgements about the personal character of its sitting president, who has divided the 
opinion of external observers in academic and diplomatic circles.44 Outside Rwanda, 
a significant proportion of the discussion boils down to narratives that are broadly for 
or against the figure of Paul Kagame. 
 
The polarisation of opinion and the fixation on the president have given rise to 
significant thematic gaps in our understanding of the Rwandan state. In particular, 
scant research has been conducted into the practical mechanisms through which the 
RPF governs a country that exhibits many features normally associated with 
instability and popular dissent.45 The sections below identify some of the more 
prominent academic contributions to debates about the country’s governance. They 
focus in particular on how the policies established by the Rwandan elite are enacted 
at the local level. These discussions provide a broader political context to the analysis 
                                                          
 
43 For a detailed summary of the cycles of Rwandan intervention in DRC, see African Arguments (2012) 
‘Rwanda in Congo, sixteen years of intervention’, http://africanarguments.org/2012/07/09/rwanda-
in-congo-sixteen-years-of-intervention-by-william-macpherson/, accessed 15 January 2016. 
44 See, for example, New York Times (2013) ‘The global elite’s favorite strongman’, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/magazine/paul-kagame-rwanda.html, accessed 16 July 2016; 
Foreign Affairs (2014) ‘Rebooting Rwanda’, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/interviews/2014-04-
01/rebooting-rwanda, accessed 12 June 2016. 
45 These include land shortages, violent instability in neighbouring states, ethnic divisions, minority 
rule, a history of repressive colonial governance and the legacy of mass intra-communal violence. 
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of policing in subsequent chapters. They also reveal how far academic debates on 
Rwandan governance have progressed with almost no explicit mention of the 




Statistical data on Rwanda’s economy and demography set it apart from other African 
states. The country represents the fourth smallest and the single most densely 
populated territory on the continent. Although it is ranked the world’s eighteenth 
poorest country according to GDP per capita, its GDP growth rate has held 
consistently in the top twenty internationally since 2000 (World Bank, 2014). Per 
capita flows of international aid to the country are extremely high. Table 1 provides 
demographic and economic details for the period of research. 
 
Table 1. Rwanda Country Information, 2014. 
Demographic and Economic Details46  
  
Population 11,241,500 
Landmass 26,340 km2 
Population density 459.7 per km2 
Population growth 2.35 per cent per year 
Population rural 8,183,900 (72.8 per cent) 
Population urban 3,157,600 (27.2 per cent) 
Population Kigali (capital) 1,257,000 
GDP $7.8902 billion USD 
GDP growth 6.96 per cent  
GDP/capita $695.69 USD 
Poverty gap at national poverty line47  
(World Bank, 2010) 
14.8 per cent 
Aid flows 1.034 billion USD per year 
Life expectancy 63.97 years 
Labor force 5.6591 million (53.95 per cent) 
Armed forces personnel 35,000 (ratio 1:321) 
Police personnel (RNP, 2013) 10,562 (ratio 1:1064) 
                                                          
 
46 From the World Bank (2014) databases, unless stated otherwise. 
47 The poverty gap index shows average depth of poverty below the national poverty line. 
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3.2 Politics in Rwanda – Between Elite Policy and Local Agency 
 
It is difficult to imagine a grimmer starting point for a fledgling government than that 
which faced the RPF in late 1994 (see Lemarchand, 1995; Gourevitch, 1996). Roughly 
ten per cent of the country’s population had been killed between April and August. 
Another twenty per cent had fled, seeking protection in the overcrowded refugee 
camps of neighbouring countries (Uvin, 2001). Communication and transport 
infrastructure across Rwanda were heavily damaged, and the seasonal food crop that 
should have been harvested during the April rains was mostly unsalvageable, 
sparking a risk of famine. In Kigali, the government ministries and financial 
institutions that survived the siege of the city had been looted of everything down to 
their lightbulbs and copper wiring (Gourevitch, 1996). 
 
Having occupied Rwanda, the RPF set up local cadres as a means of re-establishing 
political control. The process was not without violence, as pockets of resistance 
emerged in the north-west region, which had been the stronghold of the departing 
Habyarimana government.48 The rebels-turned-government made a heavy use of 
force in asserting their control. Suspected anti-RPF forces, as well as Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA)49 troops caught enacting revenge killings against the Hutu 
population were publicly executed (Binet, 2004). A high degree of centralised control 
was quickly established, and has been maintained by the RPF since.  
 
Whereas the discussions of other African states tend to focus on their weakness (see 
Zartman, 1995; Allen, 1995; Cheeseman, 2015), the strength of the Rwandan 
government raises a different set of questions. Writing on state reach in Rwanda, 
                                                          
 
48 The southern prefecture around Butare also saw a degree of anti-government resistance, after 
French forces handed over control of zones that they had declared demilitarised during their 
peacekeeping intervention in August 1994. This prompted government backlashes, most notoriously 
at the Kibeho camp for internally displaced persons, south-west of Butare. Elements in the camp 
resisted the RPF takeover, resulting in a massacre by government forces in January 1995 (Binet, 2004). 
Unrest in the south has not been as persistent as in the northern borderland regions of the country, 
however. 
49 The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) was separated from the political branch of the RPF following the 
capture of Kigali. It was renamed the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) in 2002. 
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Purdeková asks: “What are the different apparatuses through which the central 
power reaches people [in Rwanda] and how thick are they?” (2011:476). Responding 
to the same issue, scholars critical of the current government have suggested that 
the RPF’s approach remains crudely repressive and militaristic. Reyntjens, for 
example, writes:  
 
Political and social spaces were closed off, and political competition was non-
existent or manipulated; massacres, disappearances and intimidation forced 
Rwandans into submission or silence, and those bold enough to express 
dissident opinions were very rare. 
Reyntjens (2013:121) 
 
Similar analysis can be found in the work of Rafti (2008), who speaks of a destabilising 
‘armed peace’ in Rwanda, and Thomson (2011; 2013), who suggests that a high 
degree of popular unrest simmers beneath the appearance of widespread support 
for the government, and that many communities consider the RPF’s programmes of 
national unity to be unjust. Both Thomson (2013) and Reyntjens (2013) argue that 
Rwanda’s current political arrangements constitute a form of structural violence 
(from Galtung, 1969), a system that represses the peasant Hutu population and “will 
eventually lead to political instability and new conflict” (Reyntjens, 2013:13). 
 
Few observers would dispute that democratic political governance in Rwanda is 
subordinate to security issues (see Hayman, 2009). Nevertheless, more recent 
commentators have moderated the tone of critique. Rather than highlighting the 
repressive side of the regime, they have focused attention on the more technical side 
of governance, in particular the degree to which the RPF has consolidated itself as a 
political institution despite its internal divisions. Key issues they raise concern (1) the 
contrast between the centralisation of political control in Kigali and the decentralised 
state administrative apparatus (Straus & Waldorf, 2011; Chemouni, 2014; Ansoms, 
2009) (2) the RPF’s tight control over political space, and over the construction and 
discussion of political and ethnic identities (Beswick, 2010; Hintjens, 2008) and (3) 
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the RPF’s ability to draw in large flows of official development assistance that are 
attached to relatively few political conditions (Curtis, 2015; Hayman, 2008).  
 
State Administrative Hierarchy 
 
The RPF (in coalition with several smaller parties) controls a dominating majority of 
close to eighty per cent of seats in the Rwandan House of Deputies. It has won by a 
similar margin in three consecutive elections (2003, 2008 and 2013), and has 
projected its power through a tiered system of local government. The territory has 
been subdivided as follows: 
 
Table 2. Administrative Decentralisation in Rwanda, 2006. 
Administrative Unit50 Kinyarwanda Number in Rwanda 
Province intara, pl. intara 5 
District akarere, pl. uturere 30 
Sector umurenge, pl. imirenge 416 
Cell akagari, pl. utagari 2,150 
Village umudugudu, pl. 
imidugudu 
14,953 
Source: Ministry of Local Government (MINILOC). 
 
The village (umudugudu, pl. imidugudu) is not specific to rural areas, but refers to 
clusters of fifty to one hundred and fifty households across the country, including 
within urban centres. To avoid confusion with rural villages, I use either the 
Kinyarwanda term, or ‘neighbourhoods’ from here on. 
 
Rwanda’s decentralised administrative structure provides an efficient political 
apparatus for implementing central government policy. This structure extends down 
to clusters of between fifty and one hundred and fifty households. Although not an 
official branch of local government, these clusters elect representatives who are put 
                                                          
 
50 This structure has remained consistent since the decentralisation policy of 2006, although the 
particular numbers at each tier have been adjusted slightly since. The numbers here are taken from 
the period 2013-2014. 
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in contact with higher authorities and made responsible for information gathering 
and mobilisation at the grass roots level. Just above the umudugudu, the cell 
represents a hub where information is compiled and government edicts are 
distributed to groupings of between five and ten imidugugu. Executive decisions take 
place at the sector level, which has a greater role in delivering services. Executive 
secretaries at the sector level are government appointed, rather than elected locally, 
and tend to have a dominant voice in local politics and administration (Ingelaere, 
2014:215).  
 
Above the sector level, district offices form the headquarters of local government. 
These districts hold a significant degree of financial and legal independence from 
central government authorities in Kigali, particularly regarding economic 
development, agriculture, tourism and small enterprise. From the district level down, 
local government in Rwanda dispenses more than twenty-five per cent of the 
domestic budget and employs over half of the state’s public bureaucrats (Chemouni, 
2014). Nevertheless, the central government maintains a substantial role in political 
affairs at this level. District administration tends to be technocratic, tightly 
monitored, and depoliticised (Ibid.). Purdeková (2011) labels the arrangement as one 
of ‘decentralised disempowerment’, and points to the close parallels between the 
official administrative structure of Rwanda and the political hierarchy of the RPF. In 
her words: “decentralisation amounts to a mere dispatching of control making 
central power more, not less, effective” (Ibid. 2011:475). While decentralisation in 
Rwanda provides an apparatus for the local implementation of top-down state policy, 
it also aids the RPF’s intelligence gathering. Party cadres form horizontal tiers 
connected to the vertical administrative ‘pole’, and are said to engage in constant 
political surveillance of the general population (Ibid. 487).  
 
At the very top of the administrative hierarchy, the office of the President holds a 
dominant position. Its word, and that of President Kagame in particular, tends to be 
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final.51 Openly dissident voices at the highest level have not been tolerated, and a 
long list of ranking party members have been jailed or forced into exile for 
contradicting the party line (Hayman, 2009; Reyntjens, 2013; HRW, 2014a). Despite 
this executive dominance, divisions have nonetheless emerged both around policy 
(land rights have been a consistent source of internal tensions) and personality (often 
in the form of disputes between senior party members and the President) (see 
Nyamwasa et al. 2010).  
 
There is a danger here of assuming that the RPF’s means of imposing internal 
discipline at the highest level of the party are indicative of more general strategies of 
control that are applied to the population at large. Political space – the critical, public 
engagement of non-government actors with government policy – may be tightly 
managed by the RPF, but the mechanisms by which this is achieved are still poorly 
understood, particularly where they operate outside the elite circles of the capital 
city (Beswick, 2010:225). One of these mechanisms can be seen in Rwanda’s system 
of performance contracts (imihigo). These include lists of targets that are encouraged 
by certain ad lib awards and enforced through fines, personal salary deductions or 
the loss of formal employment. Imihigo exist at every tier up from individual 
households to government ministries. These targets constitute a centrally organised 
attempt, in Ansoms’ words “… to transform Rwanda into a target driven society from 
the highest to the lowest level” (2009:289). Performance contracts have not been 
without controversy, prompting a number of high-profile cases of false reporting, as 
well as accusations of state over-reach (Ingelaere, 2014). They have also promoted a 
high degree of physical mobilisation, as local authorities are incentivised to draw on 
whatever labour force is available in order to meet their targets. By marshalling the 
Rwandan peasant population to conduct chores on behalf of the state, they use up 
                                                          
 
51 The President’s Office has been prone to micro-management on issues that fall unambiguously into 
the remit of local administrators. One recent example can be seen in the President’s personal 
intervention to impose a traffic-free zone in central Kigali, see The New Times (2016), ‘Car free road 
extended’,http://ktpress.rw/2016/07/kigali-car-free-zone-extended-to-kbc-more-roads-
permanently-closed/ accessed 27 July 2016. 
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time and energy that might otherwise be put into subsistence farming (Ingelaere, 
2014, Purdeková, 2011). 
 
A second mechanism can be seen in umuganda, a community cleaning programme 
that takes place on the final Saturday of each month, officially between the hours of 
8:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m and is compulsory for Rwandans between the ages of 
eighteen and sixty-five. Communal work varies in nature, but often includes some 
element of manual labour, building, repairing local infrastructure or cleaning. The 
practice is not without controversy, and has been regarded as a drain on the time of 
many Rwandans living hand to mouth (see Ingelaere, 2010). 
 
Where the RPF has incorporated other sections of society into implementing policy, 
it has maintained close to absolute control over how those policies are made, enacted 
and enforced (see Beswick, 2010; Chemouni, 2014; Purdeková, 2011; Ansoms, 2009). 
Even where new arrangements appear to open up political space and give voice to 
local actors, in practice they tend to entrench state power. Ansoms (2009) writes in 
detail on the disconnect between the visions of an urban elite in Kigali who draft 
national agricultural policy and the peasant farmers on whom the policies are 
imposed. She points to the inefficiency of an urban, agriculturally illiterate minority 
managing the activities of some seven million peasant farmers, and highlights the 
unhelpful view of certain government representatives that rural poverty is the result 
of “the wrong peasant mentality” (Ansoms, 2009:298). Ingelaere (2010; 2014) finds 
a similar arrangement with respect to transitional justice under the Gacaca system, 
whereby the government’s language of popular ownership serves as a convenient 
cover for its effective control of the process.52 Lending weight to these arguments is 
the fact that the making of public policy in Rwanda has been characterised by secrecy, 
                                                          
 
52 Although Ingelaere’s claims about the degree of popular agency in Gacaca proceedings have been 
disputed (see Clark, 2014), there appears nevertheless to be a strong theme emerging in the literature 
on Rwandan development – where RPF policy encourages local participation, this almost always 
directly serves the stated aims of the party, which retains the capacity to reassert complete dominance 
over whatever domain may have been decentralised (see Purdekova, 2011; Chemouni, 2014; Booth & 
Golooba-Mutebi, 2012).  
81 
 
something that has encouraged distrust and the spreading of rumours about the 
government’s real intentions (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012:384).  
 
These legitimate concerns aside, analysts determined to expose authoritarian state 
practices in Rwanda ignore the pockets of agency that exist at the different tiers in 
the country’s hierarchical administrative structures. Criticisms of this nature have a 
tendency, in Clark’s terms, to “state, rather than show, the specific ways in which 
power is distributed from the centre to the periphery” (2014:208). Ingelaere 
(2010:273) describes a “dialectic of state reach and over-reach” in Rwanda, in which 
mechanisms do exist to correct problematic policies, albeit after their 
implementation. Recent changes to both the Ndi umunurwanda, officially a 
reconciliation policy, but one that has been accused of publicly shaming Hutu 
communities, and the Nyakatsi scheme, a programme to abolish thatched roofing 
which proved insupportably costly for many Rwandan farmers, can be viewed as 
examples of the RPF altering its stance in the face of popular resistance (Sommers, 
2012; Ingelaere, 2014; Reyntjens, 2013).  
 
Overall, the extension of political control outwards from authorities in Kigali is 
inevitably a complex affair. Research at different levels of analysis, or over different 
periods, can produce wholly different explanations for political events and 
behaviours. Analysts who focus narrowly on revealing aspects of the government’s 
character – negative or positive – and those guided by overtly political or normative 





Overseas Development Assistance 
 
Overseas development assistance has promoted Rwanda’s economic recovery, 
helped consolidate the RPF’s rule, and established Kigali as a hub for domestic and 
international elites (Goodfellow & Smith, 2013:3193). The amount of foreign money 
flowing into the country has been used by critics to account for developmental 
successes, which were made possible – they argue – not by efficient government 
implementation, but simply owing to the financial resources made available to the 
RPF (Reyntjens, 2004; Lemarchand, 2007). Over forty per cent of the national budget 
is made up of foreign aid (World Bank, 2014). 
 
There can be little doubt that the country has received markedly more foreign aid 
owing to the events of 1994 (Uvin, 2001; Reyntjens, 2004; Curtis, 2015). Debates 
persist about the degree to which the government has manipulated international 
guilt. Critics argue that the RPF has cynically deployed ‘genocide credit’ to resist 
conditions being imposed on aid that would interfere with some of its more 
authoritarian modes of its governance (see, for example, Reyntjens, 2013). 
 
A struggle continues to play out between donors pressing for influence over the 
political direction of the RPF on the one hand, and government ministries reliant on 
budgetary support but resistant to external influence on the other (see Uvin, 2001; 
Hayman, 2008). The situation is typical of similar negotiations that take place across 
the developing world, except perhaps that the RPF shows a greater ability than many 
states to stand its ground and maintains significant control over developmental 
projects and expenditure (Hayman, 2009). 
 
It is worth noting that over the course of the RPF’s leadership, donor programmes 
have become increasingly guided by the prevailing ‘good governance’ agenda (Collier 
& Hoeffler, 2005). In response, part of the government’s strategy has been to 
cultivate an aesthetic of progress, even where the lived experiences of Rwandans 
may lag behind the statistics (Ingelaere, 2010; Sommers, 2012). Ansoms, for example, 
refers to ‘cosmetic upgrading’ and ‘imposed modernity’, regarding RPF practices 
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based on improving appearances without addressing the needs of the country’s 
poorest citizens (Ansoms, 2009:304). This is largely a technical question for 
developmental specialists interested in ensuring that the impacts of any individual 
project align with the indicators used in monitoring and evaluation. But it has been 
complicated by the government’s active interference in the scientific construction of 
knowledge about Rwanda, a persistent methodological challenge for researchers 
working in the country (Ingelaere, 2010:41).  
 
Ethnic and National Identities 
 
Since 1994, the public portrayal of ethnic identities in Rwanda have been 
reconstructed into a form less explicitly confrontational between Hutu and Tutsi, 
while less threatening to the elite Tutsi minority (see Hintjens, 2008). This has 
involved controversial legislation prohibiting the open discussion of ethnic 
categories, particularly anything resembling political mobilisation based on them. 
Critics have labelled the government’s approach as one of ‘enforced amnesia’ 
(Lemarchand, 1999), which they see as a strategy deployed to disguise the 
‘tutsification’ of senior government offices (Reyntjens, 2013). More positively, these 
policies have undeniably made a practical contribution to quietening overt 
discussions of inter-ethnic rivalry in the country, at least for the time being. 
 
At the same time as legislating on ethnic divisionism, the RPF has deployed a range 
of historical, pre-twentieth century cultural practices as sources of national unity. 
Policies from umuganda, a monthly mandatory community service, to imihigo 
performance contracts and the gacaca genocide trials, have been implemented in a 
manner designed to invoke Rwanda’s pre-colonial history.53 The official government 
narrative is relatively straightforward: the twentieth century, marred by colonial rule 
                                                          
 
53 The name umuganda is taken from a traditional Rwandan practice of mutual support when an 
individual requires help with a challenging task. Imihigo refers to the traditional Rwandan vow of 
bravery. Gacaca is a corruption of the Kinyarwanda word umucaca, the name of traditional outdoor 




and inter-ethnic conflict, was an aberration. Rwanda’s true identity can be found in 
the eight hundred years of political organisation predating the German and Belgian 
administrations. New RPF policies are intended as reminders of that common 
heritage, even where they resemble ‘invented traditions’ (see Hobbsbawm & Ranger, 
1983) that transparently serve the interests of a political elite which is struggling to 
its assert common ancestry with the broad base of the population. The social impacts 
of umuganda in particular are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
 
There can be no question that the Rwandan population remains deeply divided. 
However, the crude categorisation of the Hutu as a repressed majority and the Tutsi 
as a dominating minority fails to capture the country’s more nuanced social 
cleavages. These include a regional north-south divide, entrenched by the rival 
historical strongholds of the Kayibanda and Habyarimana administrations, as well as 
important distinctions within the ethnic Tutsi population: the Abasope who remained 
in Rwanda during the genocide, the Abasaija who returned from Uganda, the 
Abajepe, returnees from Burundi and the Dubai, Tutsi from DRC, as well as other Tutsi 
populations returning to Rwanda from Europe and North America.54 Viewing 
Rwandan politics exclusively through the lens of Hutu – Tutsi divisions oversimplifies 
a complex social environment, and raises serious challenges for researchers, since 
the open discussion of these topics is not permitted in the country. 
  
                                                          
 
54 Informal Discussion, Research Assistant, Kigali, 18 June 2014. 
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3.3 Policing Rwanda 
 
The following sections revisit Rwanda’s political trajectory through the lens of 
policing, crime, and public order. Police behaviour offers insight into broader patterns 
of state practice, government ethos, and the quality of political life (Bayley, 1971). 
Police both reinforce the idea of the state in the popular consciousness, and 
represent the ‘nexus point’ between the state and the people. Individual police 
officers are some of the most influential agents of political socialisation. Their 
demeanour affects popular attitudes not only towards themselves, but also towards 
the law, the government, and political authority in general (Marenin 1982; Bayley, 
1971). 
 
The 1994 genocide has been treated as a blank slate moment in Rwandan history, 
after which new institutions and practices were built ‘from the ground up’ or ‘out of 
the ashes’ (Gourevitch, 1996; Baker, 2006). Considering the damage done to the 
country and the near complete removal of the Habyarimana administration, this 
account has some intuitive value. It has appealed to observers eager to depict 
subsequent government policies as being unique to the RPF, whether they view them 
favourably or unfavourably. 
 
The blank slate image does not hold up well on closer inspection, however, and 
notable historical continuities can be found in almost all fields of Rwandan 
governance. I argue that policing is no exception to this. Although significant changes 
have been made in the training, appearance, and operations of the Rwanda National 
Police as compared to its pre-genocide predecessors, broader features of the policing 
system in Rwanda – both state and non-state elements – have shown a striking 
persistence over time, particularly in terms of their structure and the manner of their 
control. 
 
The sections below focus on social organisation at the local level in Rwanda, the 
function of the police at this level, and the role of centralised political authorities in 
coordinating them. They show how certain technologies of information gathering 
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that have become central to modern crime prevention in Rwanda grew out of 
developments in the north-western borderland regions around Gisenyi. 
 
Table 3. Timeline of Policing Institutions in Rwanda 
Period Official Policing Actors 
Pre-Colonial Period 
~ 1600 – 1890  
Ingabo z’u Rwanda (Rwandan Military) 
 
Early Belgian Colonial Period 
1916 – 1949 
Force Publique 
Late Belgian Colonial Period 










1974 – 1994 
Gendarmerie Nationale 









Local Defence Units 
2000 – Present 
President Kagame 
Rwanda National Police 
Local Defence Units (1997 – 2014) 
DASSO (2014 –)  




Oral histories55 indicate a period of centralised political organisation in Rwanda that 
stretches back almost a thousand years (Vansina, 2005). These accounts spotlight the 
Ingabo z’u Rwanda, the Rwandan military, as an institution that served as the 
cornerstone of early Rwandan society (Muzungu, 2003; Rusagara, 2009). The 
Kingdom’s durability and its reputation as a dominant military force in the region 
                                                          
 
55 Often in the form of poems, locally ibisigo. 
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from the seventeenth century onwards remain sources of national pride for many 
Rwandans.56 
 
Historical accounts stress the intricacy of the Rwandan Kingdom’s societal structure 
and its relationship with the nation’s military hierarchy, particularly under the 
Nyiginya dynasty of Tutsi kings (Vansina, 2005). At the lowest level was the nuclear 
family (urugo), the country’s basic social unit. These supported small protection units 
of young men within a particular age bracket (Rusagara, 2009:41). Above the nuclear 
family was a much broader family unit (inzu), which could include several hundred 
individuals through extended familial and marital ties. The inzu was often associated 
with a particular hill of origin (umusozi, pl. ibisozi), and broadly overlapped with a 
lineage (umuryango) that contained other families who were related through marital 
ties dating back several generations: 
 
Table 4. Social Hierarchy under the Rwandan Kingdom, Nyinginya dynasty 





Extended family Inzu 
Nuclear family Urugo 
 
Each of these tiers was represented by a leader (umutware), who served under the 
Rwandan King (umwami). According to Rusagara, the hierarchical construction of 
leadership in ancient Rwandan society paralleled modern military ranks: 
 
                                                          
 
56 In local accounts, the name ‘Rwanda’ is thought to originate from a corruption of the verb ku-andaa, 
to grow or expand, linking military conquest to the kingdom’s very identity (Informal discussion, Kigali, 
14 December 2014; see also Rusagara, 2009).  
57 Although broadly speaking hierarchical, the divisions between the different tiers listed here are not 
clear-cut. There is significant overlap between, for example, the regional level and the clan unit (see 
Newbury, 1980).   
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The section commander, therefore, coincides with the head of the nuclear 
family, the platoon commander with the extended family head, the company 




Under the Nyiginya dynasty – a period of military expansion beginning in the 
seventeenth century – every Rwandan man was required to be part of a military 
regiment (itorero). Individuals went through five to six years of training in martial arts 
and civic values.58 When not fighting with the national army, they were responsible 
for keeping the homesteads and livestock of their extended family safe. 
 
Early Rwandan society was moderated by a code of ethics known as imiziro, the 
policing of which was a communal activity. The police and the military, as understood 
in terms of contemporary institutions, were not distinguished. Mugambage writes 
that the national army had two main functions: “it acted as the King’s army, charged 
with defence [and] it ensured social harmony and adherence to social norms by 
arresting social deviants” (Mugambage, 2005:48). Rusagara (2009) likens the system 
to a single cell organism, in which the Rwandan elite represented the nucleus, while 
the population (the plasma in his analogy) produced a protective membrane: the 
military ingabo. It was onto this social structure that new external enforcement 




The surrender of the Rwandan monarchy to German forces in 1890 fractured the 
societal structure of the country. Some regional and lineage leaders (abatware) 
disputed the monarch’s decision to capitulate. Although the broad structure and 
ethical code of Rwandan society endured, the ingabo became divided and reverted 
                                                          
 
58 The same word, itorero, is used for the military training schools of the period. 
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to self-protection units at the level of the extended family (Des Forges, 2011). 
Following the defeat of the German administration in 1916, Belgian colonial 
authorities continued the German practice of administrative decentralisation. In 
1926 the country was split into nine territories: Nyanza, Astrida, Shangugu/Kibungu, 
Ruhengeri, Biumba, Kibuye, Gitarama, Kigali and Kisenyi. Each territory was divided 
into chiefdoms (chefferies) and sub-chiefdoms (sous-chefferies), run by co-opted 
traditional authorities, often lineage leaders from the pre-colonial system. Each sub-
chiefdom included named hilltops that housed particular extended families. 
 
Table 5. Structure of Belgian colonial administration, 1926 - 1963. 
Belgian Colonial Administrative Unit Number across Rwanda 
Administrative District: Ruanda-Urundi 1 
Territories 9 
Chiefdoms (chefferies) 45 
Sub-chiefdoms (sous-chefferies) 565 
Hilltop Communities59 (collines) N/A 
 
For internal security, the Belgian authorities deployed the Force Publique, the first 
organisation in the country’s history that resembled a dedicated police force. 
Although a relatively small group in raw numbers (an estimated 250 corporals and 
privates in 1925, led by three Belgian officers and four non-commissioned officers), 
the Force Publique developed a reputation for arbitrary brutality and was widely 
feared (see Rusagara, 2009). The rank and file of the Force Publique were never 
recruited from Rwanda or Burundi, and were drawn instead from the Belgian Congo. 
This gave rise to a language barrier, as the force spoke Swahili or Lingala while the 
population they oversaw would speak Kinyarwanda or Kirundi. Local issues could only 
be poorly communicated to the force, who made use of indiscriminate violence in 
quelling popular dissent. The system was predicated on hostility between the police 
and the community. There was little attempt at partnership in solving local problems. 
This was typical of other arrangements across the continent at the time (see Alemika, 
2009). 
                                                          
 




The Rwandan population endured this arrangement for over thirty years, until 
popular dissatisfaction with the Force Publique was identified as a threat to the 
nation’s stability (Des Forges, 2011). The response of the governing Belgian Resident 
was to divide the duties of the Force Publique, which was maintained for the military 
purpose of territorial defence while policing the civilian population was turned over 
to a new institution, the Police Territoriale on 12 February 1949. The Police 
Territoriale was commanded by Belgian officers and headquartered in Usumbura 
(now Bujumbura). It managed a force of recruits drawn from across the Ruanda-
Urundi territory. The Police Territoriale was responsible for policing public order 
infractions including road safety, night patrols, the protection of livestock and the 
arrest of “criminals and vagrants including drunks, drug users, the mentally sick, 
beggars, vandals and idlers” (RNP, 2014:23). 
 
By 1960, Rwanda’s police force numbered 446 officers, divided between 
headquarters in each of the country’s nine territories. Respective to the population, 
these numbers were very low. To give an example, the Police Territoriale force in 
Astrida was comprised of between fifty and one hundred officers throughout the 
1950s, while a census shows that the territory housed over seventy-thousand adult 
men during the same period. The Police Territoriale did not carry firearms, and 
complained of difficulties in apprehending suspects. When it came to actual law 
enforcement, the Police Territoriale relied heavily on pre-emption and surveillance. 
Part of their job was to report incidents of “military deserters, escaped prisoners, or 
anyone found carrying dangerous weapons […] and subversive documents” (RNP, 
2014:23).  
 
Although commanding more popular support than the Force Publique, the Police 
Territoriale continued to prioritise protecting the regime over ensuring public 
security. In cases where criminal activities or popular unrest risked overwhelming 
local police authorities, the new territorial police had recourse to the Force Publique, 
which in serious cases could employ its notoriously violent unit, Maintien et 






Immediately following independence, despite some Rwandan officers being 
promoted to commanding positions within the Police Territoriale, ethnic Tutsi were 
actively excluded from the police force. Many Tutsi officers already in the Police 
Territoriale at the time of independence pushed to remain in the central 
headquarters in Usumbura (Burundi), as interethnic violence drove tens of thousands 
of Tutsi out of Rwanda. As a result, Rwanda’s police force was drawn predominantly 
from Hutu populations in the country’s southern provinces, the stronghold of the 
new President Grégoire Kayibanda. 
 
When the Belgian Congo became independent in 1960, a large contingent of the 
Rwandan Force Publique rebelled against the departing Belgian authorities. They 
secured the right to return to the Congolese territories from which they had originally 
been recruited. The result was an overall restructuring of the enforcement agencies 
in Rwanda, with the Force Publique replaced by a new, locally recruited Garde 
Nationale. The Police Territoriale was rebranded as the Police Nationale and placed 
under the Ministry of the Interior. A recruitment and training centre was established 
in Ruhengeri and the police force expanded significantly under the First Rwandan 
Republic (1959 – 1973).  
 
In 1963, the nine sub-national territories became prefectures administered by 
Préfets, each controlling a number of so-called communes, run by a local 
Bourgmestre. These communes, which elected their own councillors and 
Bourgmestres, became the core administrative unit of the country, and enjoyed a 
high degree of financial and administrative autonomy (World Bank, 1987). Each 
commune was allowed to establish its own police force, a Police Communale, to 












Prefecture Council (appointed) Préfet 
(appointed) 
10 
Sub-Prefecture  Sous-Préfet 
(appointed) 
22 
Commune Council (elected) Bourgmestre60 143 
Sector Committee (elected) Councellor 
(elected) 
Approx. 10 per 
commune.61 
Cellule  Responsable 
(elected) 
Approx. 10 per 
Cellule. 
Nyumba Kumi 






In 1973, Kayibanda was removed from office by his Military Chief of Staff, Juvénal 
Habyarimana. In the early years of the Habyarimana administration, the so-called 
‘Second Republic’, the Garde Nationale and the Police Nationale were replaced by 
the Forces Armées Rwandaise and the Gendarmerie Nationale respectively. The 
President’s preference was for internal security to be managed by Rwandans from 
his stronghold in the north of the country (northerners, or abakiga). Habyarimana 
harboured a personal suspicion of the police force, which was disproportionately 
staffed by southerners (abanyenduga) thought to be sympathetic to the old 
Kayibanda regime. The early years of the Second Republic coincided with a low-level 
insurgency in the country’s southern prefectures, made up of Tutsi ‘Inyenzi’ fighters 
from across the Burundian border. Interethnic tensions became heightened, and the 
more ethnically integrated southern police units were side-lined in favour of soldiers 
and paramilitary police recruited from the northern areas around Gisenyi and 
Ruhengeri. 
 
                                                          
 
60 The Bourgmestre position went from being elected under the Kayibanda administration, to 
appointed under President Habyarimana. 
61 Numbers vary significant over the period 1963 – 1994 due to population grown and displacement. 
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The new Rwandan paramilitary Gendarmerie was modelled on the contemporary 
French Gendarmerie. It held a dual mandate of maintaining law and order and 
defending the national territory, and worked under the remit of the Ministry of 
Defence (RNP, 2014:48). A specialist branch, the Police Judiciale, was set up to run 
criminal investigations in conjunction with civilian inspectors who worked out of the 
Ministry of Justice. All branches of the police were characterised by a high degree of 
politicisation in terms of recruitment, deployment and the promotion of senior 
officers. For the most part, the regime favoured Hutu from the country’s northern 
prefectures. 
 
Although the general administrative structure of the First Republic was maintained, 
the 1973 coup saw a marked re-centralisation of power, with a dominant executive 
branch in the Office of the President. In a relatively subtle but significant change, the 
Bourgmestre position at the head of each commune went from being locally elected 
to being appointed by the Ministry of the Interior. As a result, the Bourgmestres 
became exceptionally powerful in local politics, and were granted a broad spectrum 
of personal powers for so long as they carried out the government’s core policies. 
Among the communities they administered, Bourgmestres were referred to as 
abategetsi, or absolute rulers, rather than by the more sympathetic ‘abatware’ used 
traditionally for community leaders. Local police units often found themselves 
serving as the enforcement arm of these individuals, who would delegate duties, 
sometimes in the service of personal interests (RNP, 2014:46). 
 
Through increased control over the local Bourgmestres, the Habyarimana regime 
could coordinate the operations of the Police Communale more closely. These local 
police monitored the lower administrative tiers of the country, down to the Nyumba 
Kumi, (lit. ‘ten households’) – an unofficial administrative tier echoing the Inzu 
extended family unit of the pre-colonial era. The Second Republic saw the increasing 
politicisation of Rwanda’s administrative hierarchy. Cadres for Habyarimana’s MRND 
Party were built into the commune and sector levels. Aside from resolving local 
disputes, the Police Communale were involved primarily in surveillance, acting as 
94 
 
“antenna for the gendarmerie”, particularly regarding political dissent (RNP, 
2014:45).  
 
The RPF invasion of northern Rwanda in 1990 saw a blurring of boundaries between 
different enforcement institutions. The Gendarmerie Nationale took on a more direct 
combat role on the front lines around Ruhengeri, while the FAR began to perform 
functions previously assigned to the police, such as conducting weapons searches in 
private homes. The country’s major cities were fortified during this period, and a 
specialist unit of the Gendarmerie Nationale, the Groupe Mobile, was deployed to 
Kigali and charged with securing key government facilities and strategic points 
throughout the city. It controlled access to the major thoroughfare roads throughout 
the capital, patrolling crossroads and setting up roadblocks. The unit quickly 
developed a reputation for brutality and extortion, which it justified in the name of 
anti-insurgency and the hunt for Tutsi RPF infiltrators (ibyitso).  
 
As the war continued into 1992, the extremist Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi 
militias grew out of the Hutu youth movement of the MRND party. Their activities 
precipitated a deterioration in the everyday functions of the Police Communale, who 
became side-lined by the more numerous and often more violent militiamen. Local 
power struggles pitted commune Bourgmeisters against local militia leaders, while 
secteur administrators and police representatives were either unable or unwilling to 
prevent the arbitrary abuses of the Interahamwe. In 1994, all branches of Rwanda’s 
security forces were complicit in the planning and execution of the Genocide Against 
the Tutsi (Prunier, 1995). Across the territory they either deliberately coordinated 
and armed local Interahamwe cadres to commit massacres, or else lost control of 
them altogether. 
 
Post-Genocide Policing and Reconstruction 
  
In post-conflict environments, police are often called upon to do the impossible: 
simultaneously reassert the state’s control of violence while protecting the 
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population at large (Potholm, 1969:140; Francis, 2012:9).62 The scale and the 
intimacy of the violence perpetrated in 1994 sets Rwanda apart from other post-
conflict states. Many of the killings more closely resembled individual murders than 
impersonal ‘battle-deaths’, and private grievances flourished in the devastated local 
communities that survived the genocide. Popular expectations of the government’s 
role in security, law and order were almost entirely eroded by the time the RPF took 
over control, while many among the population were terrified about how the new 
government might act (Prunier, 1995). 
 
Policing in the post-genocide era can be split into distinct stages.63 Immediately 
following the genocide, policing was one part of a concerted effort by the RPF to 
restore some baseline of public order. In 1996 there followed a crisis brought about 
by returning Hutu refugees, which precipitated the North-Western Insurgency in the 
late 1990s. The early 2000s saw a range of new challenges associated with rapid 
urbanisation, particularly in Kigali. More recently, terrorist grenade attacks in Kigali, 
Gisenyi and Rusizi have forced a rethinking of security at the country’s strategic 
hotspots. Contemporary challenges tend to be associated with (1) a growth of 
‘intellectual crimes’, in particular fraud and money laundering, (2) competition for 
work in the informal sector, compounded by youth unemployment, and (3) conflicts 
over land use and ownership.64  
 
Early Days, 1994-1996 
 
First we had the problem of retaliation – both revenge attacks or people killing 
to destroy the evidence against them. We had to disarm the population, and 
try to get between these people [to] pacify them.  
Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 20 January 2015  
                                                          
 
62 For a detailed analysis of the nuances involved in restoring policing systems in post-conflict 
environments, see Marenin (2005) ‘Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations’. 
63 Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 20 January 2015 




After the fall of Kigali, remnants of the Habyarimana regime fled across the border 
into Zaire. They left behind very little by way of police personnel or equipment for 
the incoming RPF. The new government selected Colonel Deogratias Ndibwami, a 
senior officer in the pre-genocide Gendermerie Nationale, as the first Chief of Staff of 
the new force. For personnel, it drew on elements of the RPF that had experience in 
maintaining public order in northern Rwanda during the ceasefire of July 1992 – April 
1994 to build a new National Gendarmerie. Due to conditions in the Arusha Peace 
Accords, some preparation and training had already been undertaken for officers in 
the RPF to join the Rwandan police force. UN policing staff undertook further training. 
The first batch of officers they trained graduated November 1994, raising the 
strength of the force to nine hundred (UNDP 1995). These recruits joined an 
organisation that lacked functioning police stations, vehicles, or basic office 
equipment, from chairs to pens and paper, all of which had to be borrowed from 
other fledgling government agencies (RNP, 2014:80). A UNDP report from the time 
states that the Gendarmerie lacked “even the minimum basic material resources 
required to fulfil its tasks, and that funding for its successful rehabilitation […] cannot, 
at the present time, be made available by the government of Rwanda” (UNDP, 1995). 
  
In these circumstances, the new government recruited a police force at the commune 
level, on the model of the Police Communale. This force required less formal training 
and expensive equipment than the Gendermerie, but could provide information to 
better direct its operations. A recruitment drive was pushed forward across all 140 
communes. Funding was eventually obtained for a Communal Police through 
donations from the Japanese, Dutch and UK governments, as well as from the UNDP. 
The first function of the new force was to open genocide cases and compile lists of 
suspects from the communities in which they worked. One of the main challenges for 
government authorities was to prevent genocide perpetrators from joining the new 
force. 
 
There is relatively little information available on Rwanda’s internal security between 
late 1994 and 1995. The bulk of international attention at the time was focused on 
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the refugee crisis across the border in Zaire. At the same time, the RPF was trying to 
re-establish a baseline of social order in Rwanda without compromising its 
international reputation. Critical accounts emerged nonetheless, including a detailed 
report from Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (Binet, 2004), which throws a spotlight 
on inhumane prison conditions (notably in the Gitarama detention centre) and the 
massacre at Kibeho refugee camp on 22 April 1995. The report claims that MSF teams 
witnessed: “abuses and brutalities committed by the administration and armed 
forces, particularly against displaced persons and the hundreds of thousands of 
detainees crammed into prisons” (Ibid. 2004:9). Rwandans themselves tend to be 
reticent to talk about the period, which was characterised by fear, post-genocide 
trauma and a wave of opportunistic, violent crime. 
 
Collecting evidence and arresting individuals suspected of involvement in the 1994 
massacres was an enormous undertaking, hampered by the limited capacity of the 
new police force. Murder rates spiked markedly in 1995 and 1996.65 This can be 
attributed to the twin threats of revenge killings and desire to remove potential 
witnesses to genocide crimes. Commune branches of the Gendarmerie were 
inundated with accusations made by citizens against other members of the 
community. These needed to be investigated even when they turned out to be 
baseless (a denouncement process known locally as gutunga agatoki, lit. ‘pointing 
fingers’). 
 
To compound these problems, the genocide and its aftermath spread small-arms 
across the Rwandan countryside. These had been distributed from military barracks 
under the departing Habyarimana regime, either for self-protection or to actively 
resist the new RPF authorities (Binet, 2004). The police dedicated a significant 
amount of energy to collecting army issue rifles and grenades, a process that involved 
regular and unannounced searches of private properties (RNP, 2014).  
 
                                                          
 
65 Interview, Theos Badege, Head of RNP Criminal Investigations Department, Kigali, 2 March 2015. 
98 
 
Borderland Policing and the North-Western Insurgency, 1996-1998 
 
From 1995, the ousted FAR coordinated with the remnants of the Interahamwe and 
began to launch systematic attacks into Rwandan territory from refugee camps in 
Zaire. In 1996 and 1997, waves of returning refugees included armed groups intent 
on resisting the RPF. They infiltrated communities in the borderland region around 
Gisenyi and began preparing for civil war in the Northern Prefecture. In the early 
months of 1997, this developed into a full-scale insurgency (African Rights, 1998). 
Although the fighting was relatively short-lived, peaking in May of 1997 and subsiding 
by the end of the year, it was significant both in asserting the RPF’s control of security 
and in trialling its new security protocol. Senior officers in the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army at the time claim the insurgency posed an existential threat to the state 
authorities, in which communal police were explicitly targeted by insurgents (RNP, 
2014:85): 
 
It is a little-known fact, but [the RPA] lost more soldiers fighting that 
insurgency than during the liberation of Kigali in 1994. If we lost the fight 
there, we knew we could lose the whole countryside … and this [was] not a 
war that can be won easily. That was Habyarimana’s home, and we were not 
welcome there. We had to convince the people that we could bring them 
security and the opposition could not. […] Without their support we could not 
win. 
Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 20 January 2015 
 
At the start it was like we were blind, we could not see into the towns and 
villages. We had no information. 
Interview, Retired Gendermerie Officer, Kigali, 25 January 2015 
 
The military tried to use its force but it was impossible. That fight was only 
won by what the people told us. 




The civil conflict and the return of large, predominantly Hutu, refugee populations 
across the border from the DRC in 1996-1998 put strain on security arrangements, 
particularly in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri (now Musanze), the largest towns in north-
western Rwanda. Over six thousand civilians died in massacres attributed to both the 
opposition and to government forces, while some six hundred thousand were 
displaced during the conflict (Amnesty International, 1997). The killing of several 
hundred civilians, allegedly by RPA soldiers at Mohoko market in Kanama, Gisenyi 
Prefecture on 8 August 1997, remains seared into the popular consciousness in 
Gisenyi, where Kanama has become a by-word for government abuses.66 
 
Alongside the political violence of the insurgency, both opportunistic street crime and 
more organised crime linked to drug trafficking and cattle theft, took hold in the 
region (African Rights, 1998). As a result, small communities formed self-protection 
groups. Volunteers organised rotas to perform night shifts. Young men were assigned 
a number of night patrols per month to keep watch over properties and livestock. 
The practice was encouraged by prefecture administrators in the North-West.  
 
We were fighting more than the opposition and the old regime. Th[e] road 
that comes from Kisoro [Uganda] through Ruhengeri and to Gisenyi has 
always been a big route for smugglers. Many drugs and weapons are passing 
through that way. When we fought the opposition, we were disrupting these 
criminals, and they would fight us.  
Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 20 January 2015   
 
As the violence of the insurgency subsided, so did incentives to volunteer as 
abanyerondo. Individuals began making excuses to shirk their unpaid duties. To fill 
the gap, the government expanded Local Defence Units (LDUs) in 1998. These 
operated out of offices at what is now the district level and were identifiable by their 
distinctive red uniforms. LDUs trained personnel in Rwanda’s lowest administrative 
                                                          
 
66 Informal discussion, Rubavu District, 16 November 2014. 
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tiers, especially in more remote parts of the country. Training included the handling 
of weapons, and many LDUs carried firearms. 
 
In a region in which low-grade insurgency has often proved intractable, with ‘bush 
wars’ dragging on for years or decades, the suppression of the North-Western 
Insurgency in Rwanda stands out as a short and successful military campaign. 
Although violence has persisted in the Kivu provinces of the DRC, the conflict was 
effectively expelled from northern Rwanda in 1997 and has not spilled back across 
the border since. The counter-insurgency strategies used in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi 
displayed many of the hall-marks of contemporary policing in Rwanda. Policies 
trialled during the insurgency have since been rolled out to the country as a whole. 
Most significantly, counter-insurgency efforts saw the first systematic enforcement 
of villagisation, in which scattered homesteads were uprooted and concentrated first 
into camps and then smaller hilltop clusters that were maintained after the fighting 
had ended. At the time of its implementation, the aim of this policy was to “isolate, 
identify and disarm” rural communities around Gisenyi and Ruhengeri.67  
 
Villagisation was the first step in a series of government policies focused on 
encouraging the local production of intelligence. It produced an apparatus that was 
later adapted to crime prevention more generally. The policy is one of the more 
striking examples of large-scale social engineering in the country’s history, and is not 
without controversy (Ansoms, 2009:302). It coincided with the government 
coordination of locally organised night patrols (amarondo) and the expansion of 
LDUs. Prunier (2008:336) commends the informal policing networks set up by the RPF 
during this period, which he considers to have played an impressive role in 
maintaining public order. As the deputy chief of staff in the RPA, who would later 
become the first Inspector General of the Rwanda National Police, remarked: 
 
                                                          
 
67 Interview, RDF Senior Officer, Kigali, 20 January 2015 
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Efforts by the community greatly complemented the work of the security 
forces, for it would have required a large number of security forces and 
resources to deal with the situation. The success in ending the insurgency in 
the north-west attests to the effectiveness of community based approaches. 
Mugambage (2005:54) 
 
Overall, the late 1990s through to the early 2000s saw Rwanda’s north-western 
borderland acting as a site of additional challenges and of new innovations regarding 
the national policing system. The impact on present day arrangements in the region 
are discussed in depth in Chapter Six. 
 
Urban Policing and its Challenges 
 
This city is always moving. If you let it, it can lose you. 
Interview, Rogers Rutikanga, RNP Kigali Metropolitan Police Commander, 8 October, 2014 
 
In the years following the genocide, Kigali was repopulated in several successive 
waves. First came returning ‘old case load’ refugees, predominantly ethnic Tutsi, 
populations that had fled the anti-Tutsi massacres in 1958 or during the anti-Inyenzi 
crack downs in the 1970s. Two years later saw the return of ‘new case load’ Hutu 
refugees who had fled the country in 1994. Individuals in both groups laid claims to 
properties, giving rise to a crisis of ownership that heightened inter-ethnic tensions 
in the city.  
 
In 1997, as the security situation in the north of the country deteriorated, refugees 
flooded into Kigali’s outer townships, further complicating policing arrangements as 
the security forces became concerned about the possibility of infiltration by anti-
government insurgents. Many people had been attracted to the city’s rapidly growing 
informal settlements where they could achieve a degree of personal anonymity that 
was impossible in the countryside. These individuals placed added stress on the 
fledgling RPF police forces, which were tasked with managing disputes between 
genocide survivors, old-caseload returnees, new-caseload returnees (those who had 
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fled the country during the 1990-1991 civil war and 1994 Genocide) and suspected 
genocide perpetrators. 
 
More recent years have seen a dramatic rise in rural-urban migration, as well as rapid 
population growth in the capital. Goodfellow (2014:311) observes that growth rates 
in urban populations across the country grew by five hundred per cent between 1990 
and 2014, compounding at a rate of almost ten per cent per year. The police have a 
particular concern about second generation rural-urban migrants, whom they see as 
particularly prone to criminal behaviour: 
 
Today we have a new generation on the streets. The city made them. They are 
vijana – teenagers, maybe they are twenty years [old] now. They did not see 
the war and they do not share the traditional code of people who come in from 
the villages […] keeping control over them is one of our biggest challenges. 
Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 20 January 2015 
 
As social units, urban neighbourhoods operate differently from rural hilltops, 
particularly in terms of the anonymity afforded to local residents. As Hills writes: 
“cities lack the traditional control mechanisms of rural areas; it is relatively easy for 
people to find anonymity in bigger cities; and tarmac roads make it easy for robbers 
in fast cars to enter and exit.” (Hills, 2008:218). In Kigali, the fresh challenges brought 
about by expanding informal settlements have been complicated by a series of recent 
terrorist attacks linked to violent opposition groups in the DRC. Between 2008 and 
2013 the government has recorded twenty-eight grenade attacks in the city. 
Seventeen people have been killed and 398 wounded. These incidents brought about 
a much increased police and military presence in Kigali city centre, with visible patrols 
and permanent armed guards at strategic locations and major cross-roads, 
reminiscent of the city’s fortification in the early 1990s. Despite this, the city’s overall 
trajectory has been towards greater crime control and security in the years following 
the genocide. Kigali is now considered a ‘regional anomaly’, characterised by orderly 




The RNP, Recent Reforms and Community Policing Initiatives 
 
In 2000, the Rwandan Gendarmerie, Judicial and Communal Police Forces were 
combined to form the Rwanda National Police (RNP), which according to the 
country’s 2003 constitution, is the “…organ in charge of the safety and security of 
people and their properties and which has the jurisdiction over the entire territory of 
the Republic of Rwanda” (Republic of Rwanda, 2003). 
 
Table 7. Police Institutional Reforms, 2000. 
1994 - 2000 2000 - Present 
Department Government 
Ministry 
Department Government Ministry 
Gendarmerie Ministry of Defence Rwanda National 
Police 




Ministry of Internal 
Security 
 
Judicial Police Ministry of Justice 
 
The merger was part of a general streamlining of the security sector in Rwanda, in 
which a range of agencies had previously held overlapping mandates. It was also an 
attempt to distance the policing agencies under the RPF from those of the 
Habyarimana era.68 It followed a two-year period of popular consultation to 
determine what kind of police force local communities engage with most positively. 
The national police were rebranded, down to the uniforms of individual officers (from 
green to blue to reduce popular associations of the RNP with the military), and 
thousands of unqualified communal police officers were made redundant. 
 
The new force was put under the control of Colonel Frank Mugambage (Director 
General of Police, 2000-2004), former Deputy Chief of Staff in the RPA. Its original 
3500 trained officers were drawn primarily from three backgrounds: former officers 
in the RPA, former judicial officers transferred from the Ministry of Justice, and 
                                                          
 
68 Interview, Senior Police Officer, Kigali, 5 December 2014. 
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civilian recruits. Since then, the RNP has rapidly expanded.69 In the first decade of the 
RNP, between 2000 and 2010, over 8800 officers were added to the force, while in 
2011 alone, almost 2000 judicial officers passed through the Gishari training 
programme, increasing the force by twenty-five per cent. Despite this, Rwanda’s 
current police capacity remains well short of the UNODC recommendation of one 
police officer to four hundred and fifty members of the population. In Rwanda today, 
the ratio is approximately 1: 1000, up from 1: 1600 in 2010 (RNP, 2013).  
 
The RNP’s strategies for dealing with this shortfall draw on lessons learnt during the 
North-Western Insurgency. They involve the co-option of local patrols in performing 
security roles, such as guarding public properties, managing public events and 
supporting police at the sector level and below.  
 
In the years following the insurgency, LDUs quickly developed a negative reputation 
among the Rwandan population. An official survey (see RNP 2014:106) records a 
meagre 54 per cent popular confidence in LDUs in the mid-2000s, a remarkably low 
figure for a government document. By contrast, the police and defence forces scored 
97 per cent and 98 per cent respectively. The report goes on to state that LDUs had 
become a “liability in their engagement with the citizens they were meant to protect, 
with some officers using their guns to intimidate the public and carrying weapons 
into public spaces such as bars” (Ibid.).  
 
The government responded first by disarming LDUs, and ultimately by ending the 
programme and temporarily disbanding its membership. They were replaced by the 
District Administrative Security Services Organ (DASSO), a smaller and better trained 
outfit. Even before the establishment of DASSO, however, the failings of the LDUs 
saw many communities reviving the traditional amarondo patrols, this time paid for 
originally by voluntary household donations. Many disbanded LDU and communal 
police officers found security roles in the new local patrols. With time, government 
                                                          
 
69 This was an exceptionally large intake based in part on the counter-terrorism drive in Kigali at the 
time. Nevertheless, the school has produced roughly 500 new recruits each year since. 
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administration at the cell and umudugudu level co-opted and formalised the 
amarondo. Patrolmen were systematically registered at local administration 
headquarters and a drive to provide them official uniforms is currently being rolled 
out from the capital. Household contributions in most neighbourhoods are today 
mandatory and can be enforced by judicial police in the case of non-payment. 
 
Local patrols are part of a broader system of community policing, which has become 
one of the flagship initiatives of the new RNP.70 In the President’s terms, the new 
force represents “an evolution of the policing function from the authoritarian, 
paramilitary, top down model to […] participation by ordinary citizens in policing their 
own communities” (President Kagame, quoted in RNP 2014:11).   
 
Government documents detailing Rwanda’s community policing model tend to be 
both vague and laden with aphorisms. The RNP’s strategic plan for the period of 
2013-2018 describes it as, “[a strategy] whereby local communities are involved in 
identifying security issues and consequently finding solutions for such issues” (RNP, 
2013:10). The official RNP handbook on community policing asserts that the policy 
“is founded on the principle that in a democratic society, the police are entrusted by 
their fellow citizens to protect and serve the public’s fundamental rights to liberty, 
equality and justice under the law […] the police must be part of, and not apart from, 
the communities they serve” (RNP, 2010:9). It goes on to state that officers should 
perform their duties in accordance with the “Seven Cs”: “communicating with the 
community to create cooperation, collaboration, coordination and change in order 
for sustainable peace, democracy and development to take root” (RNP, 2010:11). 
Statements of this kind, very often reproduced in government documents and 
research interviews, are of limited analytical value. The language used here is 
probably a reflection of more general guidelines and standard texts on community 
                                                          
 
70 Officials also cite financial difficulties, the lack of reporting to judicial police (resulting in incomplete 
case files) and lessons learnt from the counter-insurgency campaign as being behind the adoption of 
community-orientated models of public order maintenance and reporting (RNP, 2014). Mugambage 
(2005:54), himself responsible for much of the transition process, notes how the popularity of these 
models with international donors as the “reforms of choice” also played a role. 
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policing, which suffers from a somewhat shapeless definition when espoused by 
professional police trainers. 
 
In more practical terms, the policy involved establishing a Directorate of Community 
Policing in 2007, which grew to become one of the RNP’s sixteen core departments 
in 2014 and is now housed in the RNP central headquarters in Kigali. The 
department’s stated purpose is to “direct and implement policy, [and] devise crime 
prevention strategies in close collaboration with the community through community 
policing committees” (RNP, 2014:81). The RNP handbook, generally somewhat 
imprecise, does set out in more concrete terms the relative responsibilities of civilian 
committees and the police at the cell and umudugudu levels: 
 
1. The community will be responsible for [the] mobilisation and organisation of the 
community policing committees (CPCs) they select to engage their local police at 
various defined levels on crime prevention. 
2. Community policing encourages a broad, but not unlimited role for the community 
and sets to guard against creating unrealistic expectations of the police. 
3. The community must reciprocate by providing criminal intelligence and cooperating 
with the police. 
4. Both the community and the police must create a working partnership to solve 
security problems. 
RNP Handbook of Community Policing (RNP, 2010:14). 
 
By late 2013, when this research began, the total number of neighbourhood 
committee members (imbanzabigwi) reached 71,085, just under five individuals per 
imidugudu. Table 8 shows how they complement the police deployments at the local 
tiers of Rwanda’s administrative hierarchy. The specific duties of the committees are 





Table 8. Administrative Units and Policing Infrastructure, 2013. 
Administrative 
Level 
Number Level of Police 
Hierarchy 
Number CPCs  
Provinces 5 Regional 
Command 
5 - - 
Districts 30 Police Districts 30 - - 
Sectors 416 Police Stations 75 - - 
Cells 2150 Police Posts 216 Cell CPC 
members 
10,100 
Imidugudu 14,953 - - Umudugudu CPC 
members 
71,085 






3.4 Crime Statistics, 2014 
The crime statistics below give an indication of the distribution and frequency of 
particular crimes across Rwanda for the first quarter of 2014.  
 
Figure 2. Incidence of Crime by Province, First Term, 2014 
 
 






















































































































































































































Figure 5. Incidence of Crime by Offence for Kigali City and Five Border Districts 























































GENOCIDE DENIAL 1 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 
DISCRIMINATION AND SECTARIANISM 
PRACTICES 
2 1 1 3 0 0 0 2 
PARRICIDE 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
SPOUSAL HOMICIDE 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 
INFANTICIDE 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
POISONING 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
MURDER AGAINST OTHER PERSONS 2 8 4 1 1 0 1 0 
INVOLUNTARY HOMICIDE 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 
ASSAULT AND BATTERY 103 64 71 29 7 17 28 27 
ABORTION 2 1 2 1 2 0 1 1 
CHILD DEFILEMENT 31 22 53 14 13 5 11 6 
RAPE 10 1 6 1 1 2 3 0 
HARASSMENT OF SPOUSE 0 7 23 4 0 4 0 3 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KIDNAPPING AND UNLAWFUL 
DETENTION OF A PERSON 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CYBERCRIME/ COMPUTER RELATED 
CRIMES 
1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
DEFAMATION IN PUBLIC AND PUBLIC 
INSULT 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
THEFT WITHOUT VIOLENCE  74 62 38 5 0 1 0 0 
HOUSEBREAKING AND THEFT 97 85 30 26 28 13 22 16 
ARMED ROBBERY  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FRAUD AND DECEIT 46 16 18 9 5 0 3 0 
BREACH OF TRUST 23 13 12 5 3 0 2 0 
BOUNCING CHEQUES 25 9 15 2 2 0 0 0 
EMBEZZLEMENT OR DESTRUCTION OF 
PUBLIC PROPERTY 
4 6 4 1 7 3 3 2 
CORRUPTION AND RELATED OFFENCES 12 4 3 0 0 1 0 1 
FORGING DOCUMENTS AND RELATED 
OFFENCES 
21 9 16 10 5 0 2 1 
PIRACY  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
COUNTERFEITING MONEY 13 1 9 3 2 1 1 0 
ARSON AND DEMOLITION 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
OFFENCES RELATED TO ARMS 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
OFFENCES AGAINST INTERNAL AND 
EXTERNAL STATE SECURITY 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC 
SUBSTANCES 
79 49 46 39 22 19 46 4 
ENVIRONMENT DEGRADATION 1 0 5 0 1 0 1 0 




Figure 6. Incidence of Bribery by District, 2013 
Province District Frequency Percent 
Kigali City Gasabo 126 5.5 % 
Kicukiro 72 3.1 % 
Nyarugenge 83 3.6 % 
West Rubavu 229 10.0 % 
Ngororero 258 11.3 % 
East Kirehe 251 11.0 % 
Nyagatare 295 12.9 % 
North Gicumbi 237 10.4 % 
Rulindo 182 8.0 % 
South Huye 262 11.5 % 
Kamonyi 291 12.7 % 
Total  2286 100.0 % 
Source: Transparency International, Rwanda Bribery Index (2013) 
 
Statistics are taken from the first quarter of 2014, the period immediately before I 
began conducting interviews. The specific definitions of different crimes listed in 
these statistics can be found in the Rwandan penal code (Republic of Rwanda, 2012). 
Although I was shown statistics from a more extended timeframe – figures that 
broadly reflect those included here – I was unable to gain permission to reproduce 
them. Crime statistics in Rwanda are a particularly sensitive issue for the RNP, one 
that is complicated by the contradictory pressures to simultaneously demonstrate a 
falling trend in crime while promoting a higher degree of crime reporting from the 
public.71 I draw two main points of analysis: first, these numbers represent 
remarkably low levels of micro-level violence, and, second, that crime rates across 
Rwandan territory appear to be relatively uniform outside of the capital city. 
 
National rates of micro-level violence and street crime in Rwanda are remarkably low: 
To give these statistics some context in comparison to international averages, the 
World Economic Forum combines survey and statistical data to rank Rwanda ninth 
internationally in terms of the control of organised crime, twenty-first in terms of the 
reliability of the national police and sixth with respect to the low business costs of 
                                                          
 
71 Interview, Senior Officer, Criminal Investigations Department, Kigali, 12 February 2016. 
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crime and violence (World Economic Forum, 2014). Gallup has ranked the country as 
the safest in Africa in both 2014 and 2015, and as the fifth safest territory 
internationally in 2015 (Gallup, 2015; 2016). 
 
Considering the current tone of debate on the RPF, these reports are likely to be 
contested. Both the potential disconnect between national statistics and the lived 
experience of local residents, as well as the government’s involvement in the 
production of data, raise questions about the validity of the more strikingly positive 
findings in developmental reports on Rwanda (Ingelaere, 2010). Nevertheless, even 
the Rwandan government’s staunchest critics tend to acknowledge the high degree 
of internal security that it has been able to achieve (Reyntjens, 2013:5; Thomson, 
2011:12). 
 
Nothing in the way these crime statistics were presented gave cause for suspicion 
that they may have been doctored. They were intended for internal use, each incident 
was meticulously reported in paperwork, and the numbers were confirmed by hand 
written statistics marked up on the walls of individual district headquarters that I 
visited. Deliberately massaging statistics as they pass from local police stations to the 
RNP headquarters in Kigali would incur severe penalties, especially in the aftermath 
of recent controversies involving other government department statistics.72  
 
A degree of under-reporting certainly occurs, something that senior officials in the 
RNP acknowledge quite openly as a challenge.73 Communities and households are 
reluctant to involve uniformed officials in what they consider to be personal matters 
(domestic violence was often cited as an example, and the RNP is currently 
introducing a range of programmes in attempt to address this). Reporting is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter Five. Even when regarded with cautious scepticism, 
                                                          
 
72 See, for example, New Times (2015) ‘How probe uncovered the rot in Mutuelle de Sante’, 
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-02-03/185585/, accessed 16 June 2016. 




however, these figures still speak to an exceptional developmental success story, 
especially when seen in the context of Rwanda’s recent history. 
 
Figure 4 shows assault, theft and drugs offences to be by far the most common crimes 
perpetrated during the period in question. Political crimes, of which genocide 
ideology has perhaps received the most attention to date, are shown to be relatively 
infrequent. I acknowledge that the threat of punishment may be as powerful as its 
application in these cases, stifling political discussion at the local level in Rwanda. 
Nevertheless, the prevalence of political crimes appears somewhat less significant in 
statistical terms than has been implied in recent critical accounts of Rwandan political 
governance that have claimed these laws are arbitrarily applied to “anyone who 
makes public statements that the government perceives as critical” (Thomson, 
2011:442; see also Reyntjens, 2013). 
 
Outside of Kigali, rates of crime across Rwandan territory are relatively uniform, 
including in its borderland districts: Figures for Kigali’s three districts, Kicukiro, 
Nyarugenge and Gasago show rates of crime that are several times higher than the 
national average outside of the capital. Other districts deviate relatively little from 
the mean, except for those housing the country’s larger cities Muhanga, Rwamagana, 
Nyagatare, Rubavu and Gicumbi, which present marginally higher figures than rural 
districts.  
 
The relative uniformity of crime rates across Rwanda suggests consistency in the 
administrative structures, resources and practices of different departments, all of 
which are bound by the same set of centrally coordinated guidelines, and are tested 
against regular imihigo security performance contracts. This is in keeping with the 
stated aims of the RNP that “every district shall be policed with the same rigour, in 
order that the rule of law is brought to all Rwandans” (RNP, 2013:5).  
 
Nevertheless, it is of note that, once the more heavily border related crimes such as 
cross-border smuggling and the forging of documents are put aside, Rwanda’s border 
districts show almost no deviation from national averages outside of Kigali, and are, 
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if anything, slightly safer than districts set at greater distances from international 
borders in terms of violent offenses. Border towns are notoriously unruly spaces, and 
recent borderland analysis would suggest that just to hold these border districts to 
the national average would require some additional energy on the part of national 
police departments, due to the added challenges associated with governing them 




As the academic literature reviewed in this chapter indicates, despite heated debates 
on the character of the RPF, the government’s police have to date received very little 
systematic analysis. Government and police, Bayley (1971:102) argues eloquently, 
“cannot be distinguished any more than a knife and knife edge can be usefully 
distinguished in the act of cutting”. Researchers’ neglect of policing in Rwanda is a 
missed opportunity for better understanding the state. 
 
The establishment of the RNP in 2000 was the first time that a single dedicated 
organisation has been responsible for state policing in Rwanda. The move marked a 
departure from arrangements dating back to the post-colonial administrations of 
Presidents Juvénal Habyarimana and Grégoire Kayibanda, under which state policing 
functions were split between the paramilitary gendarmerie, the judicial branch, and 
the communal branch, all run out of different ministries of state. The new national 
police force expanded quickly, and has recently crossed the threshold of one officer 
per one thousand citizens. This is considered a significant milestone by international 
organisations that advocate the UN recommended ratio of 1:450 (RNP, 2014:105). 
The growth of the RNP has not been limited to the raw number of new recruits, 
however. The organisation has shown a constant internal evolution, creating new 
directorates and departments on an almost annual basis.74 Backed by funding from 
                                                          
 




the Belgian and German development agencies, as well as the European Commission, 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the United Nations Development 
Program, it has undertaken professionalization and training programmes for staff and 
officers, and maintains an excellent reputation among development partners for its 
efficiency in crime prevention and its control of petty corruption.75 
 
Behind these recent developments in the police as a state institution lie notable 
continuities in Rwanda’s historical policing system. Rwandan society has existed for 
centuries under political arrangements with very strong and clearly defined 
hierarchies that exist below what is today the district level. Examples can be traced 
from the umuryango lineage unit of the pre-colonial period, through the Belgian 
colonial sous-chefféries and the communes and cellules of the Kayibanda and 
Habyarimana administrations to the modern decentralised state structure. Different 
arrangements of local policing have been built into the political hierarchy, with 
information being reported up and orders of enforcement being passed down. At the 
most local level, modern self-protection units comparable to the Inzu protection units 
of the pre-colonial Ingabu z’u Rwanda, have endured in one form or another, with 
most small communities able to recruit and coordinate a group of young men to 
patrol and protect properties in difficult times. Thus Rwandan policing agencies have 
always been interwoven with the country’s decentralised bureaucracies. These 
entwined structures extend from central authority in the capital city to the level of 
individual neighbourhoods throughout the country. 
 
From the colonial era on, policing has consistently had two faces in Rwanda: (1) an 
official coterie of uniformed officers representing the central state (the Force 
Publique, the Police Territoriale, the Police Judiciale, the Gendermerie and more 
recently the Rwanda National Police) and (2) informal communal police legitimised 
at a more local level (the Police Communale, Nyumba Kumi militiamen, Local Defence 
Units and more recently DASSO and Community Policing Committees). Throughout 
                                                          
 
75 Interview, GIZ Development Staff, Kigali, 20 April 2014. 
116 
 
the latter half of the twentieth century, the nature of policing in Rwanda has been 
shaped by the interaction between these assemblages. Where the former enforce 
the law and protect the governing regime, the latter report information up the chain. 
They are also involved in the day-to-day regulation of local neighbourhoods, which 
takes place more often according to the informal umuco nyarwanda (the Rwandan 
cultural code, which is a descendent of pre-colonial imiziro ethics) than parliamentary 
legislation. Neighbourhood leaders are more often concerned with kirazira, such 
things as drunkenness, indecency, and other behaviours of a type not strictly illegal 
but strongly frowned upon in traditional Rwandan society, than with actual 
criminality, which tends to be much less common. 
 
Without local mobilisation, central police forces in Kigali would lack antenna at the 
neighbourhood level and be hamstrung by their limited capacity. However, 
empowering local patrols without sufficient oversight has in the past resulted in 
widespread abuse. Twice in recent history the balance between state police and local 
patrol groups has swung this way, first during the uncontrolled criminality of youth 
militias in the run up to the 1994 genocide (after which they were intentionally 
unleashed on the population), and then, although to a much lesser extent, in the 
reported abuses of Local Defence Forces in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This 
balance between local mobilisation and oversight has been in constant flux 
throughout the course of Rwanda’s troubled history. Rapid social and demographic 
change, particularly in the country’s larger cities, raise new and pressing challenges 
for government policy makers who define the interaction between policing groups 
operating at different tiers of Rwanda’s administrative hierarchy. 
 
The proliferation of Community Policing Committees, whose members today number 
over one hundred thousand76 (or roughly one per one hundred Rwandans), is 
reshaping the landscape of policing in Rwanda. Sitting atop this army of non-state 
policing partners is the newly rebranded and rapidly expanding institution of the RNP, 
                                                          
 
76 Private communication, RNP Senior Officer, 16 June 2016. 
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which has introduced a spectrum of new initiatives under the auspices of a 
community policing strategy. Chapter Four details how this arrangement plays out in 
terms of the personal interactions between key players in Rwanda’s security network. 
 
Finally, recent crime statistics from Rwanda confirm international reports that rates 
of criminality in the country are remarkably low, especially compared to the 
surrounding region. The incidence of crime is highest in the capital city, Kigali and is 
otherwise relatively uniform across the country. This suggests that Rwanda is policed 
under a consistent system, and not subject to the idiosyncrasies of local departments 
and the personal command of their senior officers. At the same time, it raises 
questions about the specific practices of policing in the country’s border towns, which 
once adjusted for border specific crimes such as cross-border smuggling and the 
counterfeiting of documents, differ little in their prevalence of crime compared to 














This chapter approaches public authority in Rwanda from below, mapping the actors 
involved in the prevention of street crime. It progresses through a series of sub-
sections – on abanyerondo night patrolmen, house guards, community policing 
committee members, police community liaison officers, judicial police officers, 
district security officers, private security guards, and RDF military patrols – looking 
both at the individual duties associated with these positions and their points of 
contact in the broader policing system. Each sub-section amalgamates information 
from a range of interviews and informal discussions to offer a representative 
overview without identifying individual contributors. 
 
The second section of this chapter makes use of thick description to provide 
illustrative accounts of four criminal incidents that occurred in 2014 and 2015. These 
descriptions demonstrate the importance of Rwandan policing systems below the cell 
tier of government administration. They show the diversity of actors working at this 
level and the range of channels available for information to pass to state authorities. 
Providing this degree of detail on Rwanda’s policing groups, their work and their 
interactions has not been done before in a systematic manner. It allows not only for 
the identification of central themes in Rwandan policing (discussed in Chapter Five), 
but also for the comparison of nuanced mechanisms of local crime prevention 




4.2 Actors and Activities 
 
Figure 7, below, is drawn from my own observations and from the accounts of 
Rwandans working in policing roles. The diagram represents a security network, an 
arrangement of individual agents, groups and formal institutions that are 
“interconnected to authorise and provide security for internal and external 
stakeholders” (Dupont, 2004:78). It provides an overview of what is a complex, 
multitiered system, containing dominant (higher) and dominated (lower) nodes, and 
mediated by the inter-personal interactions linking them together (Shearing & Wood, 
2000). My concern is with the lower tiers (those closest to the population at large, 





Figure 7. Rwanda's Policing Network – Actors in Public Order Maintenance 
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The Abanyerondo Patrolman 
 
Irondo (a patrol, lit. to patrol, pl. amarondo,) and abanyerondo (patrolmen, sing. 
umunyerondo) became established in the late 1990’s as the North-Western 
Insurgency triggered a rise in traditional self-protection groups. Abanyerondo I met 
were for the most part otherwise without formal employment. They took odd jobs 
during the day to supplement their income from the night patrol (between 12,000 
and 20,000 RWF / month depending on region and time spent in the role). Although 
women were not explicitly excluded from the amarondo role, in practice they were 
all men. Their ages varied, but typically patrol men were quite young, in their mid-
twenties, or else much older, often in their fifties or sixties. 
 
The employment of these men, at night, in uniform, is part of a government strategy 
to co-opt otherwise underemployed elements of the community into state-
sanctioned roles. In the words of one senior Police Commissioner “we don’t just keep 
an eye on our youth, we give them something to do”.77 The same logic applies to 
abanyerondo who are older but otherwise idle. 
 
The routine of abanyerondo begins at 5 p.m. with a meeting at the cell administrative 
offices. Here they are joined by up to one hundred fellow patrolmen, approximately 
five from each umudugudu contained within the cell. These meetings are lively 
events, varying from cell to cell, in which patrolmen sing songs together and practice 
drill. Once assembled, the group is briefed by a representative of the military reserve 
force or a member of DASSO. They are handed their uniforms and nightsticks 
(abanyerondo never carry firearms), and reminded of the main rules of their job – 
that they have no ‘right to punish’, that they are forbidden from drinking alcohol on 
patrol, and that any illegal activity on their part will result in their immediate 
                                                          
 
77 Interview, Rogers Rutikanga, Kigali City Police Commander, Kigali Metropolitan Police Headquarters, 
8 October 2014. 
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dismissal.78 They are also briefed on any recent incidents in their area. Abanyerondo 
then patrol for twelve hours, taking rests on street corners or in newly constructed 
irondo posts (small wooden kiosks found in more affluent imidugudu and reminiscent 
of traditional police boxes in the UK).  
 
Accompanying abanyerondo on their patrols, I observed their role in the community 
first hand. Night patrolmen find their work both exhausting and unstimulating.  The 
bulk of patrols are uneventful. For the most part, irondo work consists of meandering 
walks along silent and poorly lit dirt tracks. Only in exceptional circumstances do they 
enter houses.  
 
Abanyerondo observe the sounds and lights of night life seeping out from under the 
door frames or through the closed blinds of their neighbourhood. At least one 
member of the patrol carries a small portable radio, which provides some 
entertainment through the early hours. Otherwise abanyerondo make intermittent 
small talk and keep an ear out for the phone of their leader, which on eventful 
evenings guides them from complainant to complainant. At 5 a.m. the head of each 
patrol messages the cell executive secretary and the head of their umudugudu, most 
often the words ‘bwakeye neza’ (lit. “dawn has arrived well”), the all-clear that marks 
the end of their shift. 
 
There were occasional notable incidents, but accounts of them were mostly months 
old. Those most commonly described were drug offences, either discoveries of illegal 
brew, or small quantities of cannabis. The main exceptions occurred in 
neighbourhoods with clusters of small bars, where irondo patrols were called upon 
to intervene in occasional drunken brawls or fights between prostitutes competing 
for clients. 
                                                          
 
78 Drinking on the job is done only subtly and depends on the leniency of the patrol leader. Most 
abanyerondo can recount tales of fellow patrolmen dismissed, fined or otherwise disciplined by their 





The occasion for abanyerondo to use violence occurs very rarely in most 
communities. When patrolmen did speak of violent encounters, examples fell broadly 
into cases where they acted in self-defence, of suspects attempting to escape, or in 
the breaking up of disputes in the streets or in bars. The main exception was where 
suspects were caught in the act of crimes during the early hours in which judicial 
police patrols are temporarily suspended (approximately 3 a.m. to 4.30 a.m.), when 
amarondo patrols are expected to hold them until the police patrols restart and they 
can be handed over. With the justification of ‘preventing escape’, suspects are often 
beaten during this period.  
 
The overzealous use of force by young men in otherwise mundane security roles is 
nothing new. Notably local communities and judicial police reacted to this in different 
ways. Community policing committee members either tacitly encouraged some 
degree of physical punishment or turned a blind eye to it. Sector police, on the other 
hand, uniformly condemned this behaviour. While they are bound to voice the official 
narrative, they also acted on it, enforcing a strict policy against the arbitrary use of 
violence by night patrols. Patrolmen were required to pay hospital bills in cases where 
suspects were badly injured. Examples circulated of cases where abanyerondo had 
been held, fined, or dismissed from the jobs for the use of unnecessary force. In two 
cases I encountered, patrolmen had done prison time for enacting this kind of street 
justice. It was notable that police tended to frame these policies as matters of 
discipline in which the night patrol had overstepped its boundaries, as one officer 
stated explicitly: “that is not their [abanyerondo] job. Only we [police] have the right 
to punish”.79  
 
On occasion, members of the community (young men in each case) would run from 
the patrols I accompanied. The response of the abanyerondo was relaxed, and they 
rarely gave chase. These men were not in their own umudugudu but lived close 
                                                          
 
79 Interview, Judicial Police Constable, Kicukiru District, 28 August 2014. 
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enough to be recognised. They could have any number of reason for not wanting to 
be seen. Maybe it was drugs, maybe some breach of the Rwandan cultural code that 
might have social repercussions should they be identified (cases of unsanctioned 
romance were often cited). They were not likely to be thieves, and even less likely to 
be violent. Most often the patrolmen would look on and laugh: ‘ni vijana tu’ (they’re 
just youth). Amarondo protect their own turf, and are acutely aware of the 
boundaries of their jurisdiction. Once an intruder had left their neighbourhood, the 
matter was most often dropped. 
 
For the most part, local residents ignored night patrolmen altogether. This was an 
odd response in streets where acquaintances normally exchange warm greetings. In 
conversation, residents would address abanyerondo as subordinates, asking them to 
perform small tasks around the neighbourhood, scolding them for the appearance of 
laziness, or requesting information about the resolution of local incidents. Their 
attitude is in part a reaction to the recent enforcement of amarondo payments, a fee 
of between 1,000 and 3,000 RWF per household per month. These payments have 
aroused some local resentment, especially where they do not accompany a 
corresponding reduction in petty theft. Consequently, members of the community 
regard patrolmen with an element of disdain. 
 
The exception is the head of each irondo, who carries significantly more social 
standing than his subordinates. Very often he also serves as head of security on the 
umudugudu community policing committee, and is known locally by name. It was not 
unusual for irondo leaders to have past military experience, and all have undertaken 
some level of training under the Rwanda National Police. With respect to crime 
reporting, the irondo leader is the first point of call. He is telephoned in the case of 





The House Guard 
 
The number of house guards has swollen with the growing middle class and the 
increasing presence of international staff in Rwanda’s larger cities. No longer 
confined to the most elite suburbs, they can be found in properties far from 
concentrations of wealth. Similar to night patrolmen, house guards are almost 
exclusively male. They play a significant role in information sharing in cities, often at 
the headwaters of information flows.  
 
Typically, these individuals live in small rooms connected to but insulated from the 
interiors of larger properties. Their daily routine involves a dawn start, after which 
they launch immediately into odd jobs: gardening, cooking and general upkeep 
around the property. Other than occasional visits to local markets, guards pass their 
day inside the compounds they protect. It is a solitary existence, living and eating 
alone, but one that is coveted in a population struggling with youth unemployment, 
especially in cities (see Sommers, 2012).  
 
To break the solitude, guards engage in doorstep conversations. They stand on the 
thresholds of their gates sharing gossip and the occasional cigarette or disguised 
liquor with the guards of neighbouring properties, private security officers in the 
neighbourhood, and at night with passing abanyerondo. In this manner 
neighbourhood news, especially relating to crime, spreads quickly. Guards 
demonstrated a remarkable level of knowledge about their social surroundings. It 
was not uncommon for them to be able to describe in detail the occupants of 
upwards of twenty neighbouring properties. 
 
This local knowledge can be double-edged, and petty theft on the part of house 
guards is one of the more common crimes in affluent areas.80 In the cases I 
encountered, dishonest gate guards were most likely to be reported by their peers, 
                                                          
 
80 Interview, Senior RNP Officer, Criminal Investigations Department, Kacyiru (Kigali), 8 February 2015. 
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who either overheard them bragging in doorstep conversations, or who had been 
asked for assistance in criminal acts. As a safeguard against petty theft, many house 
guards have only been able to obtain their positions through personal connections. 
Often they are distant relatives of the property owner, or originate from the same 
village making them easily traceable. They understood that their misdemeanours 
would carry back to their places of origin, often where extended families were reliant 
on their income. As one guard explained: “If I steal here I lose everything […] I lose my 
house and my salary. Even if I am not arrested I cannot go back to my village. They 
will know what I have done”.81 
 
House guard pay is variable and is negotiated with the landlord or house occupier. In 
Kigali it can be counter-intuitively high in comparison to other security roles that 
confer greater societal status. A generous occupier can pay their guard comfortably 
more than an entry grade judicial police constable receives. Similarly, although the 
cost of hiring from private security companies is often significantly higher than the 
pay of private house guards, their actual take-home pay is roughly the same 
(approximately 30,000-50,000 RWF per month in Kigali and somewhat less outside of 
the capital). In many cases private house guards earn more than their uniformed 
counterparts in private companies.82 
 
The presence of house guards is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the 
prevention of street crime. This is clear in other countries throughout the region, 
where even heavily armed security behind gates has seemingly no impact on the 
violence that engulfs the streets beyond them (see Steinberg, 2008). Nevertheless, in 
Rwanda’s larger cities these individuals play a significant role as witnesses and 
informants. They coordinate with the more mobile amarondo patrols. A network of 
house guards turns collections of properties into a more organic social unit that 
communicates internally, increasing resistance to criminal activities in the 
neighbourhood.  
                                                          
 
81 Interview, House Guard, Kigali (Kibagabaga), 12 February 2014. 




The Head of the Umudugudu and the Community Policing Committee 
 
In 2007, the elected heads of each umudugugu were put in charge of committees 
including four other members: a head of information (dissemination or 
‘sensitisation’), of welfare, of development and of security (doubling as the head of 
the local irondo). These village CPCs are made up of unpaid volunteers, with a 
relatively even split of men and women in positions of responsibility. In 2014, the 
number of CPC members trained by the RNP topped 100,000, approximately one for 
every one hundred Rwandan citizens. Where irondo patrols represent the 
enforcement body at the local level, CPCs provide monitoring and oversight. They 
have grown extremely rapidly: from June 2008 to June 2013, CPCs numbers were 
increased from 14,953 to 75,081 members. 1472 CPC members were trained at 
Nkumba Center from 2009 to the end of July 2013; while a further 23,371 went 
through less formal training at the district level (RNP, 2015). Those trained at Nkumba 
are known locally as Imbanzabigwi. This training is funded through the National 
Itorero Commission, a name adapted from the traditional military training schools of 
the pre-colonial period (see Chapter Three).  
 
Brief CPC meetings are convened every morning and at any moment that notable 
incidents take place in the neighbourhood, while more substantial meetings are held 
on a bi-weekly basis. The committees are the first tier of policing in Rwanda that has 
a state endorsed capacity to punish offenders. This is limited to minor infractions 
(most often public order offences or breaches of household performance contracts). 
Penalties involve small fines or referral to abunzi community courts. With respect to 
public order infractions, particularly among youth, CPCs can also recommend that 
repeat offenders be transferred either to Ingango re-education camps or else to 
Iwawa, an island detention centre on Lake Kivu. This was generally a last resort, part 
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of a three or five-strike policy depending on the neighbourhood and the nature of the 
infraction.83 
 
CPC meetings across the country are the source of a torrent of information that flows 
into the central police headquarters each day. According to the official RNP handbook 
on community policing: 
 
1. Each committee submits a report to its immediate higher level on the problems 
identified and the possible measures taken. The report must be submitted not later 
than 24 hours after each session. 
2. Each committee submits a monthly, quarterly and annual report to the immediate 
higher level in hierarchy; each report is submitted within a period not exceeding 15 
days after the end of the given period. 
3. The chairman of the committee shall always provide information to the nearest 
Police Unit, and is obliged to urge people in his locality to provide him/her or any other 
security organ with first-hand information. 
4. At the district level, the District Police Commander (DPC) coordinates the Sector 
Community Policing Committees in the District. At the provincial and Kigali city level, 
the Regional Police Commander (RPC) represents all committees in the Province or 
Kigali City. 
5. Every Regional Police Commander (RPC) collects information from all committees 
under his/her area of responsibility and submits them to the Commissioner General 
of Police. 
6. Reports of Community Policing Committees are analysed at the different set 
administrative levels. 
RNP Handbook on Community Policing (2010:17-18) 
 
Heads of imidugudu are expected to be inyangamugayo, individuals with an 
upstanding reputation for moral decision making in their local community. They 
                                                          
 
83 Interview, head of security on CPC, Gisenyi, 3 November 2014. 
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receive certain perks, which may include health insurance, a toll-free phone to 
contact cell offices or practical tools such as bicycles to assist in their work. These, 
along with enhanced status in the neighbourhood make for clear incentives to accept 
an unpaid position. Ordinary CPC members do not receive these benefits, and it is 
more difficult to understand the incentives to undertake this demanding role. They 
are required to attend the Rwanda Peace and Leadership Centre in Nkumba for two 
weeks, and dedicate significant time and energy to the role without any tangible 
compensation.  
 
In general, incentives to participate in local security vary from location to location. 
The differences are important because they influence the way that information is 
shared. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six, which unpacks local 
policing in the border town of Gisenyi, away from the centre of power. One of the 
emerging challenges in Rwandan crime prevention is how best to ensure continued 
community participation in these roles in the face of changing circumstances and 
shifting demographics.84 
 
Away from the central hills of Kigali, the committee positions of welfare, 
development, and information tended to be in-name-only. This may be temporary as 
new structures expand out of the capital. For the time being the actual 
responsibilities of CPC members in towns such as Kamembe and Gisenyi were less 
differentiated. Each of them is expected to have an excellent knowledge of their 
respective portion of the umudugudu, approximately twenty households per 
member. When asked, many CPC members could offer detailed accounts of 
household goings-on in these small clusters – in particular where marital tensions 
existed or where young men were considered to be potentially troublesome. In many 
suburban imidugudu (particularly in more sensitive areas of the country) CPCs 
monitor the comings and goings of people passing through their neighbourhoods. 
Individuals planning to stay overnight are required to meet with the head of the 
                                                          
 
84 Interview, Market Stall Holder, Gisenyi, 18 November 2014. 
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umudugudu and sign a registration book, giving their name, place of residence and 
their local host. Hosts, in turn, are held responsible for the actions of their guests. 
When speaking of surveillance in Rwanda, this intra-communal monitoring is the core 
mechanism. It is both more penetrating and more ubiquitous than the clandestine 
monitoring often attributed to undercover government agents from the NISS, the CID 
or MINADEF (discussed in Chapter Five). 
 
CPCs at the umudugudu level report to similar committees at the cell level. Cell CPCs 
are chaired by an executive secretary, the first salaried government employee in the 
Rwandan administrative hierarchy. Committees are made up of four positions: a 
youth representative, a women’s representative, a security representative (often the 
head of a local irondo) and more recently one member of the military reserve 
(inkeragutabara), who is responsible for training on matters of security and for 
liaising with local military offices. Cell CPCs are the hub of local security, the forum in 
which communal forms of crime prevention first encounter individuals who are 
unambiguously representative of the state. They are overseen by police community 
liaison officers and report up to a security council that sits at the sector level. 
 
The Community Liaison Officer (CLO) and Work Based Organisations 
 
In Rwanda’s administrative hierarchy, the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) is the 
lowest branch of police representation. Members of the Rwanda National Police 
(most often at the rank of sergeant), CLOs work out of private offices, often within 
cell and sector administrative headquarters rather than from police posts. They 
answer to a District Community Liaison Officer (DCLO), another member of the police 
who is housed outside of the commissariat in district administrative headquarters. As 
well as interacting with the community at large, CLOs bridge the institutional divide 
between the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of Internal Security. As 
with CPCs, the position was established in 2007 under the Ministerial Order No.02/07 
on Community Policing (Republic of Rwanda, 2007). On the CLO position, which was 





[CLO methods] include: running seminars and workshops for the community; 
incorporating community policing programmes in schools; initiating crime and 
neighbourhood watch programmes; initiating community policing forums; 
[the] publication of brochures, pamphlets and posters; conducting surveys on 
the responsiveness of the community; developing partnerships with particular 
stakeholders in the community, […] exhibiting police services at trade fairs and 
shows; and the use of the mass media in sensitization. 
Mugambage (2005:57)  
 
CLOs are involved primarily in the dissemination of information, or “sensitisation” 
regarding new government programmes, as well as the coordination and monitoring 
of cell CPCs. They are also responsible for documenting individuals who occupy lower 
roles in the security hierarchy. The offices of CLOs with whom I interacted were lined 
with folders containing detailed inscription forms of all CPC and irondo members (see 
Appendix 1) in their area. New personnel are required to meet with their local CLO in 
order to register, and must provide information about their current residence, village 
of origin and next of kin. CLOs are contacted in the event of complaints made against 
abanyerondo, and mediate with umudugudu CPCs to determine appropriate 
penalties. 
 
CLOs coordinate community policing strategies with elements of Rwandan civil 
society. They do this in two ways. The first is the establishment of anti-crime clubs in 
local secondary schools. In 2014, over half of Rwanda’s 1,500 schools had formed 
such clubs. These clubs have been set up in partnership with the First Lady Jeanette 
Kagame’s Imbunto Foundation. They meet weekly and students are instructed 
specifically on elements of the Rwandan penal code. Much attention is devoted to 
the discouragement of drug use (with an almost exclusive focus on cannabis) and the 
consumption of illegal home brews.  
 
A CLO’s second point of engagement is through regular meetings with the 
representatives of work-based organisations, most notably with market trader 
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cooperatives, the association of taxi-moto operators and local money lender 
associations. The chief purpose of these interactions is to encourage members of the 
organisations to operate within the law and to report any malpractices by their peers. 
CLOs exert significant influence. They are able to enforce the exclusion of individuals 
from the cooperatives, effectively rendering them jobless.  
 
The relationship between CLOs and taxi-moto drivers is particularly revealing 
regarding the government’s interaction with work-based organisations. Drivers are 
at once a threat to public order and a practical tool for information gathering. Most 
often young men, they live on narrow and uncertain profit margins cut into by 
purchases of fuel. The nature of the work and of competition for passengers 
encourages traffic violations and at times violent confrontations between drivers. 
Taxi-moto drivers have been implicated, more so than other groups, in drug dealing 
as a means of supplementing their income.85  
 
At the same time, the strategic importance of taxi-moto drivers in information 
gathering is clear. They number over one thousand in Gisenyi, a town of just over one 
hundred thousand in total. Drivers are constantly mobile, entering areas that police 
patrols do not go. In the event of crimes or road accidents they are known to seek 
out patrol officers and transport them free of charge to the site of the incident. The 
popular perception of these drivers reflects the government’s own attitude towards 
them. They are at once vijana, troublesome youth, and maneco, government 
informants. Which of these categories they belong to depends on the individual in 
question. 
 
Police liaison officers frequently brief the leaders of the taxi-moto organisations. 
Occasionally there are government crackdowns in which vehicles are confiscated if 
drivers lack appropriate documentation. One prominent feature of almost any police 
post in Rwanda is its fleet of confiscated motorbikes. As with other elements of 
                                                          
 




Rwandan society, registration is a central part of the government’s strategy of 
control. Moto drivers are registered with the police traffic department, and are 
required to wear numbered uniforms and helmets as identification. In larger cities, 
plain-clothes police officers monitor the main collection points of taxi-moto drivers, 
conducting random checks for drugs and licences. Attempts to control the association 
do involve some positive encouragement, and the RNP has been known to make 
significant financial donations in support of its membership. While I was conducting 
research in Gisenyi, the Inspector General of Police arrived unannounced to meet 
with taxi-moto drivers. Among other things, he offered 2,000,000 RWF to support 
their organisation. The administration of such pledges is overseen by the local liaison 
officers. The taxi-moto organisation of Gisenyi has since formed an anti-crime club of 
its own, which meets weekly to share information with the local CLO.  
 
The Judicial Officer and the Police Post 
 
‘Blue uniform’ judicial police are the front-line state representatives responsible for 
crime prevention in Rwanda. My focus here lies with the lower ranks of the RNP: 
constables, corporals, sergeants and chief sergeants, and the officer positions of 
Assistant Inspector (AIP), Inspector (IP) and Chief Inspector (CIP). Individuals at these 
ranks manage and operate district police stations and smaller sector police posts. 
They are still widely referred to as ‘judicial’ police, despite the official merger with 
the communal police and the gendarmerie in 2000 (Karamaga, 1999; see Chapter 
Three).  
 
Daily duties are split between enforcement roles involving local patrols and 
administrative roles keeping up the basic functioning of the police post. Around the 
station, the typical day is spent dealing with complainants and people visiting 
suspects held in the station’s cells. The Rwandan police post is very much a public 
space, and throughout the day large groups gather in dedicated waiting areas to be 
seen by judicial officers or DASSO representatives. Among these duty officers is one 
representative of the police Criminal Investigations Department and one dedicated 




Most police posts have lists of strategic sites or ‘hotspots’, which are written up on 
the walls of police station entrance hallways. These include local schools, NGO 
offices, major crossroads, government buildings, bus stations, banks, hotels, 
factories, memorial sites, health centres, markets, power plants and churches. 
Patrols are organised around these sites, and the more important ones host 
dedicated guard shifts. Patrol officers carry automatic weapons. Although driven to 
the start of their patrol routes, they work most often on foot. Sector police posts are 
contactable through a central phone exchange housed in the Kigali headquarters, and 
through the emergency number 112. Specialist numbers also exist for particular 
concerns, including 113 for traffic accidents, 3512 for issues of gender based violence 
and 3511 to report abuses by police officers. 
 
Commanding officers at sector police posts receive a constant stream of situation 
reports (‘sit reps’) through their phones. They have recently adopted online text 
messaging services (particularly WhatsApp), which has allowed for the cheap transfer 
of information even where phones are not connected by toll-free government 
schemes. It has also made it possible for messages to be accompanied with 
photographs. Sitting with sector police post commanders, it was remarkable how 
active this stream of information has become. At busy times of day individuals could 
receive several messages a minute. Officers showed me photographs of suspects in 
possession of drugs, vats of allegedly illegal brew, and minor car accidents moments 
after they had been photographed by judicial patrols, irondo leaders or CPC 
members. Through the cooperation of CPCs and amarondo patrols, they gathered 
information and coordinated security, including ordering arrests, without leaving the 
police post itself. 
 
More direct police interventions do occur, but only in exceptional circumstances 
where local forms of crime prevention have proved inadequate. One notable 
example is the RNP’s recent approach to organised crime around Nyabugogo bus 
station, the central transport hub in Kigali. Nyabugogo is a bustling urban centre, a 
crowded ring of shops, ticket offices, and major roads that surrounds a stage of 
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several hundred vehicles, and, at busy times, several thousand people. The disorderly 
environment is attractive to petty criminals. In 2011 and 2012 a group of young men 
calling themselves the ‘Marines’ (because they swam through storm drains to escape 
arrest) began to conduct more daring and organised thefts. 
 
Security within the bus station is handled privately by a cooperative of bus 
companies. When it became evident that private security guards were being 
overwhelmed, and that petty criminals had begun carrying weapons, the RNP 
intervened in force. After a period of plain-clothes investigation, police conducted a 
series of raids on the bus station and surrounding underground drains, cutting off the 
drainage ditches and arresting anyone attempting to flee through them. Ticket touts 
and local shop owners were called upon to identify repeat offenders, and crime rates 
at the site dropped significantly. 
 
Interviewees recounted similar police reactions to cross-border car theft at the 
Ugandan border and to drug related violence in Nyamirambo in the early 2000s. 
According to these accounts, the cases involved brutal examples of the state’s 
capacity for violence through short, well-informed operations by armed judicial 
police. Perhaps contrary to outside perspectives of Rwandan security, operations 
such as these are rare. In the words of one senior officer: “The best operations only 
need to happen once. If we did this more they would find ways to fight us […] they 
would also come to hate us. We make our point and we leave the rest to […] the 
community”.86 Infrequent demonstrations of hard state security capacity linger in the 
popular consciousness, deter organised criminal activity and reassure unarmed 
community security that a safety net exists if situations deteriorate to the point 
where their own roles become dangerous. The inertia of these interventions in 
deterring crime lingers long after control has been returned to more local forms of 
security (discussed in Chapter Five). 
 
                                                          
 
86 Interview, Senior Security Officer, Kigali, 20 November 2014. 
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The District Administrative Security Services Organ (DASSO) 
 
DASSO replaced Local Defence Units in May 2013. DASSO officers are commonly 
demobilised soldiers, and are at times still referred to as inkeragutabara or ‘reserve 
force’ officers. They are armed with nightsticks rather than firearms and are 
identifiable by their pale green uniforms. Officially, the new programme was framed 
as an “antidote to the duplication of responsibilities among the multiplicity of 
community neighbourhood watch initiatives, local defence forces and reservists, all 
of which are part of the overarching community policing policy” (RNP, 2014:120), 
although a much more common unofficial narrative was that they were the direct 
result of the failings of the LDFs: 
 
We had a problem [with the LDFs], we recognised it … and so we fixed it. They 
went from red to green and the system is working much better now. 
Interview, Senior Police Officer, Kigali, 15 January 2015 
 
DASSO is not a part of the Rwanda National Police, and operates under the remit of 
the Ministry for Local Government (MINILOC), rather than the Ministry of Internal 
Security. Although its command structure intersects with the Rwandan Defence 
Forces through Joint Operations Centres, DASSO answers officially to district mayoral 
offices. 
 
Although some overlap of duties remains, DASSO is expected “to leave space for 
other crime prevention initiatives at the lower administration levels” (Law No.26, 
Republic of Rwanda, 2010b). District officers’ first duty is to guard government 
administrative offices, in particular district headquarters. DASSO reproduce a number 
of the functions of judicial police. They have the power to make arrests and to deliver 
suspects to local police posts. Similarly they perform a number of administrative 
functions around the police station, and are involved in the documentation and 
questioning of individuals being detained. Like judicial officers, DASSO patrol 
strategic sites and provide regular situation reports to the commanding police 




In practice, the role of DASSO officers whom I encountered was predominantly a 
supportive one. They were called upon in cases where disputes became too heated 
for local CPCs to handle without the presence of uniformed state officials. These 
often occurred in more remote regions where judicial police were spread thinly. 
 
Two things stand out with respect to DASSO. First, the programme is new, still in the 
process of being rolled out from the capital. DASSO numbers remain relatively low 
and it was evident that their place in the local security apparatus was still being 
negotiated during the time of research. In particular, a great deal of attention is being 
put on distancing DASSO from past Local Defence Units. Second, elements of DASSO’s 
role duplicated those of other positions under a separate command hierarchy. This is 
neither an accident nor inefficient. The hierarchies intersect further up the chain at 
the Joint Operations Centres at both the district and national level. The duplication 
of command chains extending down to the local level provides internal mechanisms 
of oversight and verification. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, 
state security representatives at the local level in Rwanda are themselves under 
intense scrutiny, particularly with respect to anti-corruption measures. The 
introduction of DASSO alongside cell CPCs and judicial police offers one more lens 
through which the state can keep an eye on its own.  
 
The Private Security Guard 
 
The last ten years have seen a surge in the registration of private security companies 
in Rwanda, especially in Kigali. This is in part a response to government 
demobilisation drives, which have shrunk the official size of the RDF by up to thirty 
per cent since 2000. The private security sector has absorbed many demobilised 
soldiers. New companies must register with the Ministry of Internal Security through 
the Rwanda National Police. They are required to demonstrate that their employees 
have undergone sufficient training and that the proposed uniform does not too 




The most visible private security companies in Rwanda include Aegispro, KK Security, 
Intersec Security, Wide Vision Security, RGL Security and Top Sec Security. Alongside 
these, a range of smaller private companies have also been registered as security 
branches of the institutions that they guard. To give some indication of their number, 
Aegispro alone employs some 4000 security personnel country-wide, 3000 of whom 
are based in Kigali. This is roughly the same number as other organisations including 
KK Security and Top Sec Security, while Intersec Security is somewhat larger with 
approximately 5,500 security personnel across the country. 
 
Article 41 of the Law Detailing Police Powers (Law No.46, Republic of Rwanda, 2010b) 
states that the Rwanda National Police will oversee private security companies and 
provide them with advice on the improvement of their performance. In practice, 
private security personnel are in constant contact with judicial police in their sector. 
They salute passing police patrols and share situation reports with sector police posts 
in the event of incidents. As with amarondo patrols, private security guards are 
licensed to detain suspects, but only until they can be turned over to judicial police. 
 
Intersec Security stands apart from other PSCs in Rwanda. It is administered by 
Crystal Ventures, a government parastatal linked to the RDF, and unlike other 
organisations its guards are licensed to carry firearms (see Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 
2012). The organisation is contracted more than other firms to protect government 
buildings and financial institutions and employs a higher proportion of demobilised 
soldiers. The popular perception of Intersec is that it is a de facto branch of state 
security linked to the RPF. 
 
Most companies have two basic ranks for their security personnel: inspectors and 
supervisors. Starting salaries are between 40,000 and 50,000 RWF per month, and 
increase with promotion and good performance (see Appendix 1). Although 
comparable to the starting salaries of judicial police constables and DASSO officers, 
private security personnel do not enjoy the same perks with respect to subsidised 




Perhaps the key difference between private security guards and other elements of 
the security apparatus in Rwanda is that they are stationary, confined to the 
properties or institutions that they are charged with guarding. Aegispro goes one step 
further, with its guards required to stay physically inside the compounds or 
institutions they guard, rather than be posted in the street outside as with other 
organisations. Shifts last up to twelve hours, and tend to be uneventful. Accounts of 
past incidents date back months or years, most often cases in which suspected 
criminals attempted to enter the property and fled once spotted. Private security 
guards are a crude deterrent, as well as one further element of Rwandan society who 
monitor full-time their immediate surroundings. 
 
The Soldier and the Military Patrol 
 
The creation of the RNP in 2000 was intended to reduce overlapping responsibilities 
between different security agencies, and to free up the RDF from the task of every-
day crime prevention in order to focus on threats to state security and terrorism. The 
fact that the senior command of the RNP was drawn originally from the military, and 
that senior military officers have on occasion been transferred into the police to 
address particular issues or to fill capacity shortfalls, is testament to the division of 
labour between the two organisations. This is in contrast to accounts of other state 
security apparatuses across the African continent, in which the police and the army 
overlap significantly in their everyday duties (Owen, 2014), competing for the 
personal rents that can be extracted through police work (Hills, 2009). The result is 
that soldiers of the RDF play only a limited role in preventing crime in Rwanda’s cities. 
 
Among the different branches of the Rwandan security network, the RDF commands 
the highest status, and on the streets soldiers are treated with deference by private 
security guards, police and DASSO officers.87  In practice, soldiers perform a relatively 
                                                          
 
87 Despite a general subservience to the military on the part of the RNP, police officials were quick to 
cite Chapter 4, Article 21 of Law No.46/2010 (Establishing Police Powers), which guarantees their right 
to “arrest any soldier involved in the commission of an offence” (Republic of Rwanda, 2010b). There 
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similar role to that of private security guards, protecting sensitive government 
infrastructure, key government offices and main road intersections. They are capable 
of rapidly closing down the country’s road network if called upon to do so, something 
that has occurred in recent years, notably in the immediate aftermath of grenade 
attacks in the capital. At 3 p.m. in most of Rwanda’s major cities, military foot patrols 
depart from central barracks and do rounds of commercial districts before returning 
to base. The sight of at times fifty or more heavily armed soldiers amounts to a visible 
display of force, a reminder of the state’s capacity for violence. But notably these 
troops rarely enter residential districts, and tend to avoid any interaction with the 
population, who are generally content to do the same, simply getting out of their 
way. As one military officer remarked: “That is not their job. If they do see something 
[criminal activity], maybe if it is very serious they will stop it […] if not, they keep 
walking. And they call the police”.88 
 
When the military does become involved in policing issues, it tends to be following 
up on intelligence provided by the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) 
and relating to issues of internal security, counter-insurgency or terrorism.89 In 
general, soldiers are detached from the broad apparatus of crime control that 
connects umudugudu leaders, patrol leaders and local police in a network of personal 
relationships. They communicate with other patrols and with their commanding 
officers by military radio, rather than cell phone, and often have little attachment to 
the communities through which they patrol.  
  
                                                          
 
have been some notable examples of this in recent years, including the arrest of two ranking RDF 
generals by junior police officers, see The New Times (2006) Rusagara, Kaka ruling for September 21: 
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/Printer/2007-09-06/1110/, accessed 10 July 2016. 
88 Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Remera (Kigali), 6 February 2015. 
89 Anecdotally, I encountered cases of soldiers conducting special investigations in the manner of the 




4.3 Incidents and Interactions 
 
On arriving in Rwanda I began to compile accounts of past criminal incidents. I also 
asked individuals to contact me in the immediate aftermath of crimes so I could 
observe the way that these events were handled. This approach, although a 
supplement to interview and ethnographic data, yielded many useful observations. 
The examples below have been selected either as representative of my encounters 
between 2013 and 2015, or as otherwise particularly revealing of specific elements 
of policing. Here are many of the hallmarks that directed my research: the networked 
interactions between uniformed and non-uniformed groups, the relatively peripheral 
role of state police, and the importance of anonymity. 
 
Rather than to stand as empirical data in their own right, these cases were selected 
to illustrate observations and information supported by interviews and informal 
discussions. While the plural of anecdote is not evidence, they offer a more visual 
description of crime and crime prevention as I experienced it, than interview analysis 
alone. On occasion, I would use these incidents as conversational prompts to elicit 









A man turns off the King Faisal road in Kacyiru and immediately begins behaving 
suspiciously. He scans the dirt track for onlookers and climbs the garden wall of a 
property known to house foreign staff. Peering inside he spots a guard, drops back to 
the street and walks away. Unknown to him, a gardener in the compound opposite is 
watching through a hole in the fence. It is his second attempt to enter the property, 
and both times he has been spotted. 
 
The man is caught on his third attempt. It is 3 a.m. and the night guard, colluding with 
a friend, is pretending to sleep at the back of the property. As the intruder climbs the 
wall, they surprise him, drop him to the ground and hold him. Looking out at their 
dimly lit driveway, the house’s occupants presume two intruders are attacking the 
one guard. They call the emergency number of the Rwanda National Police (112). An 
officer at the metropolitan headquarters picks up but it is difficult to communicate 
directions. The house is deep in a maze of unsignposted dirt roads on one side of the 
Kacyiru ridge. The duty-officer informs the Remera Sector police station of a 
disturbance and says they will send a patrol to the area.  
 
Meanwhile the guards, holding their prisoner, have called the local irondo night 
patrol. In a few minutes the intruder is encircled by seven men. They ask him questions 
and beat him periodically. By the time I arrive with a soldier from the local military 
police base the situation is relatively calm. The chief of the local irondo, a demobilised 
soldier, sits on a stool above the intruder and is demanding his personal details. His 
name, his family, his umudugudu (village). The man has no identification card and is 
resisting giving away personal information. Despite this he answers questions about 
politics – the names of ministers and of administrative structures (umudugudu, 
akagari, umurenge, akarere and so on). These are tests of whether he is indeed 
Rwandan, or belongs to the much derided foreign enemy indiscriminately referred to 
as ‘FDLR’ in the city. The other night watchmen look with derision at their prisoner. 
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They lean on the walls in weatherbeaten brown uniforms, smoking cigarettes and 
gripping their nightsticks. It is clear that the events are entertaining for them, a break 
from the mundanity of the night shift. The soldier relaxes too; he has seen this before. 
He reassures me and the occupants of the house, passes on his phone number in case 
of future incidents and returns to his own post. 
 
At 4:30 a.m. the police patrols restart in Kacyiru. The intruder is given a cloth to wipe 
the blood from his face – abanyerondo delivering wounded captives to the police may 
face fines or the loss of their paid position, particularly where victims are hospitalised. 
He is bruised but not seriously hurt. He swears at his captors and is handed over to 
blue uniformed judicial officers, taken to a local police post and held in a cell. His arrest 
is recorded and he is subsequently released – ultimately his only infraction was to 
climb over a wall. The head of his umudugudu is informed of the case and advised to 
keep an eye on the man in future. To all parties, this was the expected outcome. The 
house guards later joke about the incident: “hatarudi hapa”. He won’t come back 
here. 
 
This incident, which occurred relatively early in my fieldwork, provided some 
important insights into the operation of crime prevention in Rwandan 
neighbourhoods. I draw the reader’s attention to: 
 
1. The vigilance of the gardener across the street, his ability to identify an individual 
who was not a resident of the neighbourhood, and his reaction to report suspicious 
behaviour to the house guards responsible for protecting the property. This speaks 
to a more general observation, that even in the quietest residential streets of 
Rwanda’s cities, it is extremely rare to be alone and unobserved.  
 
2. The absence of police patrols in Rwandan cities between the hours of 3 a.m. and 
4.30 a.m., during which policing is handled almost exclusively by neighbourhood 
patrols. Travelling that night to the site of the incident, I expected to encounter 
government patrols on the major cross-roads, from whom I could solicit help. There 
were none. Nonetheless, when the emergency number of the RNP was called the 
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system worked extremely well. The occupants of the property were immediately put 
in contact with the district command of the police (at the Remera police station). 
Nevertheless, due to the lack of house numbers and street signs it was not possible 
to direct a patrol car accurately to the house.  
 
3. The nature of the violence involved: in effect, this was a case of mob justice 
moderated by the knowledge that serious injury to the arrested man could incur 
penalties for the local patrolmen. On my arrival at the scene, the patrolmen were 
already in the process of trying to mask the man’s injuries, which appeared to be 
relatively superficial. I later enquired at the Kigali King Faisal hospital, where 
administrative staff at the emergency ward told me that admittances for individuals 
seriously injured by patrolmen were rare, and were followed up by officers from the 
police criminal investigations department.90  
 
4. The nature of the questioning: this took place principally to determine the identity 
of the man who had been caught, whether he was a petty criminal or someone with 
links to committed anti-government organisations.  
 
5. The repercussions: ostensibly these may appear minimal but they were important. 
The man was held in a police post cell and released shortly afterwards. According to 
members of the irondo that captured him, however, the consequences will be more 
enduring, particularly in terms of bringing him to the attention of local authorities in 
his own neighbourhood. As one member of the patrol commented: “Now they will all 
know that he is maybe a thief, and they will be watching him … if it happens again 
maybe he will go … to Iwawa91”.92 
 
6. The reaction of the local community: they strongly condoned the actions of their 
local patrol, including the use of violence. As one neighbour commented: “we do not 
                                                          
 
90 Informal discussion, hospital staff member, King Faisal Hospital, Kigali (Kacyiru), 29 August, 2014.  
91 A detention and re-education centre set on an island of Lake Kivu. 
92 Informal discussion, Amarondo Night Patrolmen, Kigali (Kacyiru), 20 August 2014. 
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know what [he] would do if he came into the house. Maybe he has a weapon. [The 
guards] did a very good job – if I was there, even me, I would have hit him!”.93 The 
incident below shows a different set of circumstances in which the relationship 
between a patrol and the local community was more strained.  
 
Incident 2. A fight in Kimironko 
 
December 2014  
 
A heated verbal exchange has led to a scuffle in the back rooms of a bar near 
Kimironko market (Kigali). The larger of two men chases the other, who is taunting 
him, in circles around the pool table. The patrons laugh and continue drinking, but the 
mood changes when the larger man throws a heavy pool ball across the bar. There is 
a general clicking of tongues. When he attempts to restrain the assailant, an elderly 
man whose job is to sit and watch the front gate is thrown to the ground. He falls 
through a plastic table that collapses its umbrella and sends a tray of bottles onto the 
floor. 
 
By this point everyone in the bar is on their feet. A friend of the larger man clasps him 
by the shoulders and tries to calm him down, but is pushed aside as the taunting goes 
on. Two men in irondo uniforms enter. The aggressor swears at them, pointing 
indignantly at the smaller man. It is clear that he knows the patrolmen personally, but 
his respect for them does not run much deeper than that of an unarmed man facing 
two with nightsticks. 
 
There are five minutes of heated discussion, in which the larger man continues to 
lunge at the smaller. He grabs the shirt of a patrolman, who waves a cell phone at 
him – a threat of bringing in higher authorities. Before this can happen, the bar 
                                                          
 
93 Informal discussion, local residents, Kigali (Kacyiru), 20 August 2014. 
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manager – a man in a suit, drinking with two wealthy colleagues – shouts at the crowd 
to leave. Evicted, they disperse, filtering out into the street. 
 
There are a few verbal parting shots, violent threats, before the assailant flags down 
a motorbike taxi and leaves the scene. The smaller man crosses the street and 
approaches two soldiers on patrol. He points to the motorbike, and tells them that if 
he dies that evening, they will know who is responsible. A few of the other patrons 
support the man’s story. The soldiers glance uninterested at the disappearing tail 
light, smile at the man and continue wordlessly on their patrol. He shouts thank you 
repeatedly after them in English, and the crowd laughs.  
 
Some time afterwards, a police patrol arrives at the scene and questions the bar 
manager about the disturbance. To my knowledge there were no repercussions for 
any of the parties involved.  
 
1. It is worth noting the range of actors involved in this case: other patrons at the bar, 
the door guard, the night patrolmen, the bar manager, the military patrol, and finally 
the national police, all of whom played some role in the resolution of this situation. 
This example typifies the rapid escalation of policing in Rwanda, as additional 
branches of the security hierarchy become involved. What was notable, in this and 
similar incidents, is that bringing in reinforcements takes place at a person-to-person 
level, very often by cell phone. Communicating with representatives of the ‘next tier’ 
up the security hierarchy was rarely a case of calling ‘the police’ or ‘a patrol’ so much 
as contacting a named officer or patrolman, known personally to the individual 
making the call. 
 
2. The willingness of the bar patrons, all Hutu and to some degree publicly 
intoxicated, to greet a Tutsi military patrol and solicit their help: I was surprised by 
how comfortable locals appeared to be in communicating with armed soldiers, who 
are a regular sight at the sector’s major crossroads and close to the Kimironko 
covered market, which is a security hotspot and considered a potential target for 
terrorist grenade attacks. One of the bar patrons commented afterwards: “We are 
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used to the soldiers now. We take care of our own business and they take care of 
theirs … they do not interfere in the street unless something is very serious”.94 
 
3. The lack of respect for the night patrolmen: they were unable to compel the 
aggressor to stop, and were abruptly evicted from the property by its manager along 
with the rest of the crowd. In my observations, this was typical. For security 
representatives with official uniforms abanyerondo command very little legitimacy 
or status. One informant commented: “these amarondo, they have no power. Their 
only power is their stick … If they make trouble for you, you can say ‘[expletive] you’ 
and go … only when the police come do you have to do what they say”.95  
 




An irondo patrol in Nibyue cell has received complaints from local residents about 
young men smoking cannabis in the unlit back streets of their umudugudu. The issue 
is raised at the 5 p.m. meeting of security officers at the cell headquarters, where 
other patrol leaders attest to seeing the same group during their rounds. When 
chased, the young men run for the small irrigation channel separating the hillside 
communities of Nibuye and Nyakabanda.  
 
The meeting is coordinated by an officer of DASSO, who asks for details about where 
exactly the sightings were made. He discusses a strategy with the heads for three 
patrols in Nibuye, then calls the Nyakabanda cell headquarters. If the boys are seen 
again, the irondo is to send around a series of messages to a group of recipients set 
up on the internet text messaging service WhatsApp, wait for different patrols to 
move between them and the swampy water front, and then arrest them.  
                                                          
 
94 Informal discussion, Hutu youth, Kigali (Kimironko), 1 December 2014.  




Later that evening, the plan is put into effect. Two teenagers are held by the 
patrolmen. A photograph of each, holding up the illegal drug, is sent around the 
policing group. The DASSO officer, who has spent the evening on duty at the district 
headquarters, arrives with a colleague to escort the young men out of the 
neighbourhood. They forward a message to the local police post, and a police pick-up 
truck meets them on a main road nearby. 
 
The boys are held in a cell at the police post, where they are identified and visited by 
family members. They are later referred to an Ingando re-education camp. 
 
I include this example in part because of how typical it was of patrol activities that I 
witnessed. Again, several points are worth noting: 
 
1. This arrest involved the coordination of some twenty patrolmen, as well as DASSO 
and judicial police officers. It offered a break from routine for those involved, since 
most neighbourhood patrols are uneventful. This gave rise to an enthusiasm on the 
part of the patrol leaders that was accompanied by what appeared to be an 
exaggerated sense of mission, as they described their role in “saving the 
community”.96  
 
2. It brought up the entrenched popular narrative condemning drug consumption, 
which was described as “completely destructive” and “not Rwandan”.97 
 
3. This case offers some insight into the geography of anonymity in Rwanda’s cities. 
It was striking that young men seeking to evade the authorities would flee into 
uninhabited areas rather than seek to blend into densely populated neighbourhoods. 
 
                                                          
 
96 From the Swahili ‘Kuwaokoa jamii’.  
97 Informal Discussion, Irondo Patrol Leader, Nibuye Cell, 2 February 2015. 
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Incident 4. A shooting in Nyamasheke 
 
The following account comes from police press statements made by the 





The Executive Secretary of Gasayo cell, Felix Ndagijimana, has asked for police 
protection while conducting a routine inspection of the Nyamugari umudugudu.  
Accompanied by two police officers, he encounters a man, Zakary Niyibizi, illegally 
constructing a house on land designated as ‘high risk’ due to the danger of landslides. 
 
In line with district regulations, Niyibizi is told to stop and to demolish the parts of the 
structure that had already been built. He refuses and responds violently, threatening 
the Executive Secretary with a machete. A fight breaks out, and members of the local 
community come to the support of Niyibizi. The cell leader is assaulted and tied up, 
and the police officers fire repeatedly into the air in an attempt to disperse the crowd.  
 
This fails, and one of the officers is seized by the crowd, who attempt to disarm him 
and tear at his uniform. The other officer shoots and kills Niyibizi, whom he claims 
was threatening the life of the executive secretary. At this point the crowd disperses, 
giving the officers time to pick up the unconscious Ndagijimana and carry him out of 
the umudugudu. 
 
They fall into an ambush at a bridge a kilometre away, where they are encircled and 
threatened with machetes. The officers shoot twice, injuring two more residents, in 
                                                          
 
98 An account of the incident can be found online through Makuruki News (2015) ‘Police Reasons on 




the thigh and lower leg respectively (one would later die on route to Bushenge 
hospital), before they are rescued by backup from the Karengera Police post.  
  
Upon returning to Rwanda in December 2015, I discussed these events with senior 
officials. The case highlights several important points: 
 
1. The example was exceptional during my time in Rwanda: the police response, 
especially that a specialist team from the Kigali CID was sent to the site, speaks to the 
infrequency of similar events, as do the press statements made by ranking officials.  
 
2.  The situation arose out of several of the most incendiary issues that play out at 
the state-society interface in Rwanda. That the cell leader was accompanied in his 
daily duties by a police escort reflects the fact that there was already a strained 
relationship between the community of Gasayo Cell, which is in the relatively remote 
lake-front district of Nyamasheke, and its state-appointed executive secretary. The 
local standing of a cell executive secretary is a litmus test for more generalised 
popular anti-government resentments in small Rwandan communities, as discussed 
in Chapter Five. A further complication in this case was the fact that the executive 
secretary found himself in conflict with residents over the highly sensitive issue of 
land rights.  
 
3. The demand to dismantle what had already been constructed is in keeping with 
other examples of state over-reach in Rwanda, described elsewhere (see Ingelaere, 
2010). In this case it was not accompanied by the enforcement capacity to actually 
see it through. Furthermore, the case is a disturbing example of what can happen 
when residents are not adequately informed of changing government regulations. 
According to local accounts, Niyibizi did not know that he was building on a prohibited 
site.99 
 
                                                          
 
99 Informal Discussion, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 18 December 2015. 
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4. The resulting violence, and most acutely the ‘ambush at the bridge’: this 
constitutes a nightmare scenario for the police and for the RPF more generally. Not 
only did the local community rise up violently against the state agents present, but 
they made use of the intra-communal cohesion and rapid means of communication 




This chapter has outlined the roles and responsibilities of individuals who work in the 
lower tiers of Rwanda’s security apparatus. It establishes the policing duties ascribed 
to different groups by Rwandan law and illustrates how these duties are performed 
in practice. My aim has been to highlight the breadth of different actors involved in 
maintaining public order at the local level in Rwanda and to give an indication of their 
relative status.  
 
In raw numbers, uniformed state police in Rwanda are vastly outnumbered by 
policing actors drawn from and legitimised by the small communities in which they 
work. The actual performance of controlling violence, a function tied inexorably to 
the idea of the state, falls to local actors. The RNP designates the limits of this 
performance, and coordinates these groups into a coherent system of crime 
prevention. 
 
The relationships between these groups are illustrated through particular incidents 
selected from my fieldwork. The majority of law enforcement work in small Rwandan 
communities, as in the first three incidents, relates to petty theft, assault and minor 
drugs offenses. The fourth incident is altogether different, and concerns an atypical 
case in which community relations with the police broke down to the point of 
violence. The relationships and activities in these incidents are analysed in greater 





CHAPTER FIVE - POLICING SMALL COMMUNITIES 
 
5.1 State, Violence, and Crime in Rwanda 
 
This chapter builds on the empirical materials in Chapter Four to investigate how 
state structures and local agency interact to keep urban neighbourhoods in Rwanda 
safe. These interactions reflect issues at the heart of Rwandan political governance: 
state reach, the control of violence, and the maintenance of public order. My focus 
is on micro-level violence (see Kalyvas, 2006) related to street crime: murder, theft, 
mugging, assault, home-invasion, public order infractions, drug offences and other 
crimes driven by opportunism.100 Such crimes have plagued other cities across the 
region (see Anderson, 2002; UN ODC, 2015).101  
 
I argue that there are three principal drivers at work to prevent these crimes in 
Rwanda: (1) the country’s hierarchical security apparatus and the way it extends into 
civil society, (2) the construction of small, self-contained community units that are 
intolerant of anonymity, and (3) an aversion to social disharmony on the part of both 
state and non-state actors, in large part resulting from the country’s recent violent 
history.  
 
Rwanda’s policing system combines elements of intelligence-led policing, community 
policing, and zero-tolerance policing into a unique arrangement. The system benefits 
from the country’s social composition, demographics, and from a cultural code, the 
umuco nyarwanda. At its core, it relies on information and the way that it moves into 
                                                          
 
100 Locally ‘ibyaha’, or in Swahili ‘jinai’. Commonly, discussants would use the Swahili term ‘dhambi’, 
literally ‘sin’ to describe these activities, the statistical occurrences of which are shown in Chapter 
Three. 
101 Gender-based or domestic violence I deemed too particular to include without the focused research 
that these crimes warrant, especially in the Rwandan context where government approaches to GBV 
were being overhauled during my stay (the establishment of the Isange One-Stop Centre and a toll-
free police emergency number for victims of GBV are two examples of the new measures being 
brought in). Although some references will be made to police practices of combatting GBV, in general 
its prevention in Rwanda involves a different set of individuals and strategies to the approach to street 
crime, and was regrettably beyond the scope of this research.  
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the policing hierarchies to inform state authorities who can then intervene 
accordingly. The movement of information is facilitated by an efficient, 
professionalised state security apparatus, but depends on a significant degree of non-
state, often voluntary, participation in policing at the local level. 
 
5.2 Rwanda’s Security Apparatus 
 
The RNP shall collaborate with other security organs, judicial and public 
organs as well as other organs […] that may assist in accomplishing its mission 
and share information with them in order to maintain public order and 
security. 
Law on Police Powers, Chapter 5 Article 40 (Republic of Rwanda, 2010b) 
 
Policing in Rwanda has taken the path of high visibility […] preventative 
patrols, timely intervention and rapid response [are] a source of fulfilment for 
communities expending time and energy on activities directed at ensuring law 
and order. 
‘Policing a Rapidly Changing Post-Conflict Society’ (RNP, 2014:118) 
 
 
As these extracts suggest, the RNP takes pride in promoting a more preventative, less 
reactionary approach to crime prevention. The organisation emphasises the 
importance of a consistent presence in the streets, while promoting a form of 
intelligence-led policing based on the timely movement of information up a 
hierarchical chain of command. 
 
At every administrative tier of the Rwandan state hierarchy, policing representatives 
parallel local government representatives. Table 9 (below) shows the various points 
of contact. Through this structure, the RNP has partitioned the population into small 
policing units. It coordinates the activities of non-state policing groups in the clusters 




Table 9. Police and Local Government Representatives 
Administrative 
Unit 
Local Government and Civil 
Society Representatives 
Policing Representatives 
Nation Central Government Rwanda National Police 
Headquarters 
Joint Operations Centre (JOC) 
District Mayor 
 
District Police Commanders 
DASSO Commanding Officers 
Sector Sector Executive Secretary 
Church Leaders 
Youth Cooperative Leaders 
Work Cooperative Leaders 
Sector Police Station Commanders 
Community Police Liaison Officers 
Cell Cell Executive Secretary Cell CPC members 
Umudugudu Head of Umudugudu CPC members 




Leadership and Hierarchy  
 
Rwandans from all tiers of the internal security network consistently singled out 
effective leadership as an essential component of crime control. Many security 
officers interviewed consider themselves to be part of a larger mission of national 
development, one that is tied to a sense of patriotism (gukunda igihugu). They were 
generally appreciative of the consistency of message between their orders and the 
edicts of the national project which are articulated through government broadcasts, 
notably presidential speeches:102 
 
We are doing what we need to do, because of the love of our country. We 
want to rebuild it and make it safe [….] It is how the President says, and it is 
what we do. 
 Interview, Abanyerondo Patrol Leader, Gisenyi, 14 November 2014 
 
                                                          
 
102 The dominance of the executive branch of the RPF undoubtedly plays a role in holding together the 
party and producing a consistent direction in public policy (Hayman, 2008, see also Hills 2007 on the 
governance of police departments according to presidential preference). 
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Without the patriotism of our citizens and the effective leadership […] at the 
highest level, we could not have security in Rwanda. 
Interview, Senior RNP Officer, Kacyiru (Kigali), 2 February 2015. 
 
Declarations of this kind, very common in formal interviews, seemed at times to 
involve little more than verbal salutes to President Kagame. The notion of effective 
leadership in Rwanda goes beyond presidential example, however. Police and district 
security officers spoke of the clarity of their roles and the consistency of their work, 
which they attributed to the leadership of the different branches lower down the 
administrative hierarchy. While different security branches (notably the RNP and 
DASSO) share certain roles, there is little duplicated command in the policing system. 
Following the reforms in 2000, it is now difficult to imagine a scenario in which 
individual officers, guards, or patrolmen would receive contradictory orders from 
different sets of superiors or had difficulty determining who was the higher authority. 
An abanyerondo patrolman answers to his patrol leader, who answers to security 
representatives at the cell level, who are in turn coordinated by DASSO officers at the 
district level, and so on up the chain of command. This formalised security hierarchy 
allows for the rapid mobilisation of different tiers of security as circumstances require 
(see Incident 2).  
 
Within the police, officers emphasise the importance of rank and the status it confers. 
Their positions are not undermined by informal structures to the same systematic 
degree that has been documented elsewhere (see Owen, 2014). The Rwandan Police 
Code of Conduct provides a detailed rulebook on the deference that junior officers 
are expected to afford to their superiors (Republic of Rwanda, 2010a). In the words 
of one junior officer: “A constable is a constable. No matter who his father is”.103 
Similarly, a rigorous set of intra-organisational disciplinary procedures are laid out in 
                                                          
 
103 Interview, Police Sergeant, Kicukiro (Kigali), 7 October 2014. As with the RDF, rumours abound 
about the domination of the most senior ranks in the police by Abasaija, Tutsi of Ugandan upbringing 
(see also Hintjens, 2008; Reyntjens 2013). I have no way to confirm this. What was striking in the RNP 
was how strongly even the idea of irregularities in recruitment or promotion in the lower ranks was 
condemned at all tiers of the organisation, and how few examples circulate, even anecdotally. 
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the Law Establishing Police Powers (Republic of Rwanda, 2010b). Interviewees in the 
RNP were often familiar with the precise wording of these documents. 
 
Senior officers manifest a significant amount of pride in the internal discipline and 
professionalism of the institution.104 They attribute these qualities to a lengthy 
training process at the police cadet school in Gishari and the National Police Academy 
in Musanze, both of which involve a gruelling physical training regimen and a heavy 
emphasis on professional conduct.105 Respondents suggested that the RNP’s 
historical links to the military and the past military experience of many of its senior 
officers (including its current Inspector General), have given rise to a military-style 
internal chain of command:106  
 
You obey your senior officer, or you face discipline. It works the same as the 
military, only the ranks have different names. 
Interview, Inspector of Police, Kicukiro (Kigali), 6 December 2014. 
 
Even off-duty we are held to a different standard than regular civilians. We 
must always represent the police […] We must pay attention to our 
appearance and our behaviour. 
 Informal Discussion, Sergeant, Kacyiru (Kigali), 15 January 2015. 
 
Officer training at the RNP is supported by a range of international actors who put a 
similar premium on professional conduct.107 In recent years, these have included the 
                                                          
 
104 This was matched by a sincere concern on the part of officers that they should not appear to be 
corrupt. On more than one occasion, officers joked to me that they exercised in their free time so as 
not to develop a ‘belly’, something that their commanding officers could consider the result of taking 
bribes. A deliberate exaggeration, these narratives nonetheless indicated the degree to which 
corruption in the organisation has been stigmatised. 
105 Interviews, Kicukiro Police Station, Kicukiro (Kigali), 9 October 2014. 
106 Since the establishment of the RNP in 2000, it has been a relatively common practice for senior 
officers to be brought in, often only temporarily, from the RDF to fill gaps in the rapidly expanding 
senior command of the police or to deploy prior experience in setting up new directorates (Interview, 
Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 16 January 2015). 
107 Interview, Huw Gosling, Project Manager for Rwanda at the UK College of Policing (Bramshill 
College), Bridgend (Wales), 24 June 2013.   
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United Nations Development Programme, the German Development Agency, and the 
British Bramshill Police College, all of which provide some degree of external 
oversight. The RNP is subject to further monitoring from government and civil society 
bodies in Rwanda.108  
 
Internally, the RNP established an Inspectorate of Police Services and Ethics in 2013, 
which includes a Directorate of Inspectorate, a Directorate of Internal Audit, an Anti-
Corruption Directorate and the RNP Ethics Centre, all of which engage in monitoring 
and anti-corruption measures within the organisation. It has also set up a police call 
centre, with several toll-free numbers the public can use to complain about police 
conduct (3511 for a complaint against a police officer, and 997 to report corruption). 
Although it was not possible to determine how much these lines are used, some 
indication can be drawn from the fact that in 2013 public complaints against 110 
officers were forwarded to the Police Disciplinary Committee. Sixty-three of these 
were referred to the Police High Council to be dismissed from the force (RNP, 2014).  
 
The RNP’s reputation for internal discipline is reflected in popular accounts. National 
police departments are one of the state’s “principle socialising and symbolic 
agencies”, and their behaviour affects popular perceptions of the state (Marenin, 
1982:384). For the most part, junior officers in Rwanda did not have the reputation 
for personally profiting from their position. Corruption (rushwa) was so heavily 
stigmatised that the slightest suggestion, even inadvertent, of attempting to bribe a 
police officer carried inherent risks. As one respondent attested: “if you even show 
them money, they can arrest you”.109 The commander of the Kigali City Metropolitan 
police confirmed that even the smallest irregular financial transactions would elicit 
harsh penalties: “even 1,000 or 2,000 francs [approximately one or two USD] … you 
go! [to prison]”.110 The Office of the Ombudsman periodically publishes lists of 
                                                          
 
108 Notably the Executive Office, the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and 
Security, the National Human Rights Commission, the Auditor General, the Ombudsman and the 
Rwanda Governance Board. 
109 Informal Discussion, Taxi-moto Driver, Kigali, 17 December 2015. 
110 Interview, Rogers Rutikanga, Muhima Metropolitan Police Headquarters, 8 October 2014. 
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individuals recently convicted of corruption, together with their profession, 
umudugudu, the amount of the bribe, the fine (often twice the size of the bribe) and 
the prison sentence (often several years, even for very small financial transgressions). 
Notably, sentences depended in part on the profession of the accused. Police officers 
found guilty of taking bribes received markedly longer prison terms than other public 
servants:111  
 
Figure 8. Rwanda Ombudsman Corruption Penalties 
 
Source: http://ombudsman.gov.rw/IMG/pdf/2015_second_quarter.docx.pdf 
accessed 21 September 2016. 
 
                                                          
 
111 Despite these measures, a recent corruption perception survey conducted by Transparency 
International ranks the RNP and in particular the traffic police) as having the highest propensity for 
taking bribes among different government departments in the country (Transparency International, 
2013). This was a source of some embarrassment for senior police officers, who emphasized that 
additional measures were being taken to combat corruption among traffic officers and that despite 
the ranking relative to other state branches, the figures remained very low in absolute terms. 
Supporting this, the same Transparency International survey ranked Rwanda as the fourth least 
corrupt state in Africa. 
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Although it is difficult to gauge public trust112 in the RNP, Rwandans with whom I 
spoke described interactions with state police as being for the most part predictable 
and transparent. This accords with recent survey reports from Transparency 
International (2013 and 2014). Interviewees considered state police officers to be 
uncompromising in their execution of the law. They operated ‘by the book’, without 
much scope for negotiation.113 This professionalism is projected onto CPC members 
and abanyerondo patrolmen at the interface between state and non-state policing. 
As one patrol leader recounted: “if we want to be taken seriously, we must behave 
like the police officers do”.114  
 
To place this arrangement in a theoretical context, Dupont’s (2004) ‘metaphors of 
capital’ provide a revealing way to look at the relationship between state and non-
state policing groups. As a state institution, the RNP has an abundance of political 
capital in its links to central government, of cultural capital in terms of expert 
knowledge and training, and of symbolic capital in terms of mechanisms and symbols 
that confer legitimacy. Police train non-state patrols and grant them a legitimacy they 
would otherwise lack in exchange for the human capital that patrolmen offer in terms 
of raw numbers, and the social capital of their embeddedness in small communities. 
 
This exchange of capitals is heavily weighted in favour of the state police. Civilian 
patrolmen are deprived of the forms of capital that would allow them to leverage 
state officials. A file on each abanyerondo patrolman is held at the cell offices and in 
the office of the district’s community police liaison officer, where box files containing 
thousands of personalised documents line the shelves (see Appendix 1). A 
patrolman’s right to work can be removed at any time without warning. They are 
poor, they are often held in relatively low esteem by the communities in which they 
work, they are not allowed to carry firearms, and their use of violence is heavily 
                                                          
 
112 ‘Trust’ has gained popularity in recent years as a metric for assessing the interaction between public 
institutions and populations (see Goldsmith, 2005). It remains plagued by definitional challenges, 
however. 
113 Informal Discussion, Small Business Owner, Kigali, 4 May 2014. 
114 Interview, Irondo Patrol Leader, Nibuye Cell (Kigali), 18 November 2014. 
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restricted (see Incident 1, in which a patrol goes out of its way to ‘clean up’ a suspect 
before delivering him to police patrols, for fear of being penalised by state 
authorities). 
  
The state hierarchy counteracts these limitations by creating institutional incentives 
for individuals to volunteer into the local security roles (notably CPC membership, 
amarondo patrols and positions in charge of imidugudu). Engaging in state-led 
activities signals a commitment to the Rwandan project that provides regular citizens 
security against being labelled as subversive. It is also a way in which they can derive 
some small degree of state authority. In some cases it could even offer a route into 
more lucrative positions in private security companies or as private house guards, 
particularly for young men well liked by their community. Due to the RNP’s 
educational requirements, however, it was not considered a stepping stone towards 
joining the state police (for the RNP’s formal recruitment criteria, see Appendix 2).  
 
Overall, the degree of coordination that state police exert over CPCs and 
abanyerondo in institutional terms goes beyond what Baker (2012:279) has termed 
“permission to row”. Regular meetings with DASSO officers, RNP community liaison 
officers and cell administrators provide a significant degree of steering and direction 




Information is passed up to central government bodies through a number of different 
channels. It can move through the RNP’s internal chain of command, the government 
administrative hierarchy, the party hierarchy of the RPF, and in more selective and 
high profile cases the military and NISS. These interconnected hierarchies provide a 
range of mechanisms intended to promote internal discipline and monitor eachother. 
Corrupt or abusive practices can rarely remain hidden by the silence of one official in 
                                                          
 
115 This is illustrated in the coordinated arrest described in Incident 3, Chapter Four. 
160 
 
one chain of command. Working together, they provide an intricate and efficient 
system of intelligence gathering, one that has attracted criticism for the degree to 
which it penetrates the private sphere of the general population (see Thomson, 
2011:444; Beswick, 2010:241; Begley, 2009:5). 
 
In recent years, commentators have alluded to the surveillance of cell phone calls and 
email communications, to the monitoring of listed individuals by agents of the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence (now the NISS) and the Presidential Protection 
Unit, and to the planting of professional government spies into organisations, as 
among the means the government employs for controlling the population 
(Purdeková 2011:488; Thomson, 2011:444; Beswick, 2010:240). In the aftermath of 
the genocide, Reyntjens (2009) argues that a ‘security machine’ was put in place by 
the RPF, he writes: 
 
In an emerging police state, the press and civil society were put under 
increasing control, party political activities were prohibited, mail was opened, 
telephones and other communications were monitored and movements inside 
the country and abroad were carefully watched.  
Reyntjens (2009:28) 
 
Almost every researcher working in Rwanda hears stories of pervasive government 
surveillance, and many will find themselves consciously or unconsciously adapting 
their behaviour accordingly (see Chapter Two). I can say nothing about the claims 
regarding full-time, trained and salaried government informants, as it was not 
something that I personally encountered.116 I was aware that both private and state 
                                                          
 
116 The RNP’s use of plainclothes police is sanctioned by Article 20 in the Ministerial Code on Police 
Conduct (Republic of Rwanda, 2010a). Under special conditions, these officers are permitted to carry 
concealed weapons. Although undercover policing is a tool of any police department, local accounts 
in Rwanda, including those within the security sector, suggest it is especially commonplace in the 
country, and deployed not only by state organisations but also private security companies. Perhaps 
most insidiously, plainclothes security is deployed on university campuses in the form of ‘fake 
students’, justified on the basis that the campus buildings were a potential target for terrorist attacks 
linked to the FDLR (Interview, Head of Private University Security Company, 3 November 2014). 
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security groups commonly deploy plainclothes security officials. In the routine work 
of everyday policing, undercover officers support police and military in their patrols 
and in the monitoring of strategic hotspots.117  
 
It is worth stressing that many similar claims, which circulate widely among 
diplomatic, developmental and academic circles in Rwanda and among diaspora 
opposition groups overseas, remain extremely difficult to verify. Even if credible 
evidence periodically emerges to support them, it is almost always accompanied by 
a wealth of unsubstantiated rumours. Certainly there is cause for suspicion, as the 
Rwandan state is characterised by a very high degree of clandestineness, especially 
in terms of internal security (see Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012:340). As Abrams 
(1988:63) argues, “the fact that someone can impose secrecy is surely evidence both 
that that person has power and that he has something to hide – common sense 
infers”. What exactly is being hidden, however, does not necessarily align with 
popular assumptions, and some of the more extreme accounts of Rwandan 
surveillance call for a common-sense re-evaluation.  
 
The political monitoring of several hundred high profile individuals is a completely 
different matter from maintaining close surveillance of over eleven million citizens. 
It seems unlikely that the Rwandan government possess anything like the 
infrastructure, funding or human capital required to deploy this kind of personalised 
surveillance to the population at large. Nevertheless, the effects of such rumours are 
tangible. Once it has been established that any degree of undercover or plainclothes 
security is in operation, popular suspicion is inclined to exaggerate the frequency of 
their deployment and the capacity of the institutions involved. Speculation and 
rumours play an important role in shaping popular perceptions of the security 
apparatus. States engage constantly in constructing an image of policing and its 
boundaries that ‘does not correspond with reality’ (Baker, 2012:276). As such, the 
                                                          
 
117 Informal Discussions, Senior RDF and RNP Officers, Kigali, January-March 2015. 
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Rwandan government has little incentive to dispel accounts that exaggerate its 
capacity to monitor the population.  
 
My approach to this issue is to draw a careful distinction between political 
monitoring, particularly among elites, and the gathering of information for the 
purpose of crime prevention. The focus here is on the latter, and involves temporarily 
putting aside such ‘shadow methods’ as tapped phones, monitored emails and full-
time government agents, which are both difficult to investigate and most likely 
confined to the upper echelons of the political realm (Beswick, 2010; Purdekova, 
2011). The Rwandan government obtains a considerable knowledge of its population 
by less secretive means. It has a formidable capacity to draw information upward to 
centralised authorities through a lengthy chain of personal communications. 
Individuals are identified by a range of cards issued by the state, including a personal 
identification card (indangamuntu), an umuganda attendance card and a mutuelle de 
santé health insurance card.118 In local administrative offices, files are kept on every 
household, particularly regarding state payments owed (see also Purdeková, 
2016:74). 
 
In terms of crime reporting, each incident conveyed by a patrol leader to the head of 
his umudugudu at the end of the night shift is discussed at the morning CPC meeting, 
and, if deemed significant, passed on to cell authorities. Representatives at the cell 
level filter this information and pass on relevant details to individuals at the sector 
headquarters, to local police station commander (as a ‘sit rep’ message) or directly 
to the district authorities. Information moves between individual agents, rather than 
between agencies, and passes upwards through the hierarchy via a series of short 
steps between people known to one another, increasingly through the medium of 
internet text messaging.  
 
                                                          
 
118 In 2014, the National Identification Agency issued smart ID cards containing biometric data to over 




Minor incidents are filtered out and handled at the appropriate tier. More serious 
matters continue to be passed up the chain until they are presented to a daily 
meeting of senior military, intelligence and police officials at the Joint Operations 
Centre (JOC) in Kigali. Meetings of the JOC are used to discuss any case involving 
murder, the discovery of weapons (particularly explosives), fatal car accidents, high 
profile corruption cases, rape, abortion, the discharge of weapons anywhere in the 
country, and a range of other serious or out of the ordinary criminal activities that 
have occurred in the past twenty-four-hour period. These meetings are attended by 
ranking members of the RNP, the RDF and the NISS, and are a forum in which all the 
intelligence drawn up different hierarchical chains of command can be discussed 
together. A report of the JOC is presented to the Chief Inspector of Police and to the 
Minister of Internal Security every morning. Thus, intelligence gathering works from 
the bottom up. Despite its internal cohesiveness, the hierarchy would be ineffectual 
if ordinary citizens did not pass information to it in a timely fashion. The battle for 







Sensitisation and Top-Down Information Flows 
 
The RNP has embarked on a campaign of ‘sensitisation’, in which police commanders, 
cell executive secretaries and liaison officers are charged with keeping local 
communities abreast of changing regulations, encouraging non-state participation in 
crime prevention, and promoting civic values. To this effect, the RNP uses a range of 
different media outlets, including publications in the government-owned New Times, 
the monthly Police Kinyarwanda Magazine and quarterly Police English Magazine, as 
well as call-in radio shows on Contact FM, Rwanda Radio, Radio One and Flash FM. 
These outlets are often used to publicise week- or month- long sensitisation 
campaigns, such as ‘Anti-GBV Week’, ‘Community Policing Week’ or ‘Road Safety 
Month’, and are run officially out of the RNP Department for Public Relations. 
 
More directly, the RNP holds monthly town hall meetings at the sector level and 
regular consultations with civil society organisations. One police officer responsible 
for these meetings reflected on the challenges of keeping the population informed 
about changing regulations119: 
 
We are still living in a transitional society, and the laws are changing […] just 
to keep up with the population. That means we have to be constantly 
communicating with the people, and sometimes it is not perfect. It is a serious 
problem in poorer areas, or where many people are illiterate – just to make 
sure that everybody knows the law. 
Interview, District Police Commander, Kigali, 24 November 2014. 
 
Judging by informal responses from moto-taxi drivers, night patrolmen, and market 
stall holders, as well as observations from the sensitisation events I attended, it was 
rare for much to be said that was not already known to those gathered. Rather than 
political socialisation per se, I had the impression that these meetings were first and 
                                                          
 
119 Avoiding events like those of the police shooting case in Nyamasheke in Incident 4, in which police-
community hostility was sparked by a misunderstanding of the rules. 
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foremost about reminding civil society organisations of the police presence in their 
communities and about the particular elements of the penal code – notably the 
penalties linked with different crimes – that applied to their trade.120 They also 
encouraged non-state groups to inform the state about suspicious or criminal 
behaviour, and provided them access (such as specialist toll-free phone numbers) by 
which to do so. At times, tangible encouragements were also provided, including 
monetary contributions to civil society groups or practical tools such as mobile 
phones and bicycles. Local government authorities might also offer exemptions from 
the many ‘contributions’ (umusanzu) that Rwandans are required to pay into the 
state system, for example waiving the monthly mutuelle de santé health insurance 
payments for civil society leaders and heads of imidugudu. 
 
The efficiency of the government’s hierarchies for gathering information and its 
mechanisms for encouraging civic participation in policing through sensitisation 
campaigns are significant factors in crime prevention, but do not sufficiently account 
for why information moves so readily from small communities in Rwanda up into the 
state machinery. The following sections provide additional environmental, cultural 




                                                          
 
120 Often the statistical prevalence of particular crimes was also emphasized, particularly if trends 
suggested that they were on the rise. This reflected the pressures put on senior district officers, bound 
to security performance contracts, to show falling crime rates in their jurisdictions. 
166 
 
5.3 The Organisation of Small Communities 
 
Despite the efficiency of the state hierarchy, the RNP, the RDF and DASSO represent 
a relatively small superstructure that sits atop a much larger policing system at the 
cell and village level. This reflects significant historical continuity with the country’s 
recent past. The significance of non-state participation in Rwanda has at times been 
obscured since, to the outside observer, the visibility of uniformed officials on the 
central hilltops of Kigali gives the impression of a country swamped with government 
security. Since 2010, grenade attacks have prompted an exceptional security 
presence in the central business sectors of Rwanda’s major cities. This is not 
representative of the security environment across the bulk of the country’s urban 
districts. In most residential imidugudu, blue and green uniformed state security 
(Police, DASSO and the RDF) rarely stray from the main roads connecting strategic 
hotspots. This is expressed in government documents: 
 
Policing and ensuring law and order in Rwanda is as much a societal function 
as it is the responsibility of the police and other organs of state, in a 
partnership that allows the latter to extend their reach beyond where the 
traditional approaches to policing would allow. 
‘Policing a Rapidly Changing Post-Conflict Society’ (RNP, 2014:117) 
 
Unlike cases, such as the South African or Nigerian police forces, where officers take 
great lengths to avoid deployment into outer townships for fear of violent resistance 
(see Steinberg, 2008; Owen, 2014), I was never given the impression that individual 
police in Rwanda were intimidated by the prospect of entering neighbourhoods that 
lie off their main patrol routes. Rather, because the RNP relies on the self-policing 
mechanisms of small communities, they can justify a light presence in many 
residential zones on the basis that these neighbourhoods are lower-profile and less 
prone to criminal activity than busy central market areas. Interviewing one patrol 
officer, this contrast was made explicit. Pointing to residential imidugudu, made up 
of low build-quality housing stretching down a hillside off the main road, he 
commented: “Those are the safe places. The people there handle their own security. 
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They bring the suspects to us”.121 These small, self-policing communities have certain 
distinctive features, detailed below. 
 
Demographics and Population Density 
 
The first distinctive feature of Rwanda’s urban neighbourhoods is the sheer density 
of humanity contained within them. Rwanda is among the most densely populated 
countries in the world, and is ranked internationally third among countries with a 
population over ten million (behind Bangladesh and The Republic of Korea) (World 
Bank, 2014). High population densities in urban neighbourhoods are commonly 
associated with the kinds of micro-level violence that are of concern in this analysis 
(see Danzinger, 1976; Harries, 1980). Rwanda’s cities have expanded at a speed that 
has elsewhere resulted in serious security concerns and rising crime rates. The 
growth of densely populated townships on the outskirts of the country’s larger urban 
spaces has been a source of alarm for police authorities. Street and house numbers 
have yet to be assigned in a way that allows police patrols to be accurately directed 
to the sites of ongoing crimes (RNP, 2013:38; see also Incident 1, above). Of even 
greater concern, high population density is prompting conflicts over land (André & 
Platteau, 1998; Sommers, 2012). The Police Criminal Investigations Department has 
identified a disturbing rise in violent crime associated with land ownership (RNP, 
2014:102; see Incident 4, above). 
 
There is another side to the relationship between population density and street 
crime, however. When internal coordination is strong, high concentrations of people 
can exert a level of scrutiny over each other that is not possible in sparsely populated 
regions (Herbst, 2000). When asked about surveillance and complaints from 
Rwandans that feel they are being constantly watched, one military official 
commented: 
 
                                                          
 
121 Interview, Police Sergeant, Kigali Nyamirambo Sector, 18 October 2014. 
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In some sense they are right. But […] you have to realise it is because there are 
just so many people. It is not like Europe or America here. Look around you. 
Where can you go where you can be alone in Rwanda? Even inside the houses 
there are many people staying there. It is not easy to commit a crime here. To 
do anything in fact, without someone seeing you do it. 
Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 10 January 2016. 
 
Wherever there are people in Rwanda, there is surveillance, intra-communal policing, 
and information channels to state authorities. Individuals attempting to evade state 
police in Rwanda tend to flee into unpopulated areas, rather than try to blend into 
densely populated neighbourhoods. This is illustrated in Incident 2, a case of young 
men in Nibuye cell evading patrols by escaping the densely populated, maze-like 
informal settlements on the banks of the Ruganwa river. This tendency was also 
emphasised by officers in the Criminal Investigations Department.122 
 
This surveillance mechanism is linked to the relative immobility of the Rwandan 
population. In traditional Rwandan society, a house is something that a young man 
constructs as part of his initiation into manhood, and then lives in permanently 
(Sommers, 2012). The desire for a life-long family home still endures among people 
who have migrated to the country’s major cities, and contributes to the relatively low 
levels of permanent intra-urban migration.123 Urban neighbourhoods may be densely 
populated, but residents tend to be well-known to one another.  
 
Furthermore, the disinclination to move lessens one of the key mechanisms that has 
been associated with deteriorating societal cohesion. Elsewhere, when a 
neighbourhood develops a reputation for hosting criminal activity, law abiding 
residents often move out rather than to attempt to restore order internally through 
collective action (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). At least for the time being, small 
                                                          
 
122 Informal Discussions, Police Officers, Criminal Investigations Department, Kigali (Kacyiru), 18 
October 2014. 
123 Interview, Senior Official, Rwandan Governance Board, 15 June 2014. 
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communities in Rwanda produce self-correcting mechanisms due to the frustrations 
of permanent residents. An example of this can be seen in the rise of voluntary 
amarondo patrols in the late 1990s during periods of escalating crime. It can also be 
seen in modern day-to-day practices. Rwandans habitually engage with their local 
CPCs to voice neighbourhood concerns or complaints about particular residents or 
patrolmen. 
 
In general, population density can impact rates of micro-level violence in one of two 
ways. It facilitates either more anonymity or more internal monitoring depending on 
the communities in question, how they are internally organised and how well they 
are coordinated by state security. For the time being, in combination with other 
factors, Rwanda’s very high population density appears to be a supporting factor in 
crime prevention.  
 
Orderly Urban Aesthetic and Public ‘Hygiene’ 
 
The clean roads and manicured lawns of Rwanda’s larger cities stand out in a region 
marked by the visual signs of poverty. Some debate has taken place as to whether 
the country’s distinctive aesthetic reflects successful development (Gourevitch, 
2009:37), or is merely ‘cosmetic upgrading’ that masks more pressing challenges 
faced by the poor (Ansoms, 2009). These debates at times obscure the impact of the 
physical setting on local security. 
 
A growing literature that dates back to Wilson and Kelling’s 1982 ‘Broken Windows’ 
thesis has shown how the appearance of order and cleanliness in a neighbourhood 
environment can reduce rates of street crime (Kelling & Coles, 1997; Sampson et al., 
2004).124 The appearance of disorder has a profound impact on the behaviour of both 
residents and potential criminals: 
                                                          
 
124 Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) original contribution has been subject to intense scrutiny over thirty 
years, while debates about broken windows and community policing have become politicised due in 




[…] at the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, 
in a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers 
tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, 
all the rest of the windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice 
neighborhoods as in rundown ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily 
occur on a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined 
window-breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, 
one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking 
more windows costs nothing. 
Wilson and Kelling (1982) 
 
By the same logic, clean, orderly environments discourage criminal behaviour, and 
produce greater social cohesion among residents, emboldening them to challenge 
any disorderly behaviour they encounter (Corman & Mocan, 2002). Government 
authorities in Rwanda have adopted the term ‘hygiene’ to refer to this kind of 
generalised public order, and the Ministry of Local Government, in conjunction with 
the RNP and One-UN Rwanda have recently begun a scheme of ‘hygiene and security’ 
awards at the sector level.125  
 
The mandatory community service, umuganda, provides an example of the Rwandan 
government’s awareness of the mechanisms that link security to cleanliness. 
Umuganda, described briefly in Chapter Three, is a community cleaning programme 
that takes place on the final Saturday morning of each month. It is compulsory for 
Rwandans between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five to take part. Communal work 
varies in nature, but often includes some element of manual labour, building, 
repairing local infrastructure, or cleaning. Umuganda serves the twin functions of 
                                                          
 
engaging directly with these debates is beyond the scope of this thesis, I draw on a series of more 
recent studies and review articles that show how many of the original claims about the relationship 
between public order and crime have survived rigorous empirical analysis (see Sampson et al. 2004; 
Xu et al. 2005; Corman & Mocan, 2002). 
125 Public Speech, Stanislas Kamanzi, Rwandan Minister of Natural Resources, Kigali, 28 June 2013.  
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physically cleaning up small communities and encouraging residents to share 
information. One high ranking RNP officer made the link between these activities and 
security explicit:  
 
Umuganda brings people together each month to […] meet their neighbours 
and know who’s who in their community. They keep their space clean […] They 
share information, so they can act like a unit when there are problems. It 
makes them safer.  
 Interview, Senior RNP Officer, Kigali, 8 July 2014 
 
By making monthly interactions between residents compulsory, umuganda 
safeguards against what Wilson and Kelling (1982:13) call “shrinking from the street”, 
in which neighbourhood residents cease to cooperate in the face of deteriorating 
circumstances. Simultaneously, cleanlier neighbourhoods have a tangible 
psychological effect on residents, one that promotes greater social order and reduces 
the fear of criminality (Sampson et al., 2004; Xu et al. 2005). Such fears can otherwise 
threaten to destroy, in Hill’s words: “not only the physical security of individuals, but 
also the social networks and technical infrastructure sustaining cities. That is, their 
order” (Hills, 2012:7). As such, the cleanliness of Rwanda’s streets is more than an 
aesthetic nicety. It is driven by a government agenda to physically construct social 
order, to build it into the lived environment of the country’s cities, and to promote 
internal security. 
 
Cultural homogeneity and the Umuco Nyarwanda 
 
Rwanda’s locally administrated, densely populated, and scrupulously tidied 
neighbourhoods also tend to be relatively culturally homogenous. Although ethnic 
divisions remain a central concern of the national police, behind the historical schism 
between Hutu and Tutsi there is relatively little linguistic, religious, and cultural 
diversity, especially when compared to the country’s larger regional neighbours 
(Hintjens, 2008). When dealing with relatively homogenous societies, community 
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policing proponents are seldom called upon to tailor programs to the needs of diverse 
sub-groups (Davis et al. 2003:287). 
 
Since it is forbidden to discuss issues of ethnicity, I was not able to establish whether 
communities with larger Hutu or Tutsi populations were policed differently. What I 
could establish is that there are noticeable differences in the manner that more 
affluent communities in central Kigali were policed compared to poorer ones. Policing 
in the central business sector of Muhima, the wealthy residential sectors of 
Nyarutaurama, Kiyovu and Kimihurua, and the government administrative sector of 
Kacyiru operates somewhat differently from the majority of urban neighbourhoods. 
These wealthy areas have a much larger uniformed state security presence than 
other residential zones, as well as a higher proportion of private security and house 
guards. They are more socially and culturally diverse than elsewhere, and contain the 
country’s highest proportion of non-Rwandans. They also contain a 
disproportionately high number of what the police regard as strategic hotspots: 
sensitive infrastructure, government offices, and financial institutions. Residents 
were less likely to know their neighbours by name, and government mobilisation 
schemes such as umuganda were less rigorously enforced. These sectors account, 
however, for a very small fraction of urban neighbourhoods, and should be treated 
as non-representative outliers when it comes to general characteristics of urban 
crime prevention.   
 
Outside of the country’s wealthiest sectors, the notion of a unified ‘Rwandan culture’ 
featured prominently in interviews, where respondents emphasised its role in 
keeping down rates of crime. How durable this culture is over time, how strongly it 
impacts behaviour, and how much it is reinforced by government edicts, is difficult 
to say. Government sensitisation campaigns have attempted to tap into cultural 
norms to foster support for government policies and to encourage financial exactions 
(umusanzu, lit. contributions) (see also Purdeková, 2011; 2016). This means that 
references to positive cultural attributes may be merely ‘safe answers’ that stick 




Nevertheless, I am not convinced that references to Rwandan culture are purely for 
show. The consistency with which these explanations emerged out of the spectrum 
of interviews I conducted, as well as the enthusiasm with which they were recounted, 
suggested a sincere national pride in the umuco nyarwanda, the Rwandan cultural 
code. Behind the formal penal code imposed by state police was a more general code 
of behaviour that was frequently referred to in communal gatherings. The most 
skeletal form of the umuco nyarwanda can be split into three broad and at times 
overlapping categories: 
 
1. The first involve ‘absolute taboos’, principally against incest and the sexual abuse 
of children.  
 
2. The second comprises a set of traditional ‘village’ ethical values, more-or-less 
universally known and often gender-specific, but adhered to only in particular social 
settings. 
 
3. The third category is most relevant to the discussion of policing. It consists of a 
complex series of ethical values, divided between indandadaciro, behaviours which 
are encouraged, and kirazira, which are discouraged.  
 
Kirazira refers in effect to public order infractions. Examples include not being seen 
eating, smoking cigarettes, kissing or showing overt affection in public places, 
littering, and making too much noise in the streets. Respondents tended to label as 
kirazira any actions that involved a loss of personal control, notably drunkenness or 
other kinds of intoxication.126 I return to these examples below in accounts of a 
generalised intolerance towards forms of social disharmony. More immediately, two 
points are worth emphasising: 
                                                          
 
126 Certain of these cultural considerations may account in part for Baker’s (2007:347) observation 
that: “even the moral overtones of leadership discourse and mayoral edicts that ban short skirts, bare 
feet, local church music, and spitting and urinating in the street […] are not protested as they might 




First, among Rwandans with whom I interacted, this cultural code was consistent and 
universally known, even when at times disregarded. This was true regardless of their 
region of origin, ethnicity, religion or social background. Similarly, it was apparent 
that kirazira and indandadaciro amount to more than a generalised code of 
politeness, and were instead perceived as a relatively formal set of social rules. Many 
respondents recounted an identical list of principles, often in precisely the same 
wording as others in different settings.  
 
Second, this code of behaviour was not associated with the state and pre-dates the 
RPF’s ascent to power in 1994. One respondent made this point emphatically: “these 
are our rules; they are not political. They do not come from the government”.127 
Government authorities have nonetheless attempted to exercise a degree of 
ownership over the cultural behavioural code. Lists of indandadaciro and kirazira 
behaviours are put up on the walls of district administrative buildings and police 
posts. They are read out at anti-crime clubs along with legal infractions and other 
local government priorities. Despite this, respondents consistently emphasised the 
separation of the Rwandan penal code from the umuco nyarwanda. They stressed 
the importance of the cultural code as a source of social cohesion: ‘the thing that 
binds our society together’. They also made clear that it was articulated, monitored 
and enforced not by state representatives, but ‘inside the umudugudu’, particularly 
by inyangamugayo: local leaders with an upstanding moral reputation.  
 
There is often a difference between the way that states and populations define the 
‘irreducible minimum’ of general order (see Marenin, 1982:838). In Rwanda, it 
appears that locally constructed accounts of kirazira may offer an insight into what 
such a public definition looks like. Societal enforcement of these principles employs 
a range of sub-state practices within the umudugudu, practices that the state has co-
                                                          
 
127 Interview, Head of Umudugudu, Rubavu District, 3 November 2014. 
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opted to crime prevention by partnering with village leaders in the policing of local 
communities. 
 
Community Policing: Information and Anonymity in Small Communities 
 
This section returns to the concept of community policing, not as a government 
strategy, but in more practical terms as a community’s internal mechanisms for 
maintaining public order. Accounts of community policing in Rwanda are often 
expressed in banalities: “the society will live in harmony”, “the people will be aware 
of crime prevention”, “human rights will be promoted”, “terrorism awareness will be 
present”, “problems in dangerous places will be known in time”, “there will be 
partnership and team building between police and the community”.128 Perhaps 
understandably I was at first sceptical of the government narrative invoked by these 
soundbites, and was inclined early on in my research to disregard the significance of 
community policing initiatives as being anything more than window dressing.129 
Behind the ornamental rhetoric, however, lie concrete mechanisms for maintaining 
public order in which the most salient feature is the way that information concerning 
security flows between the public and private spheres. 
 
It is important to note that the Rwandan security network described in Chapter Four 
is designed, rather than spontaneous. This sets it apart from systems elsewhere on 
the continent, in which community policing and sub-state security have expanded in 
response to government inadequacies (see Baker, 2004; Abrahams, 1987). Organised 
local security groups in Rwanda are not so much “tacit acknowledgements by the 
state of the limitations and ineffectiveness of its fragmented and monopolistic 
intervention strategies” (Dupont, 2004:79) as additional appendages that the 
government can control. The community policing apparatus (notably night 
                                                          
 
128 These quotations are taken from the RNP Handbook of Community Policing (2014), and were 
recounted in a range of interviews and informal discussions. 
129 Brogden (2004) has written at length about the mismatch between the rhetoric and practice of 
community policing initiatives elsewhere. 
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patrolmen, CPC members, and civilian anti-crime clubs) is subservient to the state. In 
the community policing lexicon, the RNP remains the ‘senior partner’ (see Alemika, 
2009) when it comes to their interaction. Despite this, there remains space for local, 
non-state agency in terms of intra-communal social monitoring and the circulation of 
information. 
 
Rwandan communities encourage vigilance as one of the core indandadaciro cultural 
principles. This is something identified by Purdeková (2011), who offers a rare insight 
into the mechanisms of surveillance in the country. Government agencies, she writes: 
“maintain control not only by creating a widespread network of indirect rule, but also 
through a network of eyes and ears that is much more present on a daily basis” (Ibid. 
287). Her representation of a highly repressive system in which Rwandans are 
uniformly fearful of government surveillance, however, risks oversimplifying the 
complex system of intra-communal relations that plays out at the umudugudu level. 
 
Critical accounts of this kind offer a partisan representation of a series of very 
common narratives about local surveillance in Rwanda. Purdeková’s (2011) 
provocative title quotation, ‘Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’, is taken 
from an interview with the coordinator of an Ingando re-education camp, conducted 
inside the camp itself. I encountered similar statements made in residential 
imidugudu, to the effect that ‘everyone is always watching their neighbours’ and ‘we 
are all the eyes of each other’, but was struck by how often this was intended as a 
positive reflection of communities that ‘look out for themselves’. Few people seemed 
uncomfortable with this idea, which was voiced both by police officers and ordinary 
citizens, and was, in my experience, rarely intended as a criticism of the policing 
system. This is not to say that Rwandans are not intimidated at times by the intense 
gaze of umudugudu society, only that this was not always the point of a range of 
quotations that, out of context, may sound sinister to a western ear.  
 
Furthermore, the forms of scrutiny described in these cases were not always 
associated with government monitoring. Indeed, a great deal of energy in small 
Rwandan communities is dedicated to forms of intra-communal monitoring that take 
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place separately from state administration. Information circulates constantly among 
residents, house guards, abanyerondo patrolmen, CPC members, private security 
guards and heads of imidugudu, who show a remarkable degree of knowledge about 
the composition of the neighbourhoods in which they live and work. 
 
Individuals working in the lower tiers of the policing apparatus are often able to list, 
by name, the occupants of households throughout their umudugudu, and are aware 
of who else is performing policing roles within them. Owing in part to the relative 
immobility and the high density of the Rwandan population, residents know their 
neighbours to such an extent that, as one respondent put it “if someone new walks 
into this neighbourhood for the first time, everyone who saw them would know … and 
would watch them”.130  
 
This local knowledge is supported by more formal methods on the part of the 
headpersons in charge of many urban imidugudu, who often keep written records of 
newcomers planning to stay overnight. In an arrangement that is reminiscent of the 
nyumba kumi (ten household) unit at the base of the Habyarimana administrative 
hierarchy, each of the five CPC members for many small communities is informally 
responsible for knowing the inner household workings of one fifth of the imidugudu, 
or approximately fifteen to twenty-five houses. This intense level of intra-communal 
scrutiny is often justified in terms of protecting vulnerable members of the 
community from domestic violence. It was carefully disassociated from government 
or police monitoring: 
 
We look inside those houses to know that everyone is safe and no one is being 
badly treated. 
 Interview, CPC Member, Gisenyi, 3 November 2014. 
 
                                                          
 
130 Informal Discussion, CPC member, Nyamirambo (Kigali), 3 October 2014. The vigilance of the 
gardener described in Incident 1 is one illustrative example of the sensitivity to outsiders and the high 
degree of internal vigilance directed towards them. 
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The police? […] Their job is to deal with crimes when they happen. Our job is 
to prevent crimes before they happen. 
Interview, CPC Member, Kigali, 6 November 2014. 
 
Intra-communal scrutiny is directed towards a set of social infractions (kirazira) that, 
although not necessarily formal, are defined, universally understood, and enforced 
in collaboration with the local population. The result is that urban imidugudu tend to 
demonstrate the very high level of cohesiveness that is typical of communities 
described by Wilson and Kelling (1982), in which “families […] care for their homes, 
mind each other’s children and confidently frown on unwanted behaviour”, even 
where that behaviour is not explicitly illegal. 
 
At the umudugudu level and below, the system also provides oversight of its own 
policing mechanisms. Many Rwandans I spoke to did not trust abanyerondo 
patrolmen not to engage in illegal activities, and younger patrolmen were closely 
monitored by regular citizens, who reserve the right to withhold patrol salaries if 
there are serious complaints about their conduct. As testament to this, CPC members 
and abanyerondo patrolmen are much more likely to be replaced as a result of 
community grievances than by top-down government interventions.131 
 
The RNP openly relies on locally generated information in the prevention of crime 
and in the oversight of amarondo patrols. A government document asserts that the 
community policing agenda “is effective only to the extent that the community is 
minded to get involved in working with the police” (RNP, 2014:108). Furthermore, 
given the lack of street signage and house numbers in many residential imidugudu 
local knowledge of who occupies which property is essential to the police. Officers 
linked the response time of police patrols to the effectiveness with which 
communities would self-police and the propensity of local security representatives to 
provide ‘sit-rep’ messages to police posts.132  
                                                          
 
131 Interview, Sector Executive Secretary, Kigali, 18 September 2014. 




Populations in most places prefer to resolve intra-communal or familial disputes 
locally, without the involvement of state police (Hills, 2009; Francis, 2012), and the 
Rwandan case is no exception. For the most part, amarondo patrols protect their own 
turf and tend not to stray out of their own umudugudu unless some policing activity 
has been directly coordinated from above. Internal discipline of the neighbourhood 
is meted out locally. CPCs, led by their umudugudu leader, can call public meetings in 
which to reprimand residents for inappropriate behaviour and levy fines where 
regulations have been breached.133 Most information on the behaviour of residents 
is pooled in these local policing forums and progresses no further up the state’s 
hierarchical ladder, particularly where it does not explicitly concern threats, 
perceived or actual, to state security. 
 
The relationship between local headpersons of imidugudu, who are predominantly 
Hutu and elected by their local communities, and the executive secretary at the cell 
level, a state appointee and often a delegate of the RPF party, is one of the key 
determinants of whether information is effectively shared with the appropriate state 
authorities (see also Ingelaere, 2015). Incident 4, in which a community in 
Nyamasheke turned violently on its executive secretary and his police escort, 
provides an unsettling illustration of the dangers that exist should these relationships 
break down. In general, they tend to be more amiable, but nevertheless mark a 
dividing line between the formal hierarchy of the state and communal organisations 
closer to the population.  
 
One strategy on the part of the RNP Department of Community Policing has been to 
co-opt elements of Rwandan civil society that might otherwise be threatening to 
public order and put them to work in the security hierarchy. This is evident in the way 
abanyerondo patrolmen are selected. They very often come from the sections of 
                                                          
 
133 Officially, fines must be signed off at the cell offices, although this is often little more than a 
formality. Larger disputes are referred to abunzi mediation committees (essentially local courts), 
which can recommend that repeat offenders be detained at an ingando camp for civic re-education. 
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society, especially unemployed youth, that might otherwise be disruptive. It can also 
be seen in the work of CLOs who organise anti-crime clubs in civil society. They 
encourage associations such as motorbike taxi drivers and money lenders to enforce 
internal discipline and provide information to the police on criminal activities (see 
also, Goodfellow & Smith, 2013:3196; Purdeková, 2011:493). The CLO’s ability to 
exclude individuals from membership in cooperatives is a powerful tool of state 
coercion, and a penalty that cooperative members particularly fear. 
 
Alongside these large male-dominated work cooperatives, a range of women’s 
associations play a similarly important role in information gathering at the local level. 
Government accounts of the North-Western Insurgency emphasise the fact that 
women discouraged men from participating in anti-government operations and 
passed vital information to the RPA.134 The RNP has attempted to sustain this 
relationship in peacetime. Women’s cooperatives, often artisanal groups and market 
traders, are ‘sensitised’ and organised into hierarchies by state policing 
representatives in the same manner as the other groups detailed above. There is a 
woman’s representative on every CPC, and a women’s officer at all sector police 
stations. Their inclusion is officially part of a government drive to improve gender 
equality and reduce GBV, but these women also serve as another set of antennae by 
which relevant security information can pass to state authorities. 
 
Rwanda has nothing resembling the religious police institutions that have attracted 
attention elsewhere (Baker, 2012; Abrahams, 1987). Nevertheless, church 
communities, predominantly Catholic, Protestant, Seventh-Day Adventist and 
Muslim, play a role in local security. Congregations act as an additional forum in 
which residents can assemble and share information. Many have been encouraged 
to establish anti-crime clubs, and serve as a platform from which government 
sensitisation campaigns can be launched. 
 
                                                          
 
134 Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 28 January 2015. 
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Overall, the points of interaction between civil society leaders and imidugudu chiefs 
on the one hand, and police CLOs, cell executive secretaries and DASSO district 
security on the other, is the closest thing that Rwanda has to a clear society-state 
interface. Regarding information flows, this divide is not entirely permeable, and 
underreporting has been a consistent concern of the RNP, particularly regarding 
violence between family members.135 The space below the cell level, occupied by the 
umudugudu leadership, policing committees, community patrols, civil society 
hierarchies and private security guards, constitutes the margins of the state, where 
policing takes place in what Abrahams (1987:179) has termed the “shadows, rather 
than the bright lights of legitimacy and consensus”, and where residents live under 
the intense gaze of intra-communal monitoring, in which anonymity is all but 
impossible to attain. 
 
5.4 The Allergy to Social Disharmony: State/Local Responses to Disorder 
 
The following sections investigate behavioural accounts of crime prevention in 
Rwanda, centred around the intolerances toward social disharmony that have 
resulted from the country’s recent history. I argue that a range of personal 
motivations determine the propensity of residents to monitor their neighbours and 
report information about suspicious or illegal behaviour. This results in a lack of 
predictability about who might be an impromptu informant of the state, which 
discourages dissent and contributes to distrust and suspicion at the grass-roots level, 
something that has been observed by other researchers working in the country 
(Purdeková, 2011; Thomson, 2011; Ingelaere, 2010). 
 
Rwandan policing is most effective when it comes to issues that are of mutual 
concern to umudugudu leaders and state and police representatives at the cell level 
                                                          
 
135 This underreporting has been attributed in part to cultural values of secrecy, particularly within the 
nuclear family unit and regarding sexual violence. (Interview, Theos Badege, Head of RNP Criminal 




(and above), when security is co-produced by state and non-state groups. 
Approaches to preventing drug related crime provide a useful example of where local 
and state interests merge around preventing social disharmony, and where the 
country’s community policing model is at its most efficient. 
 
Fear, Social Disharmony and the Monopoly of Violence 
 
Between 1994 and 1997, the RPF violently reasserted the Rwandan state’s monopoly 
of force. There were substantiated accounts of atrocities, most notably the Kibeho 
massacre in 1995, which circulated alongside more general rumours of government 
brutality (Binet, 2004; African Rights, 1998; Reyntjens 2013).136 This period left the 
population afraid to step out of line, and produced a level of fear that has endured in 
the popular consciousness. For the most part, however, the government’s use of 
violence has subsided. The RPF’s reputation for forceful intervention has been 
maintained more by recollection than by action (see Giustozzi, 2011). It no longer 
relies on the systematic use of violence in its day to day operations. 
 
Throughout the late 1990s, the RPF had to contend with armed resistance from 
elements of the previous regime while at the same time, urban districts, first 
abandoned and then repopulated after the genocide, were engulfed by crime 
(Prunier, 1995; African Rights, 1998). Interviewees indicated that the situation was 
particularly difficult in the outskirts of Kigali, which suffered an ‘epidemic’ of micro-
level violence involving armed gangs. Some even speak of ‘a shoot-on-sight’ policy on 
the part of security forces fighting this crime wave.137 The situation was brought 
under control around the same time as the North-Western Insurgency was defeated 
(see Chapter Three). Urban crime control involved many of the same methods as the 
counter-insurgency campaign, including the beginnings of the community policing 
                                                          
 
136 Public executions were recorded across the country, culminating in the shooting of twenty-one 
suspected genocide perpetrators in Nyamirambo stadium on 24 April 1998. Officially these were the 
final state executions, after which a 1997 ban on capital punishment came into effect. 
137 Interview, Local Businessmen, Muhima, Kigali, 10 April 2014. 
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systems already described: the deployment of Local Defence Forces, the spread of 
the amarondo patrol system and the expansion of an intricate apparatus of local 
intelligence gathering. 
 
Periodic accounts of police violence persisted into the early 2000s. In Nyamirambo, 
local, albeit conjectural accounts, offer an illustrative incident that took place in 
approximately 2002, when a man known to be coordinating a network of drug dealers 
was shot dead outside his house, allegedly by plainclothes police officers. When 
uniformed police officers later arrived, they told residents not to move the body, and 
returned only after twenty-four hours to collect it. The incident was widely known 
throughout the sector, where residents suggested that the delay had occurred 
deliberately to ‘send a message’. I have no way of confirming this story further, but 
the fact that it continues to circulate over ten years later is itself informative. This 
indicates the extent to which the post-war reconstruction period has left an imprint 
on the minds of many Rwandans about the willingness of their government to resort 
to violence in order to enforce public order. 
 
Today, according to both local and official accounts, security forces in Rwanda subject 
the population to violence infrequently. This is acknowledged even by the 
government’s most outspoken critics (Reyntjens, 2013; Thomson, 2011). Police 
shootings do occur, however, and over the course of this research I took note of the 
following: 
 
28 September 2015, Protogene Niyonsenga and Zakary Niyibizi were both shot dead 
in Nyamasheke (see Incident 4, Chapter Four). 
 
26 February 2015, Dr. Emmanuel Gasakure, former physician to President Kagame, 
was shot and killed while in police custody. 
 
17 October 2014, Vedaste Niyomugabo, a street vendor, was shot and killed in 




On 15 June 2014, an alleged poisoner, Eric Hashakimana was shot and killed trying to 
escape police custody. 
 
16 May 2014, Alfred Nsengimana, previously executive secretary of Cyuve sector, 
Musanze District, was killed in police custody by a Rwanda Correctional Services 
Officer.  
 
15 May 2014, two people were shot and killed in an armed robbery in Ruli Cell, 
Muhanga District. 
 
6 May 2014, A pickpocket was shot and killed in central Kigali (Muhima) while 
allegedly running from police officers.  
 
The nature of these incidents and the government’s response to them provide some 
insight into police attitudes towards violence. All seven cases both prompted official 
government statements and attracted critical commentary online. Piecing together 
this information, the death of President Kagame’s personal physician remains 
shrouded in political controversy. The deaths of Eric Hashakimana and Alfred 
Nsengimana similarly have a political backdrop. Nsengimana was arrested in 
Musanze on suspicion of being an infiltrator from the FDLR. He was said to be showing 
police the location of a cache of weapons belonging to anti-government forces when 
he was shot trying to escape. Hashakimana was being held on suspicion of 
involvement in an assassination attempt on General Emmanuel Ruvusha, 
commander of the RDF’s third division, which is stationed on the DRC border. Both 
cases appear to be linked to the ongoing counter-insurgency campaign in the North 
(discussed in Chapter Six), rather than routine crime prevention. The remaining 
incidents sparked internal debate within the RNP. This centred on how to prevent 
similar occurrences in the future.138 Police responses reflected Frankel’s (1980:495) 
argument that, for social order to be maintained over an extended period, it is “a 
                                                          
 
138 Informal Discussions, RNP Officers, Kigali, 10 October 2014. 
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critical minimum that police-community relations avoid situations in which police 
actions inevitably fuel popular discontents which are then projected onto the political 
system”.  
 
The international political context at the time of this research made for revealing 
discussions with Rwandan officers. In late 2014, the news of the Ferguson riots 
against police violence in the USA was a regular topic of conversation among 
Rwandan police with whom I interacted. At closer proximity, accounts of arbitrary 
police abuse in neighbouring Burundi prompted similar internal discussions at the 
RNP. Rwandan officers uniformly condemned these foreign police departments on 
two accounts. First, they emphasised that the arbitrary or ill-disciplined use of 
violence was ‘unprofessional’. Second, they stressed that by the time the riots broke 
out in Bujumbura and Ferguson, the police had, as one Rwandan officer recounted, 
“already failed in their duty … it is our job to know about these things in advance, and 
to prevent them”.139 These comments feed into the topic of state intolerance towards 
social disharmony, discussed below, whereby any violence – even state-led – that 
prompts social upheaval is to be avoided. When asked whether the cycles of anti-
government protest and violent government crackdown that were playing out in 
Burundi could ever be reproduced in Rwanda, one Kigali resident, a university 
student, replied, “It would never get that far. Here, they [government authorities] 
already know what we are thinking”.140 
 
There are no recent accounts in Rwanda of anything resembling the police ‘death 
squads’ identified in contexts such as Kenya (Al-Jazeera, 2014), Burundi (HRW, 2016) 
or in Nigeria, where the Mobile Police (Mopal) unit is known locally as ‘Kill-and-Go’, 
owing to a “trigger happy approach to crime control” (Hills, 2008:219). Over the past 
decade in Rwanda, while there have been isolated incidents of state perpetrated 
violence in enforcing internal security, even the most critical accounts do not amount 
to anything resembling the level of brutality enacted in these cases (see HRW, 
                                                          
 
139 Informal Discussion, Police Sergeant, Kimihurua (Kigali), 18 January 2015. 
140 Interview, Student at Université Libre de Kigali, Kigali (Kiyovu), 10 December 2015. 
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2014a).141 This comparison is not intended to excuse Rwandan abuses where they 
have occurred, but instead to point out that even where the government has 
developed a reputation for authoritarianism – both among critics and among 
Rwandan citizens intimidated by the state’s monopoly of force – it has done so 
despite relatively little overt violence perpetrated in the everyday operation of the 
state. 
 
The population is nevertheless periodically reminded of the state’s strength of arms. 
The heavy police intervention in Nyabugogo bus station in 2013 to thwart the 
‘marines’ is one such example (see Chapter Four). In addition, according to Human 
Rights Watch (2014) at least fourteen people were abducted, held in military custody 
and later accused of affiliation with the FDLR in Gisenyi in early 2014. Perhaps the 
most revealing aspect of this case was the President’s public response, “We will 
continue to arrest more suspects and if possible shoot in broad daylight those who 
intend to destabilise our country.”142 The message intended for the population is 




                                                          
 
141 Hills (2008:223), for example, writes of the police in Nigeria that: “the use of torture and degrading 
treatment of ordinary citizens in local police stations was widespread, routine and often resulted in 
death”. 
142 Kagame, comments made at a public speech in Nyabihu, see The East African (2014) ‘Rwanda to 
arrest or shoot anyone posing a security threat’: http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Rwanda-to-




State Intolerance of Disorder 
 
These days, even when a tyre bursts, it must be reported […] anything that 
signals fighting, we must stop it before it spreads. 
Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 28 January 2015. 
 
Security is our number one priority, everything else is secondary. We cannot 
go back to fighting a war with ourselves. 
Interview, Senior RNP Officer, Kigali Metropolitan Police (Muhima), 8 October 2014. 
 
The return to intra-communal violence constitutes an existential threat to the 
governing elite in the RPF. Significant energy is dedicated to preventing the 
normalisation of violence in the country. There is a ‘zero-tolerance’ approach to 
policing that is catered specifically towards crimes – however minor – that indicate 
social disharmony. This model involves using arrest, even only temporary, for all 
types of crimes, but especially public order misdemeanours and ‘quality of life’ crimes 
(Lum, 2009:794). Its aim is a general reduction of violence. 
 
Assaults, the most commonly reported offense, are consistently followed up on by 
police, while bars and nightclubs that are the scene of too many fights are fined or 
closed down. Similarly, drugs offenses are heavily penalised, in part because they are 
associated with a loss of control (discussed in greater detail below). 
 
This approach has already proven controversial. In 2015, Human Rights Watch 
released a damning report on conditions in the Gikondo Detention Centre, known 
locally as ‘Kwa Kabuga’ (lit. ‘for movement’, since people held there would very often 
be transitioned on to Ingando re-education camps around the country or to the 
Iwawa island detention centre on Lake Kivu) (HRW, 2015a). The camp remains one of 
the police’s main tools in an escalating conflict with ‘street hawkers’, and officials 
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have disputed the critical claims.143 Among government officials with whom I spoke, 
‘hawkers’ was used indiscriminately to describe anyone informally trading, begging 
or loitering in Kigali’s central sectors, all of which were considered unacceptable 
markers of disorder.  
 
The state’s intolerance of social disharmony can also be seen in the types of incidents 
that are presented to the JOC in Kigali. Violent deaths, the discovery of hidden 
weapons and the discharge of firearms are all reported. So too was any indication of 
escalating levels of violence in small communities and any deliberate damage to, or 
defacement of, government buildings.144 In one example joked about by officials, an 
empty sports bag left in the street was reported to the highest security council. Later 
it was discovered that the bag contained the property of a man who had been thrown 
out of his household by his spouse. As one official commented: “It is about stopping 
crimes before they occur, and that means knowing about anything that may look 
dangerous […] any threat is reported”.145  
 
The RNP’s control over firearms is particularly strict. This is partly out of a desire to 
disarm the population and mitigate against further armed rebellion after the North-
Western Insurgency, and partly as a reaction to the unpopularity of Local Defence 
Units (see Chapter Three), who used their weapons to intimidate and at times extort 
the population before being disarmed in 2007.146 Among police officers, every 
weapon is engraved with a yellow service number and turned in at the end of each 
shift. Outside of government shooting ranges, every bullet fired, even in mistake or 
into the air as a deterrent, is meticulously accounted for in JOC reports. In October 
2007, the RNP implemented a Central Firearms Registry, responsible for weapon 
                                                          
 
143 See The East African (2014), ‘Kigali city officials fight back as detainees allege abuse’: 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/Rwanda/News/Kigali-city-officials-fight-back-as-detainees-allege-
abuse-/1433218-1906224-4o1j69/index.html, accessed 22 November 2016. 
144 As an example, the theft of RPF party flags from local sector offices was presented to the centre 
(Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 8 February 2015). 
145 Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 28 January 2015. 
146 The New Times (2007) ‘Rwanda police withdraw military equipment from LDU’: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200703150353.html, accessed 10 December 2015. 
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registration, stock-pile management and the tracing of illegal firearms within 
Rwanda. The department includes a machine for the destruction of obsolete, 
redundant or illegal firearms. The state’s high degree of control over weapons is 
reflected in the rhetoric of senior officers. Commenting on armed militias in 
neighbouring Burundi, and in the context of a discussion of the disarming LDF patrols, 
one senior officer stated candidly: “how can someone who has a gun control someone 
who has a gun?”.147 
 
Incident 4 (Chapter Four) showcases the kind of chain reaction that the government 
most fears. In response to an overbearing executive secretary at the cell level, an 
umudugudu community turned violently on uniformed police. The government’s 
response was a comprehensive inquiry into the events, and a string of public 
statements justifying the police shootings and explaining the circumstances in which 
they took place.  
 
The intolerance of social disharmony extends to the conduct of state and non-state 
security representatives, as evidenced in some of the internal disciplinary procedures 
that have already been described. It is perhaps best reflected in the manner in which 
state authorities control violence on the part of amarondo patrols. Security officials 
insist that abanyerondo have ‘no right to punish’. They serve as antennae for the 
central authorities but can themselves be reprimanded for an overbearing use of 
force. This relationship distinguishes Rwandan policing from accounts of vigilantism 
in other parts of Africa, where non-state patrols operate with little to no state 
coordination, and exercise violence with relative impunity (Buur & Jensen, 2004; 
Pratten, 2008). 
 
The behaviour of the political elite in Kigali indicates a lingering vulnerability 
stemming from the recollection of extreme inter-ethnic violence of 1994 (Hintjens, 
2013). The government is strongly inclined to extinguish any sign of violence, 
                                                          
 
147 Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 28 January 2015. 
190 
 
particularly ethnically motivated, that could otherwise spark more widespread 
disorder or anti-government resistance. State concerns about ethnic divisionism are 
evident in police practices. In murder cases, investigators must establish whether 
genocide witnesses were being killed or whether attacks were motivated by ethnic 
reprisals. Similarly, in gender-based violence (GBV) cases with mixed Hutu and Tutsi 
families, steps are taken to establish whether the crimes were ethnically 
motivated.148  
 
Public speech is monitored for statements that could be considered incitement, and 
in December 2001, ‘sectarianism’ and ‘divisionism’ were made illegal in Rwanda (Law 
No. 37, Republic of Rwanda, 2001). A specific law on ‘genocide ideology’ was passed 
in 2008 (Law No.18, Republic of Rwanda, 2008), with the term defined as: 
 
An aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, speeches, documents and 
other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate people 
basing [sic] on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical 
appearance, sex, language, religion or political opinion, committed in normal 
periods or during war.  
Law Relating to the Crime of Genocide Ideology (Republic of Rwanda, 2008). 
 
It is important to note that the actual enforcement of these laws is relatively 
infrequent. Since 2010, there have been on average between one hundred to one 
hundred and fifty cases of genocide-denial, sectarianism, and divisionism combined 
per year in a population of just over eleven million. By comparison, this number 
equates to approximately half the country’s murder rate.149 While researchers such 
as Thomson (2011:443) have argued the laws are “arbitrarily applied to anyone who 
makes public statements that the government perceives as critical”, it is worth 
keeping the actual numbers of criminal cases in proportion. 
 
                                                          
 
148 Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 20 January 2015. 
149 Criminal Investigations Department Statistics (RNP, 2015), see Chapter Three. 
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Public speech is nevertheless extensively policed, but this policing occurs within small 
communities, most often without the physical presence of state representatives. 
Uncertainty about who might be inclined to report suspicious or explicitly anti-
government behaviour stifles political discussion at the local level. What is notable, 
however, is that this takes place without incurring the kind of witch-hunt associated 
with mass informant networks elsewhere (see Childs & Popplewell, 1996; Schrecker, 
1998). According to both local accounts and to senior officials in the Police 
Department of Criminal Investigations, the instrumental use of false accusations, 
something that could be expected if vaguely worded speech laws were being applied 
systematically, is rare in Rwanda.150 This matter warrants further research. I suspect 
it can be attributed to three factors: (1) the double-checking of information through 
parallel chains of informants, (2) the nature of intra-communal surveillance in which 
incriminating evidence was rarely held only by one individual who could personally 
profit from it, and (3) to a strong cultural value condemning false testimony.  
 
For all the policing of public speech, genocide-denial laws are seldom applied, and 
when they are, it appears to be done selectively and occurs in a political sphere that 
most Rwandans carefully and effectively avoid entering. Regarding speech laws, what 
I witnessed more closely resembled a form of every-day avoidance of the state, 
rather than active ‘every-day resistance’, a term that has been adapted from Scott’s 
(2008) work on peasant revolt in Malaysia and applied to Rwanda in recent years (see 
Thomson, 2011). Rwandans whom I met astutely navigated the regulations on 
acceptable and unacceptable public statements, compartmentalising the divisive 
issues of ethnicity and elite politics and generally avoiding them altogether. The 
police, meanwhile, let these self-policing mechanisms operate without the need for 
systematic crackdowns. 
 
Overall, the RNP appears torn in two directions over the issue of force. On the one 
hand, it enjoys a reputation for the capacity to use violence, something that deters 
                                                          
 
150 See Kalyvas, 2006 for a nuanced analysis of false accusations used for personal benefit in uncertain 
and violent political contexts. 
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criminal activity in itself. On the other, the institution must take care not to develop 
a reputation for arbitrary or systematic brutality, as this could spark more active 
resistance. The maintenance of social order in Rwanda relies on Frankel’s (1980:495) 
‘critical minimum’ of police-community relations, below which the police risk fuelling 
discontent that is directed against the political system. The sections below explore 
where state approaches to crime control find popular support in the attitudes and 
behaviours of Rwandan citizens. 
 
Local Intolerance of Disorder 
 
There is no more room for violence in Rwanda. It was made full in 1994. 
Interview, Head of Umudugudu, Nibuye (Kigali), 16 October 2014. 
 
Once you have seen darkness, you do whatever you can to stay in the light. 
Interview, Irondo Patrol Leader, Gisenyi, 5 November 2014. 
 
Rwanda suffers from palpable conflict fatigue, and the state’s intolerance of violence 
and disorder is reflected by the sentiments of large sections of the population. When 
speaking of attitudes towards violence, many Rwandans refer to the cultural principle 
of ‘kwanga guhemuka’, literally to restrain hatred, and commonly heard statements 
(such as those above), indicate that the legacy of the genocide remains a motivating 
force in the every-day maintenance of public order. A study from 2008 suggests that 
even fifteen years on from the genocide, over twenty-five per cent of adults in 
Rwanda displayed symptoms of clinical post-traumatic stress disorder relating to the 
events of 1994 (Munyandamutsa, et al. 2008). The notion of renewed conflict is an 
intolerable thought to many in the population.151 
 
                                                          
 
151 There are significant ethical and practical difficulties involved in researching post-conflict trauma, 
and the Rwandan government has been tightening its control over this type of research (Informal 
Conversations, Rwanda Research Roundtable R3, Kigali, 6 March 2014). What studies do exist suggest 
a degree of PTSD that is both widespread and not confined to sections of society who were specifically 




These fears are not only associated with politically and ethnically motivated violence. 
Both the genocide and the North-Western Insurgency were accompanied by 
opportunistic and violent crime that went on long after the official cessation of 
hostilities. This is a common feature of post-conflict environments, which produce 
what Marenin (2005:12) calls “a significant diffusion of threats away from the state”, 
in which residents fear “organized crime, normal crime, civic violence [and] local 
militias acting without the law and with little conscience”. 
 
The fear of crime is rarely discussed in Rwanda, and the academic focus has remained 
principally on popular responses to government abuse (see Ingelaere, 2010; Ansoms, 
2009; Reyntjens, 2013). Hayman (2009:13), nevertheless, writes of a “genuine fear 
among many people about a resurgence of violence”, while Purdeková (2011:494) 
argues that intra-communal suspicion and distrust are “strongly compounded by 
genocide fear”, which decreases dissent and assists the state in governing, 
particularly its ability to “gather and disperse, to stage and broadcast, to extract 
resources and attempt its desired transformations” (Ibid.). Participation in crime 
prevention is seen as both a communal activity, linked to the cultural code and the 
control of kirazira behaviours (again, essentially public order infractions that are 
policed locally), and as a public good in the context of the country’s violent past. The 
head of one umudugudu commented to this effect: “Our history has taught us that 
we are all responsible for protecting ourselves […] from these kinds of crimes”.152  
 
A popular intolerance towards violence does not lend itself to straightforward 
empirical or comparative analysis. Nevertheless, local narratives condemning 
violence are commonplace. In the few cases of violence in public settings that I 
witnessed, it was striking how quickly the attitudes of onlookers changed the 
moment a verbal dispute became physical, and how uniformly and vehemently 
condemned any violent action was.153  
 
                                                          
 
152 Interview, Head of Umudugudu, Kigali (Nyamirambo), 18 November 2014. 
153 Incident 2, of a bar fight near Kimironko market, provides some empirical material to this effect.  
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It is important to note that these sentiments are held to an uneven degree 
throughout the population, often related to specific family histories.154 The 
propensity for individuals to hold a strong psychological aversion to disorder based 
on their personal experience of violence or ‘genocide fear’ is not readily known, even 
to peers, colleagues or neighbours. This is another source of uncertainty about who 
might be inclined to report negative behaviours to local cell, police or district security 
officers. It was reflected in the way that house guards, private security guards and 
drivers in taxi-moto cooperatives were all most frequently reported for breaking the 
rules by their associates, particularly when their actions involved violence or drug 
use. This uncertainty, that, based on indeterminable aspects of their character or 
personal history, neighbours and friends may turn out to be impromptu informants, 
is both more pervasive and more ubiquitous than the fear of paid and trained 
government informants operating clandestinely within small communities. 
 
Drug Related Crime and Public Order 
 
For the one who beats you, he will beat you and go. But for the one who is 
consuming drugs he will destroy the whole nation. 
 Interview, Young Student and Crime Club Attendee, Gisenyi, 21 October 2014. 
 
The reaction of Rwanda’s policing system to drug offences is indicative of both state 
and local intolerance towards social disharmony.155 Perhaps to an even greater 
extent than violence, drug use is framed as an almost existential affront to Rwandan 
culture. Behind this rhetoric is a popular backlash against the loss of control 
associated with taking illegal substances, evidenced in both official government 
statements and the attitudes of residents: 
 
                                                          
 
154 The intolerance towards disorder based on historical factors was particularly strongly espoused by 
the heads of amarondo patrols with whom I spoke, although it is unclear whether they were selected 
for the job on this basis. 
155 Human trafficking is another example of a shared concern that has received a lot of government 
sponsored attention in local and national media. 
195 
 
Illicit brew, just like narcotics is becoming a menace to the Rwandan society. 
It […] fuels the rate of criminal activity. Today those who commit crimes such 
as domestic violence, robbery, rape among others are most of time under the 
influence of illicit brews as well as excessive consumption of alcoholic drinks.156 
Ministry of Internal Security, Official Statement on Drug Consumption (2014) 
 
These drugs, they can make the youth crazy and do dangerous things. […] They 
must be controlled to protect everybody. 
Interview, Head of Umudugudu, Kigali (Nyamirambo), 27 August 2014. 
 
In 2013, the RNP handled over three thousand cases of drug traffickers and illicit 
alcohol manufacturers. These constituted almost one third of all listed criminal 
incidents in the country for that year. The overwhelming majority relate to cannabis 
and illegal gins, which are either home brewed (Kanyanga) or from banned providers 
such as ‘Blue Sky’, ‘Chief Waragi’, ‘Zebra Waragi’ and ‘Kitoko’.157 Most cases were 
reported to the police by the public, with residents contacting CPC members, police 
or DASSO to pass on information about suspected drug or alcohol abuse. 
 
According to the Rwandan penal code, the growing, selling, transportation, storage 
and consumption of narcotic drugs are prohibited (Republic of Rwanda, 2012a). 
Article 594 states that “any person who consumes, injects, inhales, anoints 
himself/herself with or makes any other unlawful use of narcotic drugs shall be liable 
to a term of imprisonment of one to three years and a fine of Rwf 50,000 to Rwf 
500,000”. Prison terms are extended to between three and five years for anyone 
caught selling or making drugs, with a minimum 500,000 RWF fine (approximately 
$620 USD). 
 
                                                          
 
156 Full statement available at: 
http://www.mininter.gov.rw/index.php?id=17&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=173&cHash=e29c1d54c7
e9684a75437e0e9c748ea3, accessed 25 November 2016. 
157 Rwandan law prohibits “any drink that exceeds forty-five percent of alcohol and any other drink 
which doesn’t have the required quality for consumption” (Law Governing Narcotic Drugs, Article 24, 
Republic of Rwanda 2012a). 
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Cases relating to illegal substances dominated much of my discussion of crime and 
crime prevention in Rwanda. Drug consumption is an issue on which both local 
community leaders and police officials tend to agree, with the result that significant 
energies are dedicated to combating it. Harsh state penalties tend not to be publicly 
decried, and people involved in local security feel comfortable talking about anti-drug 
crime measures.158 There are several identifiable reasons for this: 
 
(1) Illegal drugs are considered an external threat to Rwanda, and local accounts 
frequently say that cannabis and illegal gins were ‘not grown’ and ‘not brewed’ in the 
country, but brought in from regional neighbours, particularly from the DRC and 
Uganda. They are transported in particular along the pre-1994 smuggling routes that 
transit the borderlands around Gisenyi and Musanze.  
 
(2) Cannabis consumption is strongly associated with the country’s younger 
generation, and close to ninety percent of cases in 2013 and 2014 involved individuals 
aged between eighteen and thirty-five (RNP, 2014:201). The association between 
drug consumption and young people matches the concerns of both heads of 
imidugudu and state representatives about keeping control over the country’s youth.  
 
(3) Drug consumption is linked to a loss of personal control for the drug user. In 
addition to being strongly condemned by the cultural code, it is possible that there is 
also an historical factor in effect, since drug use was closely associated with some of 
the more extreme violence that occurred in 1994 (Prunier, 1995). In the country 
today, the availability of drugs in particular communities is also taken to indicate a 
wider, societal loss of control that police authorities link to the failure of intra-
communal mechanisms of monitoring.  
                                                          
 
158 A draft bill in 2010 proposed the legalisation of cannabis as a painkiller in hospitals, but was shelved 
due in part to popular resistance (Informal Discussion, Senior Advisor, Office of the Prime Minister, 16 






This chapter has argued that the pillars of crime control in Rwanda are (1) the state 
security hierarchy and its ability to syphon information up to the relevant crime-
prevention authorities, (2) the construction of orderly environments, partitioned at 
the umudugudu level, that exhibit high degrees of self-policing and informal control, 
and (3) the incentivisation of Rwandan citizens to participate in intra-communal 
surveillance, either informally, or else in formal but unpaid positions as members of 
anti-crime clubs and CPCs.  
 
On the whole, the prevention of street crime is achieved locally in small Rwandan 
communities, rather than by the uniformed state officials who have a highly visible 
presence at strategic sites. Investigations are secondary to the construction of a 
general environment, partitioned and self-contained into small neighbourhood units, 
that is resistant to crime. Rwandan state authorities have approached crime 
prevention as a process within public order, which is in turn shaped by a range of 
demographic, environmental and cultural factors (see also Hills, 2009:12). 
 
Rwanda’s policing system uses a unique combination of intelligence-led, community-
based and zero-tolerance models. The core strategy involves maximising the number 
of situations in which individuals responsible for maintaining public order interact 
with one another. The key to success is the timely movement of information, which 
passes rapidly up the chain towards central government authorities via a long series 
of close personal links. Current arrangements give rise to a remarkably efficient 
apparatus of information gathering in which individuals reporting crime are not 
required to interact with officials distant to them in the administrative hierarchy.  
 
The enemy of crime prevention in Rwanda is individual anonymity, and significant 
measures have been taken to restrict it. Rwandan authorities effectively identify and 
co-opt individuals, such as unemployed youths, who potentially threaten public 
order. Certain of these measures have attracted criticism elsewhere, as the 
population lives under intense local surveillance by both state and non-state groups.  
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Gisenyi, Rwanda’s largest border town, offers a unique view of the mechanisms of 
crime control that have been discussed up to this point. It is far removed from the 
central hilltops of Kigali, where much of the academic research on Rwandan political 
arrangements has been conducted (see Ingelaere, 2010b). State power, as Asad 
(2004:279) writes, “is always unstable, something best seen when one moves away 
from the centre”. Focusing on urban areas outside of the capital city shows the extent 
to which policing practices are evenly extended throughout the country.  
 
In principle, Gisenyi represents one of the most difficult environments for state law 
enforcement. Its urban districts are pressed against the international border between 
Rwanda and the DRC, exposing the city to borderland dynamics that complicate its 
political governance. It lies on a well-trodden smuggling corridor connecting the 
unstable provinces of eastern DRC, through northern Rwanda and Uganda, to Kenya 
and ultimately to international markets via the port of Mombasa (Lamarque, 2014). 
It is situated in the country’s North-Western Province, the heartland of the ousted 
Habyarimana regime and the epicentre of the anti-government insurgency in 1997. 
Finally, its streets run across the border into districts of the Congolese town of Goma 
that are renowned for their high levels of urban crime. It is a site that challenges 
Rwanda’s state reach, and reveals some of its more nuanced mechanisms. 
  
Rwanda’s western border is relatively frictionless; few regulations are imposed on 
residents wanting to cross between Goma and Gisenyi.159 On a typical morning, over 
twenty thousand people walk over the petite barrière, a small checkpoint connecting 
the two towns (Kimanuka & Lange, 2010; Brenton et al. 2011). Goma and Gisenyi 
                                                          
 
159 Anyone with an identity card registering them as living within the city limits on either side of the 
border can cross free of charge. Congolese and Rwandans from further afield are required to buy a 
laissez passez, at a cost of 3000 RWF (approximately $3.50 USD). 
199 
 
merge completely at the border line, which is marked by nothing more than a dirt 
track running down the hill from the checkpoint towards Lake Kivu. Close to the 
border in Gisenyi, most houses are compounds, with walled gardens and brightly 
coloured roofing. Once in Goma, these buildings give way to the informal 
constructions of wood and corrugated iron that are ubiquitous in poorer townships 
across the continent (see Maps 5 and 6, below). At the boundary, economic, 
demographic, and infrastructural imbalances generate opportunities for the local 
populations on either side and shape the relationship between them. 
 
In Chapters Four and Five, I argued that the bulk of policing in Rwanda takes place in 
the institutional margins of the state, in tightly organised umudugudu communities 
below the cell level of government administration. Most local policing actors are not 
official state representatives, and the system relies on the timely movement of 
information up an extensive law enforcement hierarchy from small communities to 
central government authorities. Despite a high degree of state coordination, social 
relations at the community level matter.  
 
These social arrangements are likely to differ in the country’s border towns (see 
Nugent, 2012; Martinez, 1978; Dobler, 2008). The core questions addressed here are: 
(1) How consistent are policing practices in Rwanda from town to town? and (2) How, 
when goods and people cross with ease, can violent criminality be confined to the 
Congolese side of the border? 
 
This chapter revisits the three principal drivers of crime prevention in Rwanda 
described in Chapter Five: the state security apparatus, the organisation of small 
communities, and the intolerance of social disharmony. It explores each of these in 
the paired border towns and identifies aspects of policing that are specific to this 
setting. I argue that although the structures of state policing are the same as in other 
parts of Rwanda, community policing differs in important ways in Gisenyi, both in 
terms of the actors involved and in how communities engage with state 





Map 2. Street Map, Goma (left) and Gisenyi (right) Border Neighbourhoods 
 
Source: OpenStreetMap Contributors (2016) 
 
Map 3. Satellite Map, Goma and Gisenyi Border Neighbourhoods 
 





6.2 Policing and State Reach in Border Towns 
 
Border towns tend to come in pairs that are connected across a state boundary by 
the interactions between their residents.160 They can vary in the degree to which they 
are ‘inward’ or ‘outward’ facing (Nugent, 2012:557), and in most cases find 
themselves pulled in both directions. Political arrangements drive a centripetal force 
towards the metropole, while cross-border economic practices produce a centrifugal 
force outwards towards communities across the border line (Jackson, 2006). The 
governance of paired border towns reveals how states promote their agendas, and 
how their advances are “received, appropriated, and very often thwarted” (Nugent, 
2012:557). 
 
Recent political analysis of African border towns has been dominated by themes of 
state intervention and local resistance (Dobler, 2010; Nugent, 2012; Zeller, 2010). 
Sovereign authority tends to seep outward from capital cities like a droplet of water 
on filter paper. It dissipates as it approaches a state's territorial edges, and at times 
fails to reach them altogether. States with limited capacity to govern effectively tend 
to prioritise capital cities (Bierschenk & Sardan, 1997). In borderlands, they also 
encounter competition; borders generate alternative modes of governance, often 
based on informal economic interactions between residents (Zartman, 2010).  
 
                                                          
 
160 These urban arrangements have proven remarkably difficult to name. A range of efforts have been 
made, including twin-cities, sister cities, trans-border cities, binational cities, neighbouring cities, 
connected cities and companion cities, all with subtly different meanings (see Buursink, 2001). 
Significant criticism has been levelled against the popular ‘twin’ analogy, as well as other familial 
metaphors, since they imply similarity (see Arreoloa, 1996 on the “Gemini complex”). Buursink (2001) 
compromises with “border-crossing cities”, but even this remains somewhat unsatisfactory, partly due 
to some grammatical ambiguity – the cities themselves are not crossing the border – and partly 
because the observation that pairs of border towns contain crossing points says little about how they 
interact. For the purposes of description, I adopt ‘paired border towns’ to describe Goma and Gisenyi. 
With border interaction built into their definition, border towns cannot be entirely inward facing, their 
“backs turned to each other” (Nugent 2012:558). The border may be present in these cases, but it 
plays a very limited role in the everyday practices of the towns’ inhabitants. Conversely, towns set at 
some distance from a border that, by merit of strong transport and economic linkages ensure that 
residents are in constant interaction with cross-border processes, may well be able to take the name 
border town (Wilson & Donnan, 2016). 
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The border town environment complicates state-led policing, due to a range of 
factors. These include: 
 
The power of local networks and their inclination to subvert government regulations: 
Borders are profitable ‘resources’ for people living close to them (Feyissa & Hoehne, 
2010). Across Africa small differences in the market prices of foodstuffs and low-value 
manufactured goods drive a high degree of small-scale cross-border trade. For 
various reasons, this trade is subject to limited customs duty. In regions far from the 
capital, regulations may not be known, the state may lack the power to enforce them, 
or they may be deliberately evaded. Where more valuable commodities are 
concerned, the border resource can attract military entrepreneurs intent on 
controlling exchange (Nugent 2002:569). Often, state power in peripheral areas must 
be locally ‘brokered’ by individuals who accommodate the interests of powerful local 
actors (Goodhand, 2013). 
 
The lack of incentives for state authorities to police peripheral urban districts 
effectively: Across sub-Saharan Africa, states have struggled to extend their political 
control effectively outwards from political centres in capital cities into more sparsely 
populate rural regions (Herbst, 2000). Even at the centre, their power is often 
contested, constrained by limited resources, and undermined by informal networks 
(Zartman, 1995; Jackson & Rosberg 1982; Allen, 1999). Border towns tend to be a low 
priority for governments that suffer from weak institutions, and state authorities in 
Central Africa have often been content to retreat to capital cities and let peripheral 
zones fend for themselves (Rayemaekers, 2010). 
 
The lack of incentives for local officials to police effectively: State institutions in 
borderlands are rarely the only ones exercising public authority (Lund, 2006b). This 
leaves local police operating as just one coercive actor among many. A common result 
is that local police become complicit in activities which subvert the state, extracting 
rents through taxation and customs regulation, for example, and depriving central 
authorities of revenue (Coplan, 2012; Englebert, 2009; Lamarque, 2014). State police 
in border towns may be torn between loyalty to distant central authorities and the 
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need to stay relevant in the border-town political environment. Or they may exploit 
their position as gate-keepers for personal profit. In these situations, street crime and 
micro-level violence are often left unchallenged.  
 
The lack of coordination between the police forces of neighbouring states: In cases 
where central authorities are disinclined to cooperate effectively, borderland 
residents can take advantage of networked ties across the border to evade state 
enforcement, benefitting from local knowledge that agents from the capital cities on 
either side may lack (Coplan, 2012; Nugent, 2002). These cross-border networks are 
a common problem for borderland policing, particularly where hostilities exist 
between the governing states on either side. 
 
Overall, border towns, and borderlands more generally, have been depicted as zones 
of transition and of ‘concentrated intractability’ (Goodhand, 2013). They generate 
power relationships that challenge central state authority and produce regions of 
limited statehood, or ‘governance without government’ (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992; 
Zartman 2010). They are “at once […] areas of opportunity and/or insecurity, zones 
of contact and/or conflict, of cooperation and/or competition, of ambivalent 
identities and/or the aggressive assertion of difference” (Anderson & O’Dowd, 
1999:595). They are liminal spaces, and are often dangerous and unpredictable 
(Donnan, 2016). 
 
With respect to violence and criminality, African borders have for the most part 
proven to be sources of, rather than barriers to, insecurity and conflict (Korf & 
Raeymaekers, 2013). Insurgent groups and criminal gangs find themselves well 
accommodated in border regions. Empowered by the economic opportunities of the 
border and emboldened by state incapacity, they shelter behind national boundaries 





6.3 Goma and Gisenyi 
 
Paired Cities across a Frictionless Border 
 
Goma and Gisenyi came into being as Belgian and German military outposts 
respectively. These were constructed in 1900 following colonial border disputes 
between the two European powers. The towns have since ‘grown up together’, both 
rapidly expanding over the course of the twentieth century (Mathys, 2014). Today, 
they are provincial capitals, and house the government headquarters of North Kivu 
Province (DRC) and Rubavu District (Rwanda). They have a combined population of 
just over one million (Brenton et. al, 2011). 
 
The paired border towns have an exceptionally violent recent history. In 1994, 
Gisenyi was the last Rwandan city to fall to the victorious RPF. Its capture on 18 July 
marked the official end of the Rwandan Genocide (Prunier, 1995). By this time the 
town had suffered the near complete annihilation of its Tutsi population. Throughout 
the 1990s, the FDLR continued to launch sporadic attacks and cattle raids across the 
border from strongholds in DRC into rural areas north-east of the border town. 
Violence peaked during the 1997 North-Western Insurgency, although isolated 
incidents have continued to the present day (see African Rights, 1998). In recent 
years, the FDLR’s presence in the borderland has been used to justify Rwandan 
military excursions into the DRC, as well as Rwandan support for Tutsi militias in 
North Kivu (UN, 2012). Civil conflict in Rwanda has also had a profound impact on 
neighbouring Congolese territories. Between 1996 and 2003, during two destructive 
inter-state wars, North Kivu acted as no-man’s-land between the military influence 
of Kigali and Kinshasa. To this day, Congolese central government has been unable to 
exert authority over its eastern provinces or to subdue the range of militias still at 
large there.  
 
Goma is an archetypal border town as characterised in the literature discussed above. 
It occupies a zone of limited statehood where there is a pronounced administrative 
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disconnect between its provincial authorities and the central government in Kinshasa 
some 1,500 kilometres away (see Büscher, 2012; Büscher & Vlassenroot, 2010). 
Goma’s status as a site of what Büscher (2012) calls “urban governance beyond the 
state” is enshrined in Mobutu infamous pronouncement ‘débrouillez-vous’ (fend for 
yourselves), a phrase he directed at the country’s eastern provinces and which is still 
cited by local government actors (Büscher, 2016). The politics of the so-called 
‘Système-D’ in which individuals openly subvert state regulations against hawking, 
smuggling and embezzlement just to get by, endure in the city.161 
 
Gisenyi experiences a vibrant daily economic interaction with its Congolese 
counterpart. Three official crossings connect the border towns: the grand barrière, 
which lies on a major road by the lake front, the petite barrière in the town centre, 
and the makaburi (lit. graveyard) border-post a few kilometres to the north. Informal 
crossing elsewhere is prohibited, and the borderline – a narrow dirt track running 
through densely populated residential districts – is loosely patrolled by the militaries 
on both sides. The erection of a physical barrier separating the cities has been 
discussed but never implemented, and past attempts to close the border during times 
of crisis have been quickly reversed due to popular outcry. At present the border is 
open and relatively frictionless, in that it is free for local residents to cross 
(Doevenspeck, 2011; Brenton et. al, 2011) 
 
Small scale cross-border trade, amounting to earnings of under $100 USD per day, 
provides a survival economy for over twenty-two thousand traders and their 
dependents in the two cities. Most are resellers who cross the petite barrière carrying 
goods from the Rwandan markets of Murigare, Mudugudu and Yakabungo, to Goma's 
                                                          
 
161 Debates about the extent of ongoing Rwandan military interests and support for rebel militias 
across the border in DRC have been heated. The argument that violence throughout North Kivu is a 
form of controlled burn, lit by the Rwandan government to serve its own interests but directed 
expertly out of Rwandan territory may find some support in the history of militias operating in the 
borderland (particularly the CNDP and AFDL). However, it does not seem plausible when it comes to 
micro-level violence in the paired border cities, since there has been no suggestion that the Rwandan 
government has any stake in, nor means by which to control, the street crime of Goma. In short, these 
discussions take place at the wrong level of analysis to account for why micro-level violence in Goma 
does not spread to its Rwandan neighbour. 
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larger and less regulated central markets, Virunga and Birere (Lange & Kimanuka, 
2010). This trade is driven by the greater employment opportunities and the 
generally higher market prices for foodstuffs on the Congolese side.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly given their contrasting appearance, Goma, the poorer looking, 
is the wealthier of the two border towns. Prices in the city have been inflated by 
humanitarian non-governmental organisations and international peacekeepers, as 
well as by a strong mining sector that provides employment for unskilled labourers 
in the surrounding countryside (see Buscher & Vlassenroot, 2010). These economic 
resources are unavailable in Gisenyi, where residents lament the lack of available 
work. 
 
Doevenspeck (2011) highlights five common narratives used to describe the border 
in Goma and Gisenyi by those who cross it. It is: (1) a source of threats, either from 
Rwandan aggressors entering the DRC, or from Congolese instability spilling over into 
Rwanda; (2) an exit point for poor Rwandans seeking money across the border; (3) “a 
site of recreation” that allows the elite of North Kivu to sleep in the security of Gisenyi 
while working in Goma; (4) the source of the social and political exclusion of the 
Congolese Tutsi, who since the border was originally drawn have found themselves 
unwelcome on both sides; (5) an “irrevocable fact” of the nation state arena, offering 
a territorial separation of the Rwandan and Congolese political spheres. He 
summarises the essential difference between the cities as one of “[…] food security 
and freedom of expression but pronounced criminality in Goma versus personal 
security but political oppression in Gisenyi” (Ibid., 2011:11).  
 
Crime in the Border Towns 
 
The overall incidence of crime in Gisenyi is exceptionally low relative to its population 
(Republic of Rwanda, 2012; UNODC, 2015). This is characteristic of security in Rwanda 
more generally (see Chapter Three). There is sense of physical safety at the border, 
which is palpable and not just confined to government statistics. Two striking 
features of life in Gisenyi are the very low level of background chatter about crime 
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and the carefree behaviour of residents, who wander the darkest streets after sunset. 
Figure 9 shows crime statistics for Gisenyi’s Rubavu District in 2013, while Figure 10 
shows the district in comparison to the rest of Rwanda for the first quarter of 2014. 
Figure 11 is a photograph taken from the Gisenyi central police post showing how 
crime statistics are presented locally. 
 





Figure 10. Selected Crime Statistics by District for Q1, 2014 
 
Figure 11. Crime Statistics, Rubavu 2013 
Source: Central Gisenyi Police Post, author’s photograph. 
 
These tables, in accordance with the national statistics cited in Chapter Three, 
indicate that, aside from drugs and counterfeiting offences, Rubavu is typical of 
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districts housing similar-sized Rwandan cities without border-contact (Huye, 
Muhanga, Nyagatare, Kayonza and Musanze). Its crime rates are a fraction of those 
in the three districts in the capital city: Kicukiru, Gasabo and Nyarugenge.  
 
The low incidence of crime sets Gisenyi apart from the general characterisation of 
border towns as especially unruly urban centres. It also contrasts starkly with the 
levels of criminal activity in Goma. Regrettably, comparable statistics were not 
available from the Congolese town’s mayoral office.162 Local government broadcasts 
nevertheless refer to a ‘crisis’ of street crime in the city.163 In international statistics, 
the DRC is ranked among the world’s most crime-ridden states (Gallup, 2015; World 
Bank, 2015), while Goma is considered one of the country’s hotspots for micro-level 
street violence (Büscher, 2016; Brenton et al., 2011; Kimanuka & Lange, 2010).  
 
Birere district, pressed against the border, is plagued by opportunistic and violent 
crime. Goma’s poorest quartier, the township is the gateway to DRC through the 
petite barrière from Gisenyi and is a bustling commercial centre during the day. It is 
conspicuous by night for its lack of electricity, a maze of unlit and unpaved streets set 
among low quality informal housing.  
 
Youth-underemployment in Birere leaves many young men (maibobo164) standing 
idle. They cluster around small bars, harassing and extorting payments from cross-
border traders during the day, and are prone to committing more serious and violent 
crime by night. In informal discussions, residents recounted dozens of criminal 
incidents that had taken place in the quartier in the months immediately prior to 
                                                          
 
162 Due in part to the lack of police capacity to gather them. This in itself is testament to the imbalance 
in state reach and ‘legibility’ achieved by governments on either side of the border (see Scott, 1998). 
Furthermore, asymmetries shown through crime statistics alone should be treated with some 
scepticism. This is partly because they tend to be gathered according to different methodologies on 
either side of a border, and partly because different regulatory regimes create their own legal 
infractions, impacting on the statistics (see Coplan, 2012). 
163 Radio broadcast, Radio Okapi, Goma, 16 November 2014.  
164 Literally street children, but also a generic term for Congolese youth in the city, encompassing local 
groups including the Bas-Peuple, a “mafia-esque” organisation based in Birere (Kimanuka & Lange, 
2010).   
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being interviewed. Due to its violent reputation, after sunset the darkened streets 
are generally avoided by all but their own residents. One family of frustrated market-
stall traders summarised the situation: “Is it dangerous? We reset each morning. At 
night we hide, and they take everything”.165 Nevertheless, the dangers of the 
Congolese side of the border coincide with significant economic opportunities, and 
one interviewee commented that Goma is a place where: “anyone can do anything, 
tomorrow […] but at their own risk”.166 
 
For logistical reasons, it was not possible to conduct systematic research on root 
causes of crime in Goma (see Chapter Two). Nevertheless, the significant asymmetry 
in rates of micro-level violence linked to urban street crime between the two sides of 
the border has been established elsewhere (Brenton et al. 2011; Conflict Research 
Group, 2016; Doevenspeck, 2011), and I take this as established. Rather than disorder 
and violence on the Congolese side, the remainder of this chapter focuses on the high 




Overall, Gisenyi has endured the kind of violent history that would normally result in 
lingering security concerns. It was decimated by genocide in 1994 and by the 
subsequent North-Western Insurgency in 1997 (African Rights, 1998). Its urban 
sprawl merges across the DRC state boundary with Goma's poorest and most crime-
ridden quartier, a neighbourhood that houses armed criminal gangs whose 
operations are relatively unrestricted by Congolese government authorities (Büscher, 
2010; Kimanuka & Lange, 2010). 
 
The wider political context of the borderland is similarly hostile. Cycles of civil conflict 
persist in the Congolese border province of North Kivu, which is plagued by violence 
                                                          
 
165 Informal Discussion, Market Stall Trader, Goma (Birere), 9 November 2014. 
166 Interview, Petrol Trader, Goma (Birere), 21 June 2011. 
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and hosts a flourishing small-arms trade linked to extracted commodities 
(Raeymaekers, 2009; Titeca & Vlassenroot, 2012; Stearns 2011). Under these 
circumstances, the challenges of policing Gisenyi should be enormous. Nevertheless, 
it is a quiet, suburban place, where wealthy Congolese and Rwandans take weekend 
breaks to relax on the beaches of Lake Kivu. Even in outlying townships far from the 
district offices and tourist hotels, the streets are calm and relatively crime-free. 
Considering how open the border is, with both people and goods crossing en masse, 
the fact that Gisenyi remains insulated from the higher levels of violent crime 





6.4 Incidents and Observations 
 
Here, as in Chapter Five, I include two descriptive accounts based on fieldwork 
observations. These cases are intended to illustrate some of the key points on crime 
control in Gisenyi that guided further interviews in the border town. 
 
Incident 5. Rising Crime in a Border Neighbourhood 
 
The head of an umudugudu in Gisenyi has been concerned about intermittent thefts 
of livestock and of household property, which she suggests may be linked to drug 
trafficking across the DRC border. She attributes the emergence of these threats to an 
increasing number of unknown outsiders passing through the neighbourhood. The 
umudugudu is often used by locals as a route into town from areas to the north and 
west, or to the border crossing at the petite barrière. Frustrated by the situation, she 
calls on the military reserve (inkeragutabara) to intervene.  
 
Members of the military reserve, DASSO and the RNP meet with the neighbourhood 
leader, and patrols are redirected to pass more frequently close to its outskirts. Within 
the umudugudu itself there is a noticeable increase in intra-communal monitoring. 
CPC members go from door to door contacting residents asking about criminal 
activity. Community policing forums are held daily (rather than weekly or bi-weekly), 
to discuss recent occurrences in the neighbourhood. The head of the umudugudu 
tightens restrictions demanding that any outsider intending to stay in the community 
overnight, along with their host, must first meet with her at her house and sign a guest 
registration book along with their host. At the same time, the local night patrol 
receives special training, particularly in identifying illegal drugs and alcohol, and in 
reporting terrorist activities.167 These measures involve a high degree of public 
interaction between residents in the neighbourhood and the uniformed state 
                                                          
 
167 Patrolmen were not willing to discuss the specific details of this training. 
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representatives who either pass by it on patrols, or are encountered by residents on 
their way to the border. 
 
The irondo patrol leader, a demobilised ex-FAR soldier told me explicitly: “everyone 
here is happy to talk [to the police]. They cannot be afraid. The police cannot do 
anything in Goma, and that’s where the money is […] Here people just want to sleep 
safely”.168 
 
The measures taken to ensure the security of this neighbourhood illustrates how 
Rwandans respond to the perception of escalating disorder. The account is taken an 
umudugudu that I have visited repeatedly since 2009. Over this time span, I have 
been able to observe more general trends and to discuss them with local residents. I 
draw the reader’s attention to the following: 
 
(1) The community’s connections with Goma: In the words of one resident, people 
cross ‘to eat, drink, buy things, sell things […] to work, or to study, or even just to 
celebrate’.169 Crossing into the DRC is a mundane activity for most the 
neighbourhood’s residents. They do so several times a week or more depending on 
the opportunities they find over the border. 
 
(2) The cooperation between the head of this umudugudu and state security officials: 
the head of the neighbourhood went over the head of local cell authorities to contact 
RDF officers from the military reserve base. She did this seemingly without fear or 
hesitation. This cooperation was matched by a very high degree of interaction 
between residents and the neighbourhood CPC, its irondo patrol and state authorities 
at the local police post and district headquarters.  
 
(3) The perceived threats to the community and the language used to describe 
criminal activity: It was striking that criminals were referred to as adui, literally 
                                                          
 
168 Interview, Irondo Patrol Leader, Gisenyi, 18 November 2014. 
169 Informal Discussion, Local Resident, Gisenyi, 21 November, 2014. 
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‘enemies’, rather than wizi or abajura (the Swahili and Kinyarwanda terms for 
‘common thieves’). Equally striking was the way that the perception of an increase in 
minor crimes – the theft of chickens or of clothes from laundry lines – was framed as 
a threat to state security, rather than simply to the neighbourhood. Despite the use 
of militarised language, the most common concern among residents was not of 
Congolese crossing into Gisenyi, but of impoverished rural Rwandans, who were 
accused of walking into town from surrounding villages to steal livestock, clothes, 
tools and electronics from unlocked houses and gardens. 
 
(4) The intense distrust of outsiders passing through the umudugudu. This sensitivity 










Shortly after the opening of the border crossings to Goma in the morning, a police 
patrol vehicle in Gisenyi is directed by cell phone to a disturbance at the bus station 
close to the petite barrière. On arrival, the officers find two men seated on the steep 
concrete curb at the edge of the vehicle staging ground. One is half-conscious with 
drink, the other holds his head in his hands. They are surrounded by a small crowd, 
and watched over by a Wide Vision private security guard from the bus station. 
 
The guard explains that the men had been involved in a fight with one of the local bus 
drivers, who has since left on his journey east to Kigali. They had negotiated with the 
driver to drop them in Musanze (a large town approximately one third of the way to 
the capital), where they would be met by a family member with money for the ride. 
The driver had initially agreed, but before the bus could depart, tickets for all its seats 
were sold at the company stand. The men had refused to dismount when challenged, 
and one of them had fallen from the bus when pushed by the driver and the private 
security guard.  
 
The two men are driven back to the sector police post in Gisenyi. They are held in a 
covered waiting area before being questioned by a member of DASSO. They had 
crossed the border into Goma to buy tools and had stayed to take advantage of the 
city’s nightlife. At some point in the early hours of the morning they had been mugged. 
When the border reopened at 6.a.m. they had returned to Gisenyi unable to afford a 
bus ticket home.  
 
The men are released after receiving a warning from the DASSO officer, who takes 
their details. The officer suspects that they had crossed the border to drink the cheap 
home-made gin available in Goma, and double checks that they are not bringing any 





This case raises several relevant points: 
 
(1) The vibrancy of Goma’s nightlife and the availability of cheap alcohol, illegal in 
Gisenyi: The Congolese bars and nightclubs drive a nightly migration across from 
Rwanda, particularly on weekends, and Goma is often described as a place ‘to 
celebrate’.170 This was one of a number of asymmetries that allow residents in the 
paired towns to exploit the advantages available on either side of the border. They 
reinforce the difference in reputations between the urban spaces. 
 
(2) That a small scuffle resulted in an immediate police response: This was often the 
case with criminal behaviour close to the border posts, which are located several 
hundred metres from the bus station, but also reflects police intolerance to even 
minor incidents of violence. Bus stations are particularly sensitive places. This is partly 
because they have been subjected to terrorist grenade attacks in the past, and partly 
because they are one of the few sites in Rwanda in which strangers routinely 
congregate. 
 
(3) The range of policing actors who operate in the border town and the subtle 
differences in their duties: Notably, DASSO officers worked directly in the police post 
alongside officers of the RNP, something not often seen in Kigali. Furthermore, the 
man who alerted the police to the incident was not the Wide Vision private security 
guard, but a plainclothes state security officer also working in the bus station. The 
officers of the police patrol recognised the man on arrival and were deferential to 
him. Plainclothes police were rumoured to be common along the main streets close 
to the border, and neighbourhood residents were aware of their presence and knew 
how they were. Although it was obviously not possible to verify this, it is hard to 
imagine undercover state agents routinely infiltrating the border’s imidugudu 
                                                          
 
170 ‘Kusherehe’, from the Swahili kusherehekea, often implying alcohol-fuelled celebration.  
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without being locally identified. As Incident 5 has shown, these communities are 
highly sensitive to the presence of strangers.  
 
(4) The role of language and of national identity in the borderland: Although I was 
unable to confirm it in this case, accounts of similar robberies in Goma saw victims 
singled out on the basis of being Rwandan (see also, Brenton et al., 2011). Notably, 
the men had been able to return to Gisenyi from Goma despite having been robbed 
of their identity cards. Seeing that they had no money, the Congolese authorities had 
given them a new jeton without hassle. Their Rwandan citizenship was never in 
doubt, something the Rwandan police attributed to the quality of their spoken 
Kinyarwanda and the fact that they could identify their umudugudu of origin.  
 
(5) The sensitivity to drug crime (and by extension illegal brew) on the part of police 
in the border town: Even though there was no evidence of abuse and the two men 
had themselves been victims of violent crime, this was the chief concern of the DASSO 
officer on duty. The occurrence of a violent mugging on the Congolese side of the 
border was almost taken for granted by police at the Gisenyi sector police post, 
where one officer remarked “These days, it is what we expect over there. There is no 
surprise”.171 There was no indication that the case would be followed up by police on 
either side of the border. 
  
                                                          
 
171 Informal Discussion, Junior Police Officer, Gisenyi, 16 November, 2014. 
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6.5 Insulating the Borderland – Policing Gisenyi 
 
A range of unique features embedded in Gisenyi’s policing system se it apart from 
arrangements elsewhere in the country. The following sections revisit the three 
drivers of Rwandan crime prevention described in Chapter Five to determine what is 
distinctive about policing practices in the border town.  
 
Gisenyi’s Security Apparatus 
 
Compared to other regions of Rwanda, Gisenyi has a heightened state security 
presence. The headquarters of the Army Special Forces and the Third Division of the 
RDF lie approximately ten kilometres north-east of the town along the Kigali road. 
These are significant garrisons, amounting to approximately one quarter of the RDF’s 
total personnel, and their presence could create the impression that the district is 
firmly under the heel of the national army. I am not convinced this is the case. The 
bulk of troops deployed to Rubavu are there in anticipation of escalating inter-state 
tensions with DRC. Confined to barracks, they play only a minimal role in maintaining 
public order and preventing street crime in the border town. 
 
Gisenyi itself houses a small military base behind the district police headquarters on 
the main thoroughfare leading to the petite barrière. A second RDF facility sits on the 
lakefront just outside the town centre, combined with a naval contingent that 
monitors boat traffic on Lake Kivu. Soldiers from these hubs patrol the lakeside road 
and commercial centre by day and seal off the town’s beaches at night.  
 
In the aftermath of isolated grenade attacks in 2010, small groups of soldiers and 
armed police have been stationed to guard the district offices, the central bus station 
and the Nyakabungo market. Their visibility gives a misleading impression of the 
broader security environment. In over six months in the border town, I encountered 
no uniformed soldiers outside the immediate city centre. Residents explained that 
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daily military patrols serve more “to give [soldiers] something to do”172 than as a 
substantive part of crime prevention in the city. Police or DASSO officers are more 
likely to be seen in the residential areas that house the bulk of the town’s population, 
but again only rarely, most often when summoned by CPCs or amarondo night 
patrols. For the most part, police patrols centre around a staging post for vehicles 
and supplied, and two small police posts near the town centre.  
 
These deployments need to be understood in the context of the borderland’s recent 
history. In terms of internal security, the stakes are highest in the north-west of the 
country, where the RPF has faced active resistance in the past. Behind the scenes, a 
counter-insurgency campaign dating back to the civil conflict in 1997 has continued 
even during periods of relative stability. Government agents (maneco) are pitted 
against insurgents (ibyitso) not only in actual terms, but also in the popular 
consciousness by residents who continue to perceive the situation as tense. In the 
words of one demobilised soldier, ‘a hidden war’ persists in the borderland region. 
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These tensions intensified during my time in the field. Following the defeat of the 
M23 militia in November 2013, the Congolese Army recaptured territories along the 
border in the Virunga National Park on the DRC side (see Appendix 1). Ranking 
Rwandan security officials suspected that the Congolese Army was either supported, 
or infiltrated by, elements of the FDLR.174 Concerned that FDLR fighters might cross 
the border and infiltrate Rwandan towns, the government redoubled its counter-
insurgency efforts around Gisenyi and Musanze. This was the political backdrop 
behind the abduction of fourteen recent returnees from the DRC to Rwanda in the 
early months of 2014. In a case that attracted significant international condemnation, 
they were held incommunicado by the RDF (HRW, 2014a). 
 
                                                          
 
172 Interview, CPC Member, Gisenyi, 2 November 2014. 
173 Informal Discussion, Demobilised Soldier, Gisenyi, 21 November 2014. 
174 Interview, Senior RDF Officer, Kigali, 25 January 2015. 
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The impact of counter-insurgency efforts on crime is difficult to determine, while the 
subject is a sensitive one for officials who are disinclined to discuss it. To avoid 
conflating the activities of military and national intelligence agencies with the more 
routine practices of policing, I discuss crime control separately from these issues in 
so far as possible. Nevertheless, this political backdrop is important, and its effect on 
behaviour will be addressed below in discussions of the aversion to social disharmony 
close to the border. 
 
Police priorities in the North-West are laid out in district security performance 
contracts. These place particular emphasis on the control of money laundering, 
smuggling, drugs offences and the illegal possession of small arms or light weapons, 
crimes that the government has come to associate with the borderland region.175 
Importantly, these contracts stress that Gisenyi is considered relatively low risk in 
terms of ‘normal criminal activity’ and that ‘the most sophisticated crimes’ remain in 
Kigali. Regional differences in police priorities are also apparent in some of the subtle 
ways that the security apparatus has been adapted to the border town environment: 
 
First, abanyerondo patrolmen in the border town receive special training from the 
RNP, particularly in the identification of illegal substances and counterfeit money. 
They are more likely to perform professional drill before launching into their duties. 
In general, there is more regular contact between patrols and state police in the town 
than in other sites I visited. Almost all patrol leaders I met in Gisenyi had, at one time 
or another, been professional soldiers, including many who were ex-FAR, the 
demobilised military of the pre-genocide Habyarimana regime.176 This was confirmed 
in conversation with local police, who acknowledged that there were more 
                                                          
 
175 Interview, Senior RNP Officer, Gisenyi, 15 November 2014. These crimes receive an additional 
emphasis in the border town when it comes to RNP sensitisation campaigns. Although the illegal 
possession of firearms is rare in Rwanda, it is highest in the North and Western territories according 
to the Central Firearms Registry (RNP, 2014:105). Residents in Gisenyi spoke of regular, (approximately 
bi-annual) property searches for hidden weapons throughout the early 2000s. 
176 Under the Habyarimana regime, the north was ‘grossly favoured’ its representation in the state 
security forces, particularly the military (Ansoms, 2009:294; see also Prunier, 1995). Many of these 
soldiers have since been demobilised or retired from the army, but have found employment in the 
non-state branches of Rwandan policing. 
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demobilised soldiers occupying positions in the lower tiers of the administrative 
hierarchy in Gisenyi than elsewhere in the country.177 Officers emphasised the fact 
that police, military and private security guards do not stop working, even when they 
are officially ‘off duty’, and that the higher proportion of security officials living in 
Gisenyi’s residential areas means there are more direct channels for information to 
pass to state security via mobile phone contacts among serving officers, including 
those who have retired.  
 
Because of its proximity to Goma, Gisenyi houses a range of financial institutions and 
hotels used by both Congolese and Rwandan citizens. Most of these businesses have 
contracted private security companies, which means there are an unusually large 
number of officers from KK Security, Intersec Security, RGL Security and Aegispro 
working in the town centre. Similarly, Gisenyi has a high number of private guards 
not associated with the major companies, and most of the larger residences close to 
the border accommodate a full-time house guard. 
 
Finally, both private and official accounts indicate that plainclothes security officers 
are systematically deployed in areas that immediately contact the border, 
particularly those close to the petite barrière. Their principle role is to monitor the 
border for anyone crossing illegally. These officers engage in a daily battle with the 
‘chora-chora178’, networks of local smugglers who deal in low value products that are 
illegal or subject to high import tariffs when passing from DRC to Rwanda, such things 
as milk-powder, plastic bags, charcoal and certain alcohols (see also Doevenspeck, 
2011). As I have argued in Chapter Five, any use of plainclothes officials is likely to 
produce rumour and speculation about the extent of the practice and about who may 
be involved. Their presence at the border contributes to heightened suspicion among 
residents. 
 
                                                          
 
177 Interview, Senior RNP Officer, Gisenyi, 15 November 2014. 
178 From the Swahili kuchora, to draw, based on the way these smugglers develop and navigate new 
routes across the international boundary. 
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Undoubtedly the presence of additional military deployments, demobilised soldiers, 
private security guards and plainclothes security officers play a significant role in 
combating crime in the city. However, the cornerstone of the policing model remains 
its ability to gather information and to limit anonymity, not the number of personnel 
it deploys. One way in which intelligence-led policing in the border town has a 
significant technological edge, even over policing in the capital, is by the use of the 
recent GIS mapping of the town’s neighbourhoods: 
 





Map 5. GIS Map of Border Neighbourhoods in Gisenyi 
 
 
These maps, when combined with census data and details on house occupancy from 
the heads of imidugudu and their CPC members, have meant that the RNP has access 
to spreadsheets listing the occupants of every property in Gisenyi by name and by 
the mobile phone number of the head occupant. This information can then be 
matched to a precise location by using each house’s code. This is a very powerful tool, 
one that allows a significant degree of state policing to take place without officers 
leaving the police post. Following the report of a disturbance, the police can directly 
contact an umudugudu leader, or the head of security on their CPC and coordinate 
the local amarondo patrol. At the time of research, the use of similar maps had yet 
to be rolled out to policing other parts of the country. 
 
The Organisation of Small Communities 
 
As elsewhere in Rwanda, below the cell level the non-state policing system in Gisenyi 
is much larger than the state security structures that sit atop it. Community policing 
in the border town takes place in broadly the same fashion as has been already 
described. Local knowledge on the part of CPC members and amarondo patrols is 
collected by the heads of imidugudu and passed, where relevant, to cell headquarters 




With the exception of cross-border smuggling, counterfeiting, and the possession of 
cannabis, police officials remarked on the relative ease of policing Gisenyi’s 
residential neighbourhoods compared with those of Kigali and other medium-sized 
Rwandan towns (Musanze, Butare and Nyagatare). Their opinion is supported in 
reports from the JOC, by the Rubavu District security contracts, and by national crime 
statistics (see Chapter Three). Officers also highlighted a greater propensity for 
residents in Gisenyi to interact with state security organs in the city. This was 
observable at the town’s police posts, where I witnessed markedly more public 
engagement with the officers than at sites in the capital. Police posts in Gisenyi are 
very much public forums, housing large gatherings of civilians who lodge complaints 
or make requests of the state police. Police and amarondo patrols were frequently 
approached by residents either soliciting help or providing information, again to a 
noticeably greater degree than at other sites across Rwanda (see Incident 5). 
Similarly, the incentives to volunteer for security roles appear to be augmented in the 
border town. Police and residents alike described an increased willingness on the part 
of Gisenyi’s residents to take up unpaid security roles at the neighbourhood level 
(kutumia nchi, to work for the nation).179  
 
These observations can be attributed in part to subtle differences in the organisation 
of neighbourhoods in Gisenyi, which are exposed to cross-border interactions with 
adjacent areas of Goma. Gisenyi’s demographic profile is broadly similar to that of 
other Rwandan cities in population density, social composition and religion (from 
census material, Government of Rwanda, 2012).180 Here, as elsewhere, residents 
made frequent reference to the umuco nyarwanda in interviews and informal 
discussions about crime. What differed in the border town was the way in which 
                                                          
 
179 Voluntary positions include CPC members, the heads of imidugudu, the coordinators of anti-crime 
clubs, and (until recently) abanyerondo patrolmen. 
180 Ethnicity is more complicated, however, and though demographic data is unavailable, some 
residents suggested the town may be more uniformly Hutu than other areas. Gisenyi was the site of 
particularly intense ethnic violence during the genocide, and much of its Tutsi population had been 
wiped out by the time the RPF captured the town at the end of the war. A Tutsi elite has since 




Rwandans contrasted these values favourably with a negative ‘culture of Congo’, 
which they portrayed as both opportunistic and disorderly. Distinctions such as this 
tend toward unhelpful stereotypes and need to be challenged. Nonetheless, they 
indicate the degree to which the two populations have developed separate identities 
since the relatively recent and arbitrary establishment of a border between them (see 
also Barth, 1969).  
 
Both Rwandans and Congolese modify their behaviour significantly depending on 
which side of the border they are on. Accompanying residents cross the border in the 
course of their daily activities revealed some stark transformations. The same people 
who had, moments before, reprimanded a passer-by in Gisenyi for littering would 
discard their plastics on the side streets of Birere without a second thought. 
Approaching the border posts from Goma, individuals fastened their seat belts, 
carefully dusted off clothes and extinguished cigarettes as they crossed over into 
Gisenyi. The range of adapted behaviours was not confined to those that avoided 
legal infractions, but suggested a much more ingrained notion of normal behaviour 
in the two urban spaces. One Congolese interviewee summarised the situation 
succinctly: “going into Gisenyi is like going into a church, people behave differently 
there”.181 As a mental construction, the border functions as the threshold between 
neighbourhoods that are locally associated with different behaviours. 
 
Perhaps the most notable transformation involved the instrumental use of language. 
Rwandans entering DRC switch immediately from Kinyarwanda to Congolese Swahili, 
and are for the most part able to conceal their identity as Rwandan nationals – 
something that might otherwise attract unwanted attention or even harassment in 
Goma. The reverse is not true. Congolese are less likely to speak Kinyarwanda, let 
alone speak it well enough to mask their Congolese nationality.182 The result is that 
                                                          
 
181 Informal Discussion, Congolese Businessman, Goma, 29 October 2014. 
182  The Rwandan language is notoriously idiomatic, and native speakers tend to be very good at 
recognising people speaking it as a second tongue (see also Ingelaere, 2010b). 
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Congolese in Rwanda are conspicuously foreign to the local population, and are 
subject to suspicion. 
 
The fact that Congolese are easily identified in Gisenyi undoubtedly plays a role in 
insulating the border neighbourhoods of the Rwandan town from the micro-level 
violence that plagues the townships of Goma. Police in Rubavu for example explained 
that they knew they majority of theft in Gisenyi could be traced to Rwandan villagers 
from beyond the ridge of hills north-east of the town centre, not to Congolese gangs 
in Birere, because foreigners would be “immediately recognised” by CPCs and 
neighbourhood patrols.183 Officers also talked of cross-border crime taking place in 
the opposite direction. A recent rise in Rwandan involvement in Congolese street 
crime was said to be a growing problem.184 They suggested that the relationship 
between the two towns might not only deflect certain crimes out of Gisenyi, but 
could actively draw them over the border into Goma. 
 
Finally, the residents of Gisenyi appear even less mobile than inhabitants of other 
parts of Rwanda. There is relatively little rural-urban migration into the border town, 
and the residents tend to have known their neighbours for a period of years or 
decades. The result is that neighbourhoods in Gisenyi have stronger mechanisms for 
limiting anonymity than elsewhere. For their part, strangers, particularly Congolese 
with limited Kinyarwanda, know that they are likely to be recognised immediately as 
outsiders.  
 
Gisenyi’s Urban Aesthetic 
 
Neighbourhoods of Gisenyi do not differ significantly in their appearance from those 
of the outskirts of Kigali, or from other smaller Rwandan towns that make no contact 
with a national border. Recent major roadworks have temporarily detracted from the 
                                                          
 
183 Interview, Senior RNP Officer, Gisenyi, 6 November 2014. 
184 Interview, Senior RNP Officer, Gisenyi, 24 October 2014. 
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orderly appearance of the central cells of the border town, as mounds of earth and 
volcanic rock are stacked on the roadside, but this is only a temporary disruption.185 
In most residential neighbourhoods, public order has been built into the urban 
environment. There are monthly umuganda community service days and the local 
district administration employs work cooperatives to collect garbage and keep the 
streets meticulously cleaned. Certain ‘security and hygiene’ measures in the town 
have even been cause for local complaint, such as the ban on cattle in the streets of 
the town’s northern residential imidugudu and the ban on bicycles using the paved 
lake-front road.186 
 
At the border line separating the two towns, the recently constructed, high quality 
compounds of Gisenyi give way to low quality informal housing on the Congolese 
side. The side-streets of Birere are unpaved, unlit and strewn with waste, and the 
visual contrast between the paired towns is stark. Although the lakefront of Goma is 
generally well-managed by the wealthy elite who reside there, the expansive 
townships that stretch away from it to the north and west, home to close to one 
million people, suffer from poor build quality and endemic underinvestment in such 
basic services as electricity and water. Many of Goma’s streets display the kinds of 
visual stimuli that have been identified as one of the environmental factors linked to 
criminal activity (Xu et. al, 2005). 
 
  
                                                          
 
185 Notably, throughout much of Gisenyi, street lights have yet to be installed, and at night even some 
of the most central areas are enveloped entirely in darkness. 
186 Informal Discussion, Local Residents, Gisenyi, 16 November 2014. 
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The Aversion to Violence and Social Disharmony 
 
Ever since the extended civil conflict in the 1990s, the DRC border at Gisenyi has 
served as the front line between the RDF and armed anti-government militias, most 
notably the FDLR (Prunier, 2008).187 Allegations of Rwandan support for Congolese 
rebel groups continue to trigger hostilities between indigenous Congolese and 
Rwandans in both cities (Büscher, 2016). Meanwhile, rumours of FDLR infiltration 
into communities in Gisenyi have resulted in government crackdowns targeting 
returnees from DRC (Human Rights Watch, 2014b). Tensions still run high, and 
ongoing political volatility pervades the borderland. Rwandan authorities have 
exploited the status of the FDLR as a common enemy to encourage local participation 
in security. The FDLR threat sits at the heart of the RPF’s concerns about social 
disharmony, and features prominently in security sensitisation campaigns. 
 
Regarding the effect of recent history on crime prevention, interviewees in Gisenyi 
made frequent references to strategies of self-protection that emerged from periods 
of conflict in the 1990s. Elements of the informant culture which was fostered during 
the 1997 insurgency have persisted in the border town, and structures for gathering 
intelligence through communal networks remain particularly well-honed.  
 
                                                          
 
187 The city carries a generally higher security profile than elsewhere due to its proximity to regions 
of the DRC housing groups that are openly hostile to the Rwandan government. Although specific 
incidents of violence relating to this perceived threat are rare, a number are of note: In May 2010, a 
grenade exploded killing one soldier in Gisenyi, on the same day as coordinated terrorist grenade 
attacks in Kigali. The Gisenyi explosion was later said to have been accidental, see Reuters (2010), 
‘Grenade blasts kills one, injure 16 in Rwanda: police’: 
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE62404420100305?sp=true, accessed 15 November 
2016. In July, 2011, anti-government insurgents shot at and threw grenades at the homes of several 
local government administrators in Gisenyi, although there were no casualties, see US Department 
of State (2011) ‘Country Reports on Terrorism’: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195541.htm, 
accessed 15 November 2016. In December 2012, a small group of FDLR soldiers crossed the border 
north of Gisenyi and killed a Rwandan park ranger, see OSAC (2016), ‘ Rwanda 2016 Crime and 
Safety Report’: https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19752, accessed 15 
November 2016. In August 2013, mortar fire crossed the border in Gisenyi town centre, killing one 
woman at the petite barrière, see HIS Global Insight, ‘Risk of inter-state war increases following 
shelling of Rwanda from DRC’: http://www.ihsglobalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail22726.htm, accessed 
15 November 2016. 
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During the civil war, many communities formed their own voluntary self-protection 
groups to guard properties and livestock against cross-border incursions. These 
groups led to the formalisation of the amarondo night patrol arrangements that have 
since been implemented across the country as a whole. Whereas elsewhere these 
patrols were created by government edict, in the border town they emerged 
organically in response to a breakdown of civil order. As a result, participation in 
patrols in Gisenyi is still more likely to be enforced by the small neighbourhoods 
themselves than by police liaison officers or DASSO. 
 
Finally, threats emanating from the other side of the border affect how local residents 
describe criminal behaviour in Gisenyi. During parallel interviews in the Rwandan 
districts of Kicukiru and Rubavu, in which the same range of street crimes were 
discussed, it was striking how often in the border town the word adui (enemies) was 
substituted for wizi or abajura (common thieves) (see Incident 5). Adui was applied 
in particular, although not exclusively, to Congolese offenders, and was the most 
repeated of a range of linguistic turns that suggested crime near the border was 
regarded in more militaristic terms. Local officials emphasised the role of patriotism 
and the love of their country (gukundu igihugu) when accounting for the town’s high 
degree of public order.  
 
Umudugudu leaders in Gisenyi seem able to use the state’s national security agenda 
to serve more localised forms of crime prevention. In the community described in 
Incident 5, the possibility of drug trafficking – a subject made even more high profile 
in the border town due to government suspicions that the profits of the cannabis 
trade filter back to the FDLR in the DRC – was raised with police and DASSO when the 
chief concern of the local CPC was in fact the rise in opportunistic theft by countryside 
peasants sneaking into the neighbourhood at night. Framing the issue in terms of 
drug crime was guaranteed to provoke a proactive response from the police and the 




Fear and Civic Participation in the Borderland 
 
The spectre of both intra-communal and state orchestrated violence throughout the 
1990s lingers in the popular imagination in Gisenyi, and its effects vary from person 
to person. Nevertheless, a great deal of care must be taken to avoid over-simplifying 
popular fears, the causes of which are multi-faceted close to the border.  
 
Recently, disappearances linked to the government crackdown in 2014 created 
heightened suspicion between neighbours, who were concerned about both FDLR 
supporters and government informants in their midst. As one interviewee confided, 
“it was a very difficult time here. Everyone was on high alert”.188 Compounding these 
uncertainties, state controlled and private radio stations leak their signals across the 
border, exposing residents on both sides to a wealth of often contradictory 
information about local politics and recent events. Face-to-face interactions also 
subjected Congolese and Rwandan residents to different spheres of information, 
giving rise to a vibrant rumour mill that is unique to the border setting. 
 
As more information began to emerge about the nature of the disappearances in 
2014, uncertainty was replaced with a more acute fear of government monitoring in 
the border town, and the heightened sensitivity to any signs of criminal behaviour by 
both state and non-state actors hardened neighbourhoods against crime. The current 
situation is such that borderland residents are equally afraid of FDLR insurgents and 
of being mistaken for insurgents themselves in government crackdowns. They are 
therefore doubly incentivised to share information with the state.  
 
Once again, contrasting Gisenyi with urban neighbourhoods in Goma is revealing. 
When asked to compare the relationship between local residents and state officials 
on the two sides of the border, the most common responses focused on the relative 
rigidity of economic regulation rather than incidents of violence or abuse. On the 
                                                          
 
188 Interview, University Staff Member, Gisenyi, 15 November 2014. 
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Congolese side of the border, the multitude of state agencies who monitor, and 
regularly profit from, cross-border trade, have a well-documented track record for 
subjecting traders to physical harassment and extortion (see Brenton et. al, 2011; 
Titeca & Kimanuka, 2012). Strictly with reference to violence, corruption and 
arbitrary exploitation, there seems to be every reason for the borderland population 
to fear Congolese officials at least as much they fear their Rwandan counterparts. 
One Rwandan trader summarised the situation: 
 
In Rwanda, when you see a policeman, you fix your jacket […] you hide your 
liquor […] you become serious. In Goma, when you see a policeman, you run! 
Informal Conversation, Rwandan Trader, Gisenyi, 18 November 2014 
 
Residents tended to describe interactions with Congolese police as 
“straightforward”, and “simply a question of money”.189  Rwandan officials, on the 
other hand, had a reputation for doing things “by the book” or “very strictly”. The 
strictness190 of the Rwandan regulatory environment was regarded as source of 
intimidation and was more frequently cited than threats of state brutality or arbitrary 
arrest. Gisenyi’s residents are subject to an ever-growing and not always well-
communicated list of regulations linked to economic activities and security 
procedures. They must take care to avoid even small infractions lest the inflexible 
bureaucratic processes of the Rwandan state subject them to fixed penalties. The 
regulatory environment is changed very rapidly in an effort to keep up with creative 
informal practices, as one local trader complained, “they change everything every 
day”191. Encounters with Rwandan authorities are potentially unpredictable and 
expensive, and residents have little recourse to negotiation once a rule has been 
breached.  
 
                                                          
 
189 Informal Conversations, Traders at the Grand Barrière, 3 November 2014. 
190 From the Swahili word kali, also meaning fierce or severe. 
191 Interview, Rwandan Market Trader, Gisenyi, 15 November 2014. 
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Despite this kind of intimidation, for the significant proportion of Rwandans who 
either work full-time in Goma, or else do regular business there, a different logic 
applied. This was described in Incident 5, where a night patrol leader claimed that 
residents in Gisenyi were more willing to interact with state police in the Rwandan 
city because of their access to a zone of economic informality in Goma. This attitude 
has significant implications for the relationship between the paired border towns, 
and I attempted to triangulate it with cross-border traders. The result was a series of 
revealing discussions about attitudes towards social disharmony in Rwanda. Goma, 
unlike Gisenyi, was said to manifest a particular kind of social and economic disorder 
known locally as ‘kavuyo’. Importantly, kavuyo does not carry the same negative 
connotations of chaos and inefficiency as literal translations might suggest. The 
examples I was offered were of individual rational actors pursing their own self-
interest unabated. When applied to life in Goma, kavuyo was used to describe the 
economic opportunities of the city in ways that conform with the case made by 
Douglas in Purity and Danger:    
 
Order implies restriction; from all possible materials; a limited selection has 
been made, and from all possible relations a limited set has been used. So 
disorder by implication is unlimited, no pattern has been realised in it, but its 
potential for patterning is unlimited. We recognise that it is destructive to 




Narratives on the border frequently reflected Douglas’ analysis, where kavuyo 
referred both to Goma’s disorder and to its potentiality. Notably, despite its use in 
describing the economic contrast between two cities, kavuyo is considered first and 
foremost a political term.192 When asked about the source of kavuyo, of profitable 
                                                          
 
192 Testament to the term’s political significance, Rwandan respondents often discussed themes 




disorder, in Goma, the answer from respondents was almost uniformly ‘l’état’ (the 
state). This type of disorder was confined to the Congolese side of the border, and 
the imbalance between Goma and Gisenyi reflects the extent of state reach on either 
side. The Rwandan state extends its authority effectively into Gisenyi, while the 
authority of Congolese central authorities in Goma is fragmented and locally 
contested (Büscher, 2016). These contrasting modes of governance are effectively 





6.6 Policing Gisenyi – Borderland Dynamics and Cross-Border Asymmetries 
 
Returning to the question of how Gisenyi remains so well-insulated from Congolese 
insecurity, it is worth recognising that this apparent paradox rests on the assumption 
that crime and violence tend to spill over border lines. Although this widely accepted 
notion is supported by other African examples (see Coplan, 2010; Korf & 
Raeymaekers 2013), it does not seem to apply to street crime in Goma and Gisenyi.  
 
Street crime is subject to different constraints than other forms of violence found in 
borderland regions (politically or ethnically motivated violence for example, or 
violence linked to the extraction of valuable resources in the absence of state 
regulation). Perhaps most importantly, the kinds of criminal activities addressed in 
this thesis are mitigated by a relatively low threshold of ‘target hardening’: the 
possibility, real or perceived, that criminal activities will be thwarted, and the degree 
of personal risk to the perpetrator. For this reason, crimes of this sort do not 
necessarily spread. Instead, they emerge in contexts where targets are perceived as 
soft and as profitable (see Marenin, 2009). This distinctive characteristic raises the 
question of whether street crime is not just pushed out of Gisenyi by successful 
policing but actively pulled across the border by conditions in Goma. 
 
Goma and Gisenyi operate differently from the sparsely populated territories, border 
posts and truck stops that have dominated recent borderland analysis. Behind the 
peculiar characteristics of policing close to the border lies a broader logic in the 
relationship between Goma and Gisenyi that plays out in the everyday practices of 
their residents. Despite appearances, Goma is significantly more affluent than its 
Rwandan counterpart. Its markets are larger, its rents are higher, its elite is wealthier 
(resulting in marked inequalities between quartiers), and there are greater 
opportunities to earn money. In short, in terms of profitability, Goma has abundant 
targets for street crime, more so than Gisenyi, while elements of its urban 




Many residents of these paired border towns benefit from the ability to separate 
their economic activities which are conducted in Goma, from their private lives in 
Gisenyi. This separation increases the incentives to share information with the local 
security apparatus in the Rwandan town, as they can do so without the concern that 
interactions with the police will impact on their interests in Goma. Elsewhere in 
Rwanda, interacting with uniformed police or community police representatives 
carries the risk that the complainant will be found in breach of some regulation of 
which they were previously unaware. 
 
Goma provides an outlet for behaviours and informal economic practices that are 
either illegal or culturally outlawed in Gisenyi (see Incident 6). This applies to the 
economic elite in the border town as much as it does to the thousands of local traders 
who cross daily back and forth. Powerful brokers, particularly on the Congolese side 
of the border, have much to gain from the present asymmetrical relationship 
between the two towns. Many of them live in newly constructed high quality housing 
in the border neighbourhoods of Gisenyi and use the Rwandan financial institutions 
while they control businesses in Goma. They have a strong incentive to use their 
influence, where they have it, to ensure that criminal activity remains confined to the 
other side. 
 
These observations are not in keeping with the growing body of literature on state 
reach and contested authority in borderland regions. This is, in part, because they are 
related directly to the asymmetries across the border line. They are ‘border’ 
dynamics, concerned with sharply delineated difference, rather than ‘borderland 
dynamics’ concerned with how far a single government can extend its authority into 
its territorial periphery. Baud and van Schendel (1997:220) write that “where income, 
employment, and life expectancy vary sharply, a border can mean the difference 
between poverty and material well-being and occasionally between life and death”. 
This is typical of how cross-border asymmetry has been discussed, where the 
implication is that one side of the border is preferable, rather than that both sides 
are linked – with the advantages of one shaped by what takes place on the other. As 
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paired border towns, Goma and Gisenyi operate with a kind of ‘organic solidarity’, in 




This chapter has considered how border proximity, cross-border asymmetries and 
the dialectical relationship between insecurity in Rwanda and in the DRC shape each 
of the drivers of crime prevention identified in Chapter Five: 
 
Regarding the security apparatus, proximity to the international border and the 
historical sensitivity of the north-western district for the RPF have prompted a degree 
of militarisation in the Rwandan border town. This manifests itself in a greater role 
for the military reserve, a greater military presence, and more demobilised soldiers 
in non-state policing roles, particularly as CPC members and irondo patrol leaders. It 
also sees the state security apparatus prioritising security concerns that are more 
strongly associated with the borderland context: smuggling, counterfeiting, drugs 
trafficking, weapons trafficking and human trafficking.  
 
In terms of the organisation of small communities, neighbourhoods in Gisenyi do not 
differ substantially from other Rwandan neighbourhoods in their demographic and 
social composition, cultural behaviour, or urban aesthetics. What differs at the 
border is the fact that these urban qualities exist in immediate contrast to a radically 
different kind of town across the border in Goma, with residents passing regularly 
back and forth with ease. Over time, the two towns have become associated with 
different behaviours. Where Goma has a reputation for kavuyo, a profitable disorder 
stemming from limited state reach, Gisenyi is seen as economically limited but safe. 
These reputations are sustained by local practices that take for granted the different 
qualities of the two urban spaces. 
                                                          
 
193 As opposed to ‘mechanical solidarity’ in which the two resemble identical cogs performing the same 




The aversion to social disharmony, identified elsewhere in Rwanda in Chapter Five, 
appears to be magnified in Gisenyi. For state officials, the town carries an especially 
high security profile due to its proximity to the DRC and also to the region’s history 
of armed anti-government resistance, something still manifest in ongoing counter-
insurgency efforts. The state is especially attuned to any signals of social disharmony, 
and this sensitivity extends to crime prevention. At the same time, local accounts 
suggest two important facets of popular intolerance toward violence in the town. On 
the one hand there is a genuine fear of the FDLR returning from across the border. 
The genocide was especially violent in Gisenyi and survivors spoke passionately about 
preventing further civil conflict. On the other hand, government crack-downs on 
insurgent activities increase the incentive to participate in non-state security roles 
out of self-protection. 
 
The empirical findings in this chapter have been used to investigate how cross-border 
asymmetries between the paired border towns impact the policing system 
embedded in Rwandan communities. Contrary to what theoretical discussions of 
borderland regions might suggest, they indicate that proximity to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo may act as an additional driver of crime control in Gisenyi.  
 
Gisenyi appears to be a model case of effective state reach in an African border town. 
Local government administration operates consistently in accordance with national 
policies, and the town’s security is guaranteed by powerful state-led institutions. 
Owing to the political sensitivity of the borderland, there is a heightened security 
presence throughout Gisenyi’s surrounding district. Nevertheless, explanations that 
focus solely on the strength of the Rwandan security forces provide an insufficient 
explanation of how the border town is shielded from crime. Popular engagement 
remains critical to maintaining public order, and varies in both form and degree with 
its closer proximity to the DRC border. Crime prevention in the border town is tied to 
a language of national security in a manner that encourages local participation in 




Taking the various asymmetries that exist across the border as a starting point reveals 
less visible mechanisms that contribute to the relative safety of Gisenyi. Although 
security is not made at the border – the basic structures and actors are broadly the 
same as elsewhere in the country – I have argued that it is made differently there in 
terms of the day-to-day practices of policing and the priorities of the police. Counter-
intuitively, Gisenyi's proximity to a larger and more chaotic urban space in the DRC 
may promote logics of policing that facilitate, rather than compromise, a high degree 
of urban public order.  
 
A range of mechanisms in the organisation of small communities and the mindset of 
border town residents impact on how information passes into the state security 
hierarchy. In local accounts, one narrative stands out regarding the effect of the 
border on crime prevention. With access to a commercial zone in a nearby but 
separate jurisdiction, where governance is informal and often negotiable, Rwandans 
participate in policing and intra-communal surveillance in the knowledge that doing 
so will not conflict with any elements of their economic lives that they would prefer 
to keep hidden.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN – POLICING AND STATE REACH IN RWANDA 
 
7.1 Crime and Policing in Rwanda 
 
This thesis has addressed a number of central research questions: What makes urban 
neighbourhoods in Rwanda resistant to criminal activity? How can a landlocked, post-
genocide, rapidly urbanising country that borders areas of intractable insecurity be 
ranked the safest in Africa (Gallop, 2015)? How are its mechanisms of crime 
prevention affected by distance from the state capital (Kigali), and by proximity to 
the international border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)? Why does 
street crime remain confined to one side of a border that is crossed by more than 
twenty-two thousand people every day. And finally, why, despite its proximity to very 
high levels of micro-level violence, is the Rwandan town of Gisenyi not more crime-
ridden than other towns of similar size elsewhere in the country? 
 
In answering these questions, previous chapters have singled out various aspects of 
Rwandan policing and examined them in detail. What remains is to look at how this 
material fits with established academic theory and with previous studies conducted 
in Rwanda. Recent academic research has focused on the strength of the state under 
the RPF. Although some positive aspects of the current government have been 
highlighted, particularly its impressive capacity to implement developmental policies 
(Goodfellow, 2014; Chemouni, 2014), it has also been criticised for authoritarianism 
(Purdeková, 2011; 2016; Reyntjens, 2013; Ansoms, 2009). Under President Kagame, 
the RPF has been plagued by controversy over its uncompromising mode of 
governance. In recent years, Rwanda has been labelled a ‘police state’ by journalists, 
academics and dissident political figures in exile (Sundaram, 2016:7, Reyntjens, 
2009:28; Nyamwasa, 2010:1).  
 
Surprisingly, these critics seldom discuss the Rwanda National Police, nor do they give 
an account of the broader policing system that operates in the country (see Chapter 
Three). They tend to regard the Rwandan state as a unitary, centrally coordinated 
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apparatus that is reinforced in the popular imagination by the idea of the state as a 
powerful political monolith (Reyntjens, 2013; Thomson; 2011). This view of the state 
obscures the practices of individuals working in various branches of the its 
administration, especially in the security sector. 
 
In light of this imbalance, this thesis has provided an institutional outline of the RNP, 
something that is otherwise available only in documents promoting government 
policy (see RNP, 2008; 2013; 2014). Chapter Three investigated how policing 
arrangements in the country developed over the course of the twentieth century, 
highlighting the fact that the RNP is a new type of institution which has consolidated 
the Rwandan state’s policing apparatus under a single command structure. Beneath 
this new umbrella organisation, the responsibility for policing Rwandan communities 
remains divided between state and non-state partners in a manner that maintains a 
significant degree of historical continuity. 
 
Chapters Four and Five considered state strength in Rwanda from the perspective of 
individuals working to control violence at the local level. I have argued that the 
visibility of uniformed state officials at strategic sites obscures the fact that the bulk 
of crime prevention in Rwanda is achieved locally. Criminal investigations and other 
police interventions are secondary to the construction and maintenance of a general 
environment of public order, which is achieved by partitioning the country into small 
neighbourhood communities. Within these, policing is carried out by a network of 
individuals who operate in the margins of state authority: night patrolmen, 
umudugudu leaders, members of local CPCs, and members of civil society anti-crime 
clubs. 
 
Three principal drivers of crime prevention have been identified in the Rwandan 
towns where this research was sited: (1) the state security apparatus, (2) the 
organisation of small communities to limit anonymity and control public order, and 
(3) the incentives, both positive and coercive, for individuals to share information 
with government security. Having undertaken an extended period of qualitative 
research in small Rwandan communities, I argue that the avenues for information to 
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pass to government security are many, and that the circulation of security related 
information is guided in part by a widespread intolerance of social disharmony that 
results from the country’s violent history. 
 
Chapter Six examined the workings of crime prevention in what should be among the 
most difficult environments for Rwandan law enforcement: the country’s largest 
border town, Gisenyi. There is no doubt that the Rwandan police and military 
maintain a strong presence throughout the whole Rubavu borderland district, 
particularly when contrasted with Congolese police across the border, who are widely 
perceived as either ineffective, avaricious or altogether absent. This explanation risks 
oversimplifying self-policing in small communities in the border town, however. It 
also underplays Gisenyi’s dialectical relationship with Goma, which impacts both 
street crime and local surveillance. I argue that state-centric explanations offer only 
a partial account of why criminal activities do not leak into Rwanda from the 
Congolese side, and of why Gisenyi’s crime rates are consistent with those of other 
similarly sized towns closer to Kigali. 
 
The Rwandan case demonstrates notable inconsistencies with respect to each of the 
three bodies of literature outlined in Chapter One. (1) On state reach, the country 
shows a remarkable centralisation of political control despite its recent history of 
mass violence. The post-conflict state under the RPF has been able to effectively 
define its outer boundaries and control the legitimisation of violence at the local 
level. (2) Its police force remains the senior partner among a host of non-state 
policing actors below the cell level, who cooperate in the suppression of violence and 
disorder. The RNP has a reputation for efficiency and professionalism despite a tight 
budget and a staffing level that falls markedly short of the UN recommended ratio of 
officers to members of the population. (3) The authority of state institutions in Kigali 
extends remarkably evenly across the territory, and can be felt even in border 
districts far from the capital. Its reach is facilitated by a decentralised administration 
that is mirrored by a hierarchical security apparatus, in which security officers are 




The following sections revisit the main conclusions of previous chapters with respect 
to recent theories of policing, state reach and border town dynamics in Africa, then 
go on to reconsider methodological concerns and possible future developments.  
 
Policing and State Reach 
 
Rwanda’s policing arrangements do not find easy parallels beyond its borders. The 
system combines elements of zero-tolerance policing, community policing and 
intelligence-led policing. These call for policing responsibilities to be simultaneously 
consolidated and decentralised and have not always proved compatible with each 
other (Bullock, 2012; Brogden, 2004; Ruteere & Pommerolle, 2003).  
 
Although the RNP exercises dominant control over community policing forums at the 
cell level, state authorities in Rwanda are not, as Baker (2012:283) has observed 
elsewhere “dismissive of sub-state policing”. Instead, the police perceive it as one of 
the most essential tools at their disposal, and depend on the way local communities 
are organised to circulate information and restrict anonymity in residential 
neighbourhoods. The attitude of RNP officers to community policing in the country 
closely resembles the findings of Wilson and Kelling, who argue that:194 
 
The essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal 
control mechanisms of the community itself. The police cannot, without 
committing extraordinary resources, provide a substitute for that informal 
control. On the other hand, to reinforce those natural forces the police must 
accommodate them. And therein lies the problem. 
‘Broken Windows: The Police and Neighbourhood Safety’ (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) 
 
Rwandan police use the apparatus of community policing to inform an intelligence-
led, proactive approach to crime control. Whereas the majority of policing actors are 
                                                          
 
194 Interview, Senior RNP Officer, Directorate of Community Policing, Kigali, 16 February 2015. 
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not state officials, they nonetheless provide essential information to the government 
institutions that coordinate them. Non-state policing groups, particularly night 
patrols, CPC members, civil society anti-crime clubs, and umudugudu leaders, all act 
as antennae for the RNP and its patrols. They are monitored intensely by their peers, 
by other branches of the security network, and by the community at large. Non-state 
policing groups act consistently as the ‘junior partner’ in their relationship to state 
police, and conflict between the RNP and community policing actors is extremely 
rare. This sets the Rwandan case apart from situations common elsewhere in which 
non-state police act as vigilantes (cf. Abrahams 1998; Baker, 2012).  
 
The interaction between the visible police patrols that circle around residential 
sectors, and the non-state community police who work inside imidugudu, marks the 
dividing line between those who legitimise policing (the RNP) and those who provide 
it (CPC committee members and local patrolmen). Broadly speaking, the institutional 
interface of the Rwandan state is marked by the difference in the roles performed by 
these groups. Civil society organisations and work-based associations, patrols and 
private security guards, community leaders, and community policing committee 
members working below the cell level (often within an individual umudugudu) all 
operate in the state’s margins. 
 
The character of the state, as Lund (2006b:687) argues, is “intimately connected to 
the capacity to make distinctions”; a quality that, in his view, forms the “essence of 
public authority”. The state’s institutional boundaries are unusually well-defined in 
Rwanda (cf. Abrahams, 2000; Mitchell 1991). The government effectively 
distinguishes policing groups that act with its authority from those that act on its 
authority, extending its reach to the lowest level while compromising very little on its 
monopoly of legitimate force. It strictly controls the violence that local patrols can 
exercise in their line of work, and has dismantled Local Defence Units when they were 
seen to be undermining public order.  
 
In Rwanda there are a range of local actors performing functions traditionally 
associated with the state – particularly the control of violence managed by local night 
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patrols – who are not locally considered to be representatives of the state and are 
not treated as such. In short, the dividing line of who ‘represents the government’ in 
local politics is very clear in Rwanda, while the margins of state authority in terms of 
who performs state-like functions remains murky. 
 
Pockets of local agency do exist in the policing structure, particularly at the level of 
umudugudu leaders. In Chapter Five, I cited cases in which information was 
deliberately withheld from cell authorities and police posts, particularly information 
about family disputes the sharing of which would contravene cultural norms of 
privacy. Local leaders make use of their state authorisation to enforce a set of 
behaviours that do not necessarily align with the government’s definition of the 
critical minimum of public order. The cultural repudiation of kirazira (discouraged 
behaviours) extends well beyond what is enshrined in the Rwandan penal code and 
enforced by state agents.  
 
In general, however, the government security agenda is built around an aversion to 
social disharmony at the local level that is shared by the population at large that still 
bears the scars of mass violence in the 1990s. The intense intolerance that Rwandans 
expressed towards violence and social disorder was perhaps the most striking 
revelation of this research. This aversion can be attributed in part to conflict fatigue 
in the aftermath of the genocide. Rwandans live with uncertainty about who among 
them is so affected by the country’s violent history that they might report suspicious 
behaviour to the state. Nevertheless, in an atmosphere of post-genocidal paranoia, 
it is vital to subject speculative accounts of government monitoring to intense and 
unbiased scrutiny. One of the reasons informants are so hard to identify is precisely 
because they are for the most part not full-time, trained government spies (maneco) 
but are instead the traumatised survivors of brutality in the 1990s.  
 
Normative questions about the police are often set at the level of government 
legitimacy. These risk blinding observers to the more every-day realities of police 
practice – who is involved, how they work, and how the population reacts to them. 
Nevertheless, it would be naïve to conduct research into the policing of Rwanda 
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without addressing the question of policing ‘for whom’. It is necessary to ask whether 
the state’s infrastructure of information gathering is motivated by the public good of 
preventing crime, or by self-protection. Based on the materials presented here, it 
seems clear that the answer in this case is not one or the other, but both. Effective 
crime prevention in Rwanda is regime protection, in terms of the control of violence, 
the active demonstration of state security capacity, and in the popular legitimacy 
derived by ensuring security in every-day activities. 
Border and Borderland Dynamics 
 
The case of Gisenyi exposes Rwanda’s policing system to two separate but related 
political phenomena: (1) geographical distance from central state authorities, and (2) 
proximity to an international border that separates Rwanda from a radically different 
mode of governance in the DRC. Looking at the immediate effects of this border 
prompts a separation of ‘borderland’ and ‘border’ dynamics, and a reemphasis on 
the latter. 
 
The concept of the ‘borderland’ has its roots in a reconceptualization of state 
boundaries. This has involved moving away from the border’s role in international 
relations towards a more localised account of its functions, particularly in terms of 
how it affects social frameworks and informal economic systems (Coplan, 2012; 
Stoddart, 1989). This shift in focus has been accompanied by a reconsideration of 
international relations models that have traditionally taken for granted the definition 
of the state as a ‘bounded unit’ (Agnew, 1994). 
 
To a degree, the border per se has been a casualty of this shift in analysis from the 
international to the local. Strassaldo emphasises that “neighbouring relations 
between border communities are not international relations” (1996:393), while 
Coplan (2012:2) observes: “borderlands, as opposed to borders, are about border 
communities, not the management problems of nation states” (my emphasis). Baud 
and van Schendel (1997:220) are more direct: “borders are too easily reified … there 
has always been an enormous gap between the rhetoric of border maintenance and 
daily life in the borderlands”. As it zooms-in, this approach loses the international 
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boundary and brings into focus cross-border communities living in the state’s 
margins. The process has been driven in part by an ideological concern with giving 
voice to marginalised groups who grapple with the aggressive expansion of 
centralised state authorities (Fisher & Downey, 2006). 
 
While researchers have ‘zoomed in’, the borderland concept itself has spread out, 
moving from the field of political geography into areas where there is no national 
border, and where the language of boundaries is deployed only metaphorically 
(Newman & Paasi, 1998:188). Powerful anthropological explorations initially into the 
internal boundaries and the institutional margins of the state (see Das & Poole, 2004), 
have given way to the discussion of more abstracted boundaries between 
institutions, ideas and individuals, pursued through interdisciplinary approaches that 
share little in their methodologies and theoretical frameworks.  
 
Here the border is lost in two ways. First, because once so far abstracted, the idea of 
the border as a mental construct can be applied indiscriminately. We can conceive of 
borders anywhere, regardless of their significance in terms of entities that are 
distinguished on either side. Second, because it appears that what was most 
attractive about boundary metaphors as adapted from political geography was never 
really the border-line itself, but rather the idea of a space ‘in-between’. Borderlands 
as spatial representations of Victor Turner’s (1967) liminality have captured a great 
deal of imagination across different fields. 
 
The Goma-Gisenyi case emphasises that the border itself matters, especially when 
the focus zooms in to the local level. Cross-border asymmetries shape the work and 
interaction of residents in both towns. With frequent movement back and forth, the 
two sides have come to be associated with different modes of behaviour, of doing 
business, and of interacting with the state. There has been a tendency towards 
greater contrast rather than greater similarity over time. With respect to crime, 
police accounts suggest that the Congolese town has begun to act as a lightning rod 




Local government administration in Gisenyi operates in a manner that is largely 
uninterrupted by traditional borderland dynamics of contested governance. It 
provides a counter-example to the dozens of documented cases, both across the 
region and across the African continent as a whole, in which central authority is 
contested and economically subverted in border towns (Nugent, 2012; Dobler, 2008; 
Zeller, 2010). At the same time, the paired Congolese and Rwandan towns challenge 
the intuitive assumption that rising crime rates on one side of a border naturally spill 
over to the other. Goma is one of the most crime-prone cities in central Africa, while 
neighbouring Gisenyi has some of the lowest occurrences of micro-level violence of 
any urban district in Rwanda.  
 
The theoretical model in which violence develops around national borders and flows 
freely across them does not apply. As I have discussed in Chapter Six, this is partly 
because street-crime differs from other kinds of violence, and may be mitigated by 
what police practitioners call ‘target hardening’ in Gisenyi.195 The town’s location in 
a sensitive borderland region prompts both greater state attention and greater intra-
communal monitoring, both of which protect it against criminal activity.  
 
Extending theories that link physical environments to crime prevention into the 
international arena may help to account for the difference between the two towns 
(see Wilson & Kelling, 1982; Kelling & Coles, 1997; Sampson et al., 2004). It is widely 
accepted that aesthetic qualities such as damaged infrastructure and visible waste in 
the streets reinforce an impression of pervasive disorder. Goma’s reputation for 
being unsafe is owed in part to features of this sort. The result is low levels of 
community participation in the maintenance of public order, and combined with the 
absence of effective state-led law enforcement, this emboldens criminal behaviour. 
Conversely, on the Rwandan side of the border, a high degree of both government 
surveillance and intra-communal monitoring produce the perception that the town 
                                                          
 
195 Comparisons with other borderlands discussed in the literature risks conflating urban street crime 
with organised crime, with crime related to illegal cross-border smuggling networks, as well as with 
political, nationalist and ethnic violence. 
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is more secure. When, as in this case, one side of a border is popularly associated 
with high crime rates and the other with effective enforcement, their reputations 





7.2 Methodological Considerations and Avenues for Future Research 
 
Wherever possible, I have attempted to inform qualitative interview material with 
personal observations, and have triangulated accounts between regular citizens and 
government representatives. My efforts to do this are indicated throughout the text 
by the recurring preamble ‘according to both state and local accounts’, and by the 
use of thick description to illustrate criminal incidents and local reactions to them. 
This approach required a considerable amount of methodological flexibility with 
regard to field sites and subject matter as well as the choice of participants. 
 
As the result of research design or the limited access granted by government 
authorities, researchers in Rwanda have too often found themselves confined either 
to the state or the non-state sphere. Restricting research in this way can be 
misleading. My attempt to combine these perspectives at times exposed significant 
discrepancies between government and local accounts, particularly where state 
officials recited the authorised government position and non-state interviewees had 
personal prejudices against the RPF.196 Comparing the two viewpoints also 
highlighted consistencies in areas that I did not originally expect, particularly the 
aversion to social disharmony described in Chapter Five. 
 
Rwanda is a uniquely difficult place in which to conduct qualitative research. 
Rwandans customarily use language in ways that can reveal and conceal at the same 
time (Ingelaere, 2010b; see also Pottier, 2002). This way of speaking constitutes a 
barrier to access almost as significant as the increasingly tight government regulation 
of research. Even seemingly straightforward descriptions could at times be 
compromised by imprecise or idiomatic language use. The term inkeragutabara, for 
example, officially refers exclusively to members of the military reserve force.197 
                                                          
 
196 Other authors have highlighted these discrepancies to indicate widespread dissatisfaction with the 
Rwandan government, in particular its agricultural policy and its reconciliation agenda (Ansoms, 2009; 
Thomson, 2012). 
197 A standby division of the RDF under the command of the serving Brigadier General Eric Murokore. 
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Many inkeragutabara are still stationed on base and continue to wear military 
uniform, and despite their reservist status, they retain a formal role in the RDF 
command structure. Nevertheless, in common usage, inkeragutabara often refers to 
anyone who has past military service, and at times the term is extended to DASSO 
officers and abanyerondo patrolmen. To cite another example, ‘CPC’ has become a 
generic term used in many parts of Rwanda to describe any security position in the 
umudugudu, including abanyerondo patrolmen, patrol leaders and at times the head 
person of the neighbourhood. Similarly, ‘FDLR’ can be used to describe various 
enemies of the state, regardless of their affiliation with the rebel militia. In more 
mundane conversation, I found that dates and locations could be stated in ways that 
were deliberately non-specific, even when the events were innocuous and I was 
speaking to contacts known to me for months or years. Ethnographic material rarely 
fits neatly into theoretical moulds, and ought to reflect some of the messier realities 
of fieldwork. Most Rwandans have only incomplete information about how local 
security is provided, and their conflicting accounts provide an accurate reflection of 
the policing system described in these pages. Some of what I consider to be the most 
revealing material in this research came from the observation of events, behaviours 
and statements that were openly contradictory. Given the way rumour, 
misinformation and official narratives all circulate together, straightforward answers 
warrant a great deal of suspicion in Rwanda. 
 
This thesis is the product of what it was possible to do in the time available, with 
official limits on access and taking account of ethical challenges. To my knowledge it 
is also the first attempt to systematically research policing at the local level in modern 
Rwanda. It constitutes an initial foray into a complex but important subject. I can 
point to a great many details that warrant investigation in greater depth, over a 
longer period, or in different parts of the country. Most particularly, however, two 
subjects that captured my attention, had to remain on the periphery of this project. 
 
The first concerns the broader function of cross-border asymmetries between Goma 
and Gisenyi. These paired border towns are starkly asymmetrical in a great many 
respects: in the behaviour of their law enforcement agencies, in their penal codes, 
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informal border regulations, employment opportunities, external linkages (to 
international markets, state authorities and international organisations), 
infrastructure, demography, natural resources and physical geography, to name only 
a few. These differences prompt two questions that have received inadequate 
attention in the growing literature on border towns: (1) under what conditions do 
cross-border imbalances tend towards greater difference over time, or towards 
greater similarity? and (2) how do these imbalances relate to one another?  
 
The second subject is specific to Rwanda and concerns the North-Western Insurgency 
in 1997. The frequency with which the insurgency was cited in interviews with 
Rwandan police and military officials implied that it may be more significant in the 
historical development of the RPF than has been suggested to date. A few features 
stand out. First, it is an extremely rare example of the total and rapid defeat of a rebel 
insurgency. These have elsewhere proven intractable, especially in the Central 
African region (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Second, it appears to have produced strategies 
that have informed the policing models now in operation across the country, not least 
the widespread use of amarondo patrols, the ‘villagization’ of society and the manner 
in which information is gathered at the umudugudu level. 
 
Finally, the issue of gender dynamics in local modes of Rwandan policing warrants a 
significant degree more targeted analysis than was possible in this broader study of 
the male-dominated institutions of state security. As Rwanda’s security apparatus 
expands to include local anti-crime clubs built into civil society organisations, it is 
beginning to integrate a much larger number of women into surveillance roles. The 
effects of this trend at the interface between state-led and community-led policing 
actors in Rwanda would make for the subject of extremely fruitful further 
investigation.  Throughout this project I have been careful to ring-fence particular 
manifestations of street crime that were combatted by the arrangement of actors 
outlined in Chapter Four. Regrettably, this meant that crimes relating to gender-
based violence were not thoroughly investigated in the course of fieldwork. Through 
the Imbuntu foundation, the Rwandan government has been trial-running original 
modes of addressing both GBV itself, as well as local attitudes towards it. The country 
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provides an excellent laboratory for targeted research into these issues, and I 
sincerely hope that future researchers in the country take up the challenge. 
 
7.3 Transitional Security in Rwanda 
 
I have aimed to regard policing in Rwanda dispassionately, without my observations 
being tainted by preconceptions about the RPF. In reality, the subject is both political 
and deeply contentious. I am aware that there have been dire warnings about 
impending collapse in Rwanda from critical academic voices (Reyntjens, 2004:210; 
Thomson, 2011:456).  
 
I am not as convinced that Galtung’s (1969) work in ‘Violence, Peace and Peace 
Research’ is tailormade to the Rwandan case in the way that other authors have 
presented it. The confident prediction that structural violence in the country is 
tending towards a resurgence in actual violence undertheorises the former, just as it 
oversimplifies the mechanisms by which it can produce the latter. Much will depend, 
no doubt, on the politics of the executive branch. The office of the presidency retains 
enough centralised power to stabilise or destabilise in equal measure, and over time 
both elite and local grievances may well accumulate. Forecasting a return to mass 
violence or ‘even genocide’ (Thomson, 2011:456) based on current conditions, 
however, seems to me sensationalist.  
 
Nevertheless, the coming years will bring changing conditions that may threaten to 
heighten levels of crime and disorder in Rwandan cities. This is likely to prompt 
additional changes to the country’s policing system and to the operation of its state 
policing agencies. The most fundamental threat appears to be a demographic one, as 
is recognised in the government’s poverty reduction strategy papers and by the RNP 
itself (Republic of Rwanda, 2013; RNP, 2014). Rwanda’s cities are growing at an 
exceptionally fast rate, producing a crisis of housing and of land ownership (André & 
Platteau, 1998; Goodfellow, 2014). Currently over two-and-a-half million Rwandans, 
approximately twenty per cent of the population, live in urban areas. This marks an 
increase of over five hundred per cent since 1990 (Goodfellow, 2014:311). Across 
253 
 
Africa, as cities grow, second and third generation rural-urban migrants have begun 
to organise themselves and make demands of governments which often lack the 
political and social mechanisms to meet them (Hills 2009).  
 
Despite the sophistication of Rwandan crime control, there are already troubling 
signals in Kigali. The RNP is involved in a protracted conflict with informal street 
hawkers that shows little sign of abating. Many of those trading informally on the 
streets of the capital are second generation migrants born into the poorer townships 
on the outskirts of the city. This ‘assertive generation’, who are said to be 
‘increasingly aware of their rights’ (RNP, 2014), have no personal memory of the 1994 
Genocide. This may significantly lessen the aversion to social disharmony discussed 
here in Chapter Five, and may in turn come to reduce the level of volunteering into 
non-state policing roles. Relatedly, the RNP officers interviewed expressed concerns 
that the Rwandan cultural code has been undergoing change in the capital. The 
umuco nyarwanda, and notions of kirazira and indandadaciro, traditionally built into 
village life, are being adapted and increasingly side-lined in urban neighbourhoods, 
and officials I spoke with lamented a perceived erosion of social controls at the 
neighbourhood level.  
 
Future problems with street crime are unlikely to remain confined to the capital. As 
crime increases in capital cities, improved infrastructure tends to carry it back to rural 
areas, often where the police are not equipped to deal with it (see Potholm 
1969:149). This is currently one of the principle concerns of the RNP, and is listed as 
a major threat in its 2013-2018 Strategic Plan (RNP, 2013:88). In discussions relating 
to crime in Gisenyi, one senior police commander in Kigali said that if the rates were 
to rise it would most likely be the result of events in Kigali – either because more 
sophisticated crimes were leaking out of the capital, or because criminals were being 
pushed out by more effective enforcement.198 
 
                                                          
 
198 Interview, Senior RNP Officer, Kigali, 8 October 2014. 
254 
 
Changes in the nature and the degree of criminal activity are likely to be matched by 
further changes to the policing system. Unlike many police departments across the 
continent, the RNP has not been resistant to reform (cf. Francis, 2012). Government 
methods have proven controversial, particularly the forced resettlement of recent 
urban migrants back into rural areas (Sommers, 2012), and the use of transition and 
re-education camps, most notoriously the Gikondo Detention Centre (HRW, 2014b).  
 
Recent years have also seen frequent reforms of state police institutions in Rwanda, 
including the disbanding of Local Defence Units, the establishment of a new state 
enforcement arm in DASSO in 2014, and the thorough restructuring of RNP 
departments in 2013, in which the Department of Community Policing was expanded 
into a full directorate. Continuous professional development is a high priority of the 
RNP. The monthly work schedule of officers, often pasted to their office walls, are 
punctuated with regular workshops and training days. I was impressed by the 
professionalism and dedication of the RNP officers I met throughout the middle ranks 
of the organisation. These were educated, hardworking technocrats, performing 
difficult work. 
 
The major changes in Rwandan policing are taking place beneath the surface, 
however. To maintain an internal coherence throughout this thesis I have stuck to 
data from the period at which fieldwork was conducted (2014-2015). At the time of 
submission, in December 2016, there are currently over 170,000 registered members 
of CPCs in Rwanda (up from 82,000 in 2013), over 1,500 school anti-crime clubs (up 
from approximately 1,000) and roughly 100,000 Rwanda Youth Volunteers in 
Community Policing (again a significant rise, although numbers from 2014 were not 
available). Speaking of community modes of policing, Baker (2012:281) questions 
whether they will “survive the initial enthusiasm”, or whether, lacking an historical 
root in the culture of the police service they will “wither for lack of police support”. 
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Appendix 1. The Rwanda National Police – Organisation Details 
 
Organisational Details  
 
Table 10. RNP distribution across Rwanda, showing growth from 2009 - 2013. 
Indicator 2009 2013 
Population of Rwanda 10 124 927 10 537 222 
Police Officers 6 515 10 562 
Police/Population Ratio 1/1 600 1/1000 
Police Regions 5 5 
Police Districts 30 30 
Police Stations 69 75 
Police Posts 229 216 
 
Table 11. RNP organisational profile by rank. 
Rank Description 
2012/2013 
Male Female TOTAL 
Inspector General (IGP) 1 0 1 
Deputy Inspector General (DIGP) 2 0 2 
Commissioner 11 0 12 
Assistant Commissioner 21 0 20 
Chief Superintendent 61 0 60 
Senior Superintendent 77 5 77 
Superintendent 91 9 99 
Chief Inspector 179 10 189 
Inspector 168 37 204 
Assistant Inspector 1143 157 1300 
Chief Sergeant 106 0 106 
Senior Sergeant 470 9 479 
Sergeant 406 65 479 
Corporal 1308 306 1614 
Constable 4859 1061 5982 
TOTAL 8903 1659 10562 
% 84.3% 15.7% 100% 
Source: RNP (2013) 
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Police Responsibilities in Law 
Police powers in Rwanda are established under Law No.46/2010 of 14 December 
2010, the ‘Police Act’ (Republic of Rwanda, 2010). Article seven lists the following 
central responsibilities of the Police force: 
1. Ensuring compliance with the laws; 
2. Maintaining public order inside the country; 
3. Ensuring safety and security of people and property;  
4. Assisting any person in danger;  
5. Immediately intervening in case of calamities, disasters or accidents;  
6. Ensuring respect of laws relating to airspace, borders and waters;  
7. Combating terrorism;  
8. Participating in international peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance and 
training.  
 
Article Eight lists the following more practical functions of the police: 
1. Ensuring ground, lake, maritime and airspace safety;  
2. Preventing, detecting and investigating offences; 
3. Conducting general inspection of any premises it deems necessary;  
4. Implementing instructions relating to the maintenance of the security;  
5. Ensuring road safety;  
6. Ensuring security in courts;  
7. Cooperating with police of foreign countries in combating transnational offences; 
8. Ensuring security of national official dignitaries and visitors to Rwanda otherwise 
provided for by a specific law;  
9. Providing fire-fighting services;  
10. Coordinating humanitarian activities in case of calamities, disasters or accidents.  
 
The General Secretariat of the police force emphasises the following activities in 
addition to those laid out in the Police Act (RNP 2014:105). The Rwanda National 
Police will: 
1. Assume the responsibility of mobilising and sensitising the community on matters 
of security, law and order. 
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2. Discourage conduct seen as unbecoming in the community and prevent crime by 
sourcing first-hand information as intelligence gatherers from members of the 
community. 
3. Encourage local communities to conduct night patrols and report to the leadership 
instances of unusual behaviour or people who are unknown to the local community. 
 
Recruitment Requirements 
Section Two, Article Six of the Presidential Order on Specific Statue for Police 
Personnel (Presidential Order no.30/01 of 2012, see Republic of Rwanda, 2010) lists 
the following criteria for joining the RNP: 
To be of Rwandan nationality. 
To voluntarily apply. 
To be between 18 and 25 years of age unless specific skills can be demonstrated. 
To have good conduct and morals. 
To have no previous criminal conviction within six months of applying. 
To have a diploma or certificate of education at the requirement of the recruitment 
level (a university degree for officers and a senior six certificate for constables). 
To be healthy and strong enough to work in the national police, demonstrated in a 
letter from a state registered doctor. 
To have no previous job dismissals without consultation. 
To have passed the RNP tests. 
 
Institutional Structure 2013 
 
Although the RNP has since undergone some internal restructuring, at the time of 
field research in 2013 and 2014 it was organised into ten departments.199 These 
operate under a General Commissariat headquartered in Kigali and managed by the 
                                                          
 
199 The organisation has since been restructured in a general expansion intended to increase 
operations and accommodate an influx of new staff. Notably, the directorates of public relations and 
of community policing have been separated into two full departments, testament to the department’s 
increasing emphasis on community policing strategies.  
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Office of the Inspector General (IGP) and its current occupant Emmanuel Gasana, and 
two branches of the Kigali headquarters, each managed by a Deputy Inspector 
General of Police (DGIP). 
 
Figure 12. RNP departments and organisational structure, 2013 
 
Source: RNP, http://www.police.gov.rw/about-rnp/organisational-structure/, 
accessed 15 December 2015. 
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Officer Ranks by Insignia 
 
Figure 13. RNP Officer Ranks 
 










Approximate Security Sector Salaries 
 
Table 12. Salaries in State and Private Security, 2014/2015 
Position Approximate Salary (RWF/Month) 
RDF Special Forces (Entry Level) 200,000 
DASSO Supervisor 150,000 – 200,000 
INTERSEC Private Security 60,000 
AEGISPRO Private Security 55,000 
KK Security 50,000 
HighSec Security 50,000 
WideVision Security 50,000 
RGL Security 50,000 
Private Business Security (e.g. ULK 
University Security, Night Club Security) 
50,000 
DASSO Regular 40,000 – 60,000 as set by District 
RDF Patrol Soldier (Corporal) 40,000 + Insurance, a food ration, a 
transport allowance, a housing 
allowance, access to a subsidized 
Armed Forces Shop (AFOS) and credit 
through the military bank CSS Zigama. 
RNP Police (Constable) 40,000 + Insurance, a food ration, a 
transport allowance, a housing 
allowance, access to a subsidized 
Armed Forces Shop (AFOS) and credit 
through the military bank CSS Zigama. 
Private House Guard 20,000 – 60,000 
Abanyerondo Patrolman 15,000 - 20,000 
Head of Umudugudu Unsalaried + Insurance and certain ad 
hoc perks such as transport and 
telephone costs. 
CPC Member Unsalaried + Insurance 










Table 13. Monthly Gross Police Salaries by Rank, 2016 
Rank Monthly Gross, January to June 2016 
Inspector General 1,931,655 
Deputy Inspector General 1,665,089 
Commissioner General 1,408,619 
Deputy Commissioner General 1,129,102 
Commissioner 820,815 
Assistant Commissioner 686,278 
Chief Superintendent 554,004 
Senior Superintendent 527,784 
Superintendent 461,750 
Chief Inspector 315,029 
Inspector 262,192 
Assistant Inspector 201,808 
Officer Cadet 201,609 
Chief Sergeant 201,609 





Source: Rwanda Parliamentary Gazette (Republic of Rwanda, 2016).   
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Abanyerondo and CPC Personnel Identification Forms 
 












Selected Security Uniforms 
 
Figure 16. Selected Security Uniforms 
RNP Officer Uniform         DASSO Security Uniform 
 
Umunyerondo Uniform Intersec Security Uniform KK Security Uniform 
Aegispro Security Uniform ULK Security Uniform          Highsec Security Uniform 
 
